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Combining a rational-choice approach with ex­
tensive empirical testing, Wayne Francis exam­
ines the legislative committee "game" in the 
United States, arguing that within the constitu­
tional context rational behavior leads to decen­
tralized agenda setting. The committee system 
represents the linchpin in this decentralization, 
and Francis charts the flow of decision making 
from individuals in subcommittees to full com­
mittees to the entire legislature. He employs all 
fifty state legislatures as a principal data base 
for this study, including a sample survey of 
over two thousand state legislators, committee 
assignment information from all fifty states, 
and other special collections of official or 
semi-official data. This overall survey is com­
plemented by the literature on Congress and 
a more intensive study of two specific state 
legislatures. 
The leadership sets decentralizing events in 
motion at the beginning of each session by 
accommodating member requests for commit­
tee assignments and appointments as much as 
possible. Members sort themselves into com­
mittees and subcommittees that express their 
primary legislative interests and sponsor legis­
lation more likely to be assigned to their own 
committees, enhancing their chances of obtain­
ing committee approval. In addition, it is in 
the interest of any given committee to allow 
other committees to have their way if recipro­
cal treatment can be assured, as Professor 
Francis's evidence shows in a number of ways. 
Majority party legislators prefer committee de­
cisions over party caucus decisions because 
this decentralized decision making produces a 
higher bill passage rate, an important factor in 
assessing member satisfaction with outcomes. 
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Preface

A realization that gained strength as this project unfolded is the extent to 
which the United States legislative committee system is an important 
organizational phenomenon. It is a critical form, I think, in the under­
standing of all organizations that practice collective choice. The United 
States Congress is often noted for its unique qualities, but an examina­
tion of the fifty state legislatures and ninety-nine chambers has led me to 
feel that organizationally Congress is unique only in minor ways, and 
that there is an evolutionary process in which commonly felt needs 
bring about similar changes. It seems apparent that many of the interest­
ing theory-based propositions drawn from observations about Con­
gressional behavior are testable at the state level by methods acceptable 
to the scientific community. 
State legislative committee systems offer also an almost irresistible 
challenge to our understanding of how individuals behave rationally in a 
collective choice environment. They offer an opportunity to utilize theo­
retical elements of rational choice in conjunction with systematically 
collected evidence about ongoing organizational entities. The state leg­
islative bodies serve almost as a "natural experiment." Many structural 
components are identical from state to state, yet in other ways state or 
chamber attributes vary considerably. Within different structural con­
straints, legislators employ trial and error to achieve their goals. They 
do so in different size chambers, in different size committees, in varying 
numbers of committees, perhaps in party caucuses, and perhaps in sub­
committees. It would seem that discovering optimalities in the interplay 
of structure and behavior poses neither too great nor too small a chal­
lenge. In any case it is a challenge this book accepts. 
Students of comparative state politics (as distinguished from na­
tional politics) have for a long time experienced serious deficiencies in 
regularized data collection. There is no national program to record or 
even consolidate state level data through the use of modern technology. 
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As scholars, we have been fortunate to have the Council of State Gov­
ernment publications to inform us of many of the basics, but I have 
found in every case in my own research that I must initiate additional 
surveys, not only for opinions of participants, but for basic facts that 
should be collected on a more systematic basis. For help in this regard I 
am grateful to the National Science Foundation and to the Weldon 
Springs Foundation of the University of Missouri. Their financial sup­
port was crucial. 
While I am grateful for the financial support for this project, it 
should be stated that greater resources would have allowed more defini­
tive and expansive work. To some I suppose this effort may seem broad 
enough, but several self-limiting choices had to be made. In writing the 
chapters of this book I hope to stimulate some of the additional research 
that I could not undertake. My primary data sources are the responses of 
over two thousand legislators to a fifty-state questionnaire, official and 
semi-official information received from legislative service personnel in 
all fifty states, and more complete information from two "case-study" 
states, Indiana and Missouri. 
Many individuals were involved in this project, but I wish to thank 
most of all three co-authors, all of whom were funded at one time or 
another, and all of whom contributed greatly to the success of the 
project. James Riddlesperger worked with me at the inception of the 
study when it was funded by NSF. He successfully directed data collec­
tion operations for the main survey of state legislators while completing 
his graduate work. We co-authored "U.S. State Legislative Committees: 
Structure, Procedural Efficiency, and Party Control," Legislative Studies 
Quarterly 7 (1982): 453-71. Pieces of this article appear throughout 
the book. 
The second co-author was William Jacoby, who came into the 
project in the analysis stages while he was completing his dissertation 
at North Carolina. His computer and statistical expertise and advice 
were invaluable. We also co-authored the piece "Scaling Legislative 
Decision-Making: A Methodological Exercise," Political Behavior 1 
(1985): 285-303. The results of this article are employed in chapter five. 
The third co-author, John R. Baker, came to the project nearer to its 
completion. While doing his graduate work, he directed new data col­
lections to supplement the main legislator survey, including a special 
study of two states as well as additional fifty-state material. We co­
authored "Why Do U.S. State Legislators Vacate Their Seats?" Legis­
lative Studies Quarterly 11 (1986): 119-26. This article is incorpo­
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rated, with only a few additions, into chapter seven under the title of 
"Self-Interest and Legislative Turnover." 
The main legislator survey employed in this study was developed 
through two methods. First, I implemented a pilot survey prior to NSF 
funding. Second, NSF funding supported a panel of consultants for 
the final construction of the questionnaire. The survey and legislative 
specialist consultants were Ronald Hedlund, William Panning, Eric 
Uslaner, and Ronald Weber. Randall Calvert and Gary Miller were con­
sulted for their mathematical expertise and rational choice interests. 
While the final decisions were mine, their assistance was very beneficial 
and I am grateful for their help. I can recommend the procedure to other 
researchers. 
During the several years of this project's existence, sound advice 
and help have come from a variety of sources. In particular, I wish to 
thank John Freeman for his mathematical advice when the ideas for the 
work were germinating, Jim King for his help with the survey and dis­
cussions about the content, and several other colleagues who have 
offered helpful criticisms on parts of the project, including Keith Hamm 
and Malcolm Jewell. 
I am indebted also to Wendy Francis, a mathematics major at the 
University of Texas, who helped with the coding and was able to con­
struct a needed proof (where her father had failed). Others who worked 
diligently on the project were Barbara Cable, Rob Presley, and Deborah 
Basnett, all undergraduate students at the time. 

Introduction:

Definitions and Background

Committees and Committee Systems 
The foremost feature of the "legislative committee game" is that it is 
played within a committee system. Yet not very much can be said about 
a "committee system" without first discussing a single committee. A 
"committee" in popular usage may refer to a group of people selected 
by any means for any purpose to conduct business in any manner what­
soever. Committees are formed by election, appointment, or even self-
selection. Many committees are purely advisory in nature, providing in­
formation or acting as sounding boards. Many so-called committees are 
no more than collections of individuals who meet at the request of an 
executive. Committees often never vote or even provide evidence of col­
lective action. 
In his well-known work, The Theory of Committees and Elections, 
Duncan Black refers to a committee as a "group of people who arrive at 
a decision by means of voting" (Black, 1958, p. 1). His definition 
allows him to treat elections and electorates in the context of com­
mittees. The subject of this book is more focused; it concerns only/ace­
to-face groups of people who arrive at decisions through voting. An 
electorate may be seen as a committee, but a legislature or parliament is 
almost always a face-to-face committee, selected by an electorate. 
For convenience of expression, a legislature need not be called a 
committee except to make a point. Its principal units of organization are 
"committees," and committees have subcommittees. Furthermore, leg­
islatures have political party units, which are also committees, and 
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many legislatures have an assortment of other units that could qualify as 
committees. As long as they vote to make decisions, they are commit­
tees. But for most narrative purposes, it will be appropriate to employ 
distinctive labels such as caucus, standing committee, chamber, or 
legislature. 
A committee system is a set of committees whose decisions, at least 
in part, are interdependent. Among the more complex committee sys­
tems are those that govern nations or their subdivisions, namely, legis­
lative committee systems. Interdependence in legislative committee sys­
tems manifests itself in a number of ways: 
The parent committee, the legislature, dissolves into standing com­
mittees, which in turn may dissolve into subcommittees. 
Decisions of subcommittees are subject to review by the standing 
committees and their decisions in turn are subject to review by the 
entire chamber. 
Committees frequently have overlapping jurisdictions and mem­
berships, and members of different committees may find it necessary 
to trade or bargain both within and across committee jurisdictions. 
The party caucus intervenes before and/or after the decisions of 
standing committees in many legislatures, either setting the agenda 
for standing committees, or preparing positions and agenda for floor 
action. 
In many legislatures an executive committee (or policy commit­
tee) will attempt to set guidelines for other committee units. 
In essence and in most instances, a national or state legislature is a com­
mittee system. 
In many legislative committee systems, a rich if not overwhelming 
array of committees has been created. In addition to the normal duty of 
processing legislation, their tasks range from minor housekeeping func­
tions to such activities as raising campaign money, resolving chamber 
differences, and meeting with the chief executive. This book will focus 
upon those committees that actually process legislation: mainly the 
chambers, the standing committees and their subcommittees, and the 
party caucuses. 
The Central Role of Standing Committees in 
American Legislatures 
In American legislatures, the standing committees and their subcommit­
tees serve as the principal organizational units for processing legisla­
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tion. Nevertheless, until recently both systematic empirical investiga­
tion and the development of theory relating to standing committees have 
been rare (Uslaner and Weber, 1977, p. 433; Eulau and McCluggage, 
1984, p. 200). As Eulau and McCluggage have further noted, only two 
early works stand out: the insightful tirade of Woodrow Wilson against 
standing committees in the House of Representatives in his Con­
gressional Government (1885), and the lesser known but more system­
atic work of Lauros McConachie in Congressional Committees (1898). 
Studies of standing committees in American legislatures have flour­
ished since the 1950s, most notably in the study of Congress, beginning 
in 1954 with Ralph Huitt's "The Congressional Committee: A Case 
Study," referred to as "pathbreaking" by Eulau and McCluggage. The 
sheer complexity of Congress has no doubt stimulated many scholars to 
focus on a single committee. The better examples include analyses of 
the House Appropriations Committee (Fenno, 1962), the House Ways 
and Means Committee (Manley, 1965), and the House Public Works 
Committee (Murphy, 1974). A comparison of six committees (Appro­
priations, Ways and Means, Interior, Post Office, Education and Labor, 
and Foreign Affairs) was also completed by Fenno in 1973, and a multi-
committee treatment of public works issues was completed by Ferejohn 
in 1974. Among the benefits derived from these studies is the in-depth 
look at committees with subcommittees (except Ways and Means). 
While subcommittees in Congress appear to have arisen as a postbellum 
phenomenon in the expansion of Congressional duties (McConachie, 
pp. 135-137), it is only recently that they threaten preeminence in 
lawmaking. 
For state legislatures, studies of single standing committees do not 
have the luxury of prima facie importance in the scholarly community. 
No doubt many excellent studies are buried, perhaps never to be un­
earthed, in the dust of dissertation libraries. As a consequence, or per­
haps in any case, the historical record on the internal structure and 
operation of state standing committees is at best scattered. About the 
only early work of any breadth was completed by C. I. Winslow in 1931. 
Winslow's study provides overall statistical data for every state 
standing committee structure (number of committees, size of commit­
tees, number of committee assignments) and makes a special study of 
Pennsylvania and Maryland, where he found that standing committee 
action on bills was the final action in over 80 percent of the cases. Re­
peated surveys since 1963 (Francis, 1967; Uslaner and Weber, 1977; 
Francis and Riddlesperger, 1982) have made it clear that standing com­
mittees in state legislatures are very important centers of decision 
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making. In a related multistate work, Rosenthal (1974) gave principal 
weight to the attributes of standing committees in his assessment of leg­
islative performance in the states. 
Relatively little is known about "standing committees" in the legis­
latures of other nations. First, it is evident that where they exist they are 
not nearly as vital to their governments as those of Congress are to the 
U.S. government. Second, their lack of importance has no doubt re­
duced the quantity of scholarship on the subject. Third, given the late 
start of political science as a discipline, even allowing for its rapid 
growth in the United States, it is not surprising that we have only very 
recently learned very much of comparative value (See Mezey, 1979; 
Lees and Shaw, 1979; Olson, 1980). We might conjecture that "stand­
ing committees" in parliamentary bodies have been less attractive to 
their members for two reasons: (1) The ability of members to obtain 
cabinet posts, which dilutes their interest in forming strong committees, 
and (2) the fears of the leadership that strong committees would only 
further fragment what is already a multiparty system. 
Institutionalization 
A related perspective may be drawn from Nelson Polsby's examination 
of institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives (1968). To 
Polsby, an organization becomes institutionalized when it: (1) becomes 
differentiated from its environment by developing and channeling career 
opportunities; (2) develops a division of labor in which roles are speci­
fied; and (3) becomes universalistic rather than particularistic in its 
methods of conducting internal business (p. 145). The first two criteria 
are intimately tied to the standing committees and their subcommittees. 
Committee and subcommittee positions are made increasingly attractive 
to members as they acquire greater seniority. And the division of labor 
in Congress is mostly one of dividing up the work among the various 
standing committees and their subcommittees. 
The institutionalization of Congress may be seen as an evolutionary 
process. Within the U.S. Constitutional framework, where legislators 
aspire to committee headships rather than cabinet posts, organizational 
development and elaboration will occur in the standing committee and 
subcommittee structure. It would appear that Congress has been driven 
also by the need to adapt to increasing demands for action in an increas­
ingly complex and technical society. As society becomes more special­
ized, so must Congress, if it is to govern. 
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Specialization in society is reflected in the pressures brought to bear 
by organized interest groups and also by the growth and differentiation 
of the federal bureaucracy. Congress has responded to the increased de­
mands for action and the need to control first by allowing itself to dis­
solve into standing committees, and then by allowing those committees 
to unfold into subcommittees. In sum, careerism and the need to spe­
cialize have stimulated institutionalization along the lines suggested. 
There is debate, of course, over whether or not these developments are 
desirable (Lowi, 1964; Ripley and Franklin, 1984; Dodd and Oppen­
heimer, 1981). 
A cross national perspective might well lead to the conclusion that 
Congress is unique, but an examination of the fifty U.S. state legis­
latures would suggest just the opposite—not that Congress is indis­
tinguishable, for it certainly does possess features unmatched in the 
states. Nevertheless, in almost every important way relating to structure 
and development, most of the states' legislatures are similar to Congress. 
To locate these similarities, it is important to examine the structure of 
the committee system which includes both chambers and the party cau­
cuses, as well as the standing committees and their subcommittees. 
In the twentieth century, the state legislatures have been slower to 
institutionalize. It is only in recent years that most state legislatures have 
met annually rather than once every two years. With annual sessions 
have come longer sessions as well. Many states have witnessed an evo­
lution from part-time to full-time duty and, with it, increased "ca­
reerism"—legislators who list their occupation as "legislator" rather 
than salesman, realtor, teacher or retailer. On the surface it does appear 
that the state legislatures are following a path of development similar to 
that of Congress. This possibility has been noted, with some reserva­
tions, by Chaffey (1970) in his comparison of the Montana and Wiscon­
sin legislatures. 
Although it is difficult to show empirically, most observers of state 
legislative politics would probably agree that subcommittee use has be­
come much more common since 1960. Not a single remark about sub­
committees has been found in the literature of state politics dating to 
1970, although by this time the "bill explosion" (Rosenthal and Forth, 
1978) no doubt had spawned the use of subcommittees in the busier 
standing committees; and there is no question that a thorough search 
would turn up earlier evidence of subcommittee use also. In a 1981 sur­
vey, however, respondents from approximately two-thirds of the cham­
bers indicated frequent subcommittee use (Francis and Riddlesperger, 
1982). It is doubtful that they were ever so common before. In sum, the 
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state legislatures appear to be developing and institutionalizing along 
Congressional lines, a process that includes further differentiation of the 
committee system. 
Individuals in Committees 
A social science theory of a committee system cannot progress very far 
without making inferences about individual preferences. Of course 
there are different methods for making inferences. A favorite tool of the 
theoretician is to make an assumption about human preference. The as­
sumption is based normally upon introspection or observation and may 
or may not be directly verifiable. For example, it is often assumed that 
members of Congress seek reelection. We know that not all prefer re­
election (Cooper and West, 1981), but assuming that most do helps ex­
plain many other activities in Congress (Mayhew, 1974; Fenno, 1973; 
Kingdon, 1977; Fiorina, 1977). 
Inferences about human preferences can be derived from a number 
of empirical methods as well. Experimental research can be helpful 
(e.g., Fiorina and Plott, 1978), but since committee behavior is 
uniquely human—one never encounters a committee of mammals— 
very few legislative scholars apparently have found such work cost-
efficient. Most of the empirical research on legislatures has been nonex­
perimental, derived from direct observation, interviews, questionnaires, 
and official documents. Many legislators have been asked about their 
preferences through interviews and questionnaires. Included are state 
comparative studies of role orientations (Wahlke, etal., 1962), policy 
preferences (Uslaner and Weber, 1977), and committee organizational 
preferences (Francis and Riddlesperger, 1982; Francis, 1985a). In­
cluded also are many studies of Congress. Especially pertinent to com­
mittees is Shepsle's study of "revealed preferences"—actual freshman 
requests for committee assignments in the House of Representatives for 
the Eighty-sixth through the Ninety-third Congresses (1978). 
In political situations there are several ways individuals attempt to 
satisfy their preferences—through the use or threat of force, through 
delegating, through trading or bargaining, through voting, or through 
the use of information. Since committee systems in this book are demo­
cratic institutions, only the latter four will be of concern. Legislators 
delegate responsibilities, trade and bargain over legislation, vote on pro­
posals, and seek or use information to accomplish their goals in a vari­
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ety of ways. A principal goal of a legislator is to get his or her way on 
legislation, and it is in this game of legislating that these instruments of 
decision making come into sharp focus. 
From an organizational perspective, the act of delegating is the 
most critical instrument of decision making. Delegating is an act that 
transfers decision-making authority or responsibility from one set of in­
dividuals to a differently composed set. Through delegating, members 
can determine in part how trading and bargaining will occur, who will 
vote and on what issues, and the nature of information that will be avail­
able. Delegating involves moving people around, which in turn affects 
how individuals will apply the other instruments of decision making. 
Most delegations of authority in legislatures involve contingencies. 
For example, the scope of responsibilities of the group to whom they are 
delegated may be limited. Also certain internal decision-making rules, 
such as majority rule, may be imposed. In addition, policy controls over 
the decisions of the group may be retained (as when the entire chamber 
must approve a bill reported out of a standing committee). In practice, a 
number of puzzling questions arise in this process. How should the re­
sponsibilities be divided? How much autonomy should be given to the 
delegated groups? What standards of conduct should be enforced? It is 
necessary also to determine who shall serve in such groups or commit­
tees. The committee assignment process in Congress, for example, has 
become a major topic of research (for review, see Eulau, 1984). 
In face-to-face committees, where voting is required to arrive at de­
cisions, trading or bargaining seems inevitable. Winning majority sup­
port requires members to be flexible in their recommendations. A legis­
lative proposal has its supporters and opponents, but in the middle are 
those members who are opposed unless certain amendments are ac­
cepted. Members may bargain also by trading support over two separate 
proposals. In either situation, it can be shown that members of commit­
tees, for strategic reasons, often find it rational to not vote their true 
preferences (Farquarson, 1969; Brams, 1975, chap. 2, 4). 
The use of information is a crucial factor in understanding the be­
havior of members in committees. Members seek to consume informa­
tion for personal advantage or benefit in a variety of ways. They want to 
know about the content of proposals and their implications. They want 
to know about the preferences of other members. And they want to 
know about the preferences of people outside the committee. Informa­
tion search and consumption are important for individual decision 
making. Also important is the communication of information. One way 
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that individuals can change the behavior of others is to provide them 
with new information. In this sense, specialization and expertise carry 
influence. The expert or specialist in an area is in a better position to 
contribute to the information pool. 
Information costs are substantial in legislative committee systems. 
Legislators have many decisions to make, and they are inundated with 
information regarding those decisions. Reports from bureaucrats, lob­
byists, media outlets, and legislative staff are plentiful in most legis­
latures. It is usually the quality not the quantity of information that is 
lacking. As Anthony Downs has made clear, the search for and con­
sumption of information is a costly enterprise and the rational actor 
must feel that the benefits will outweigh the costs (1957, pp. 207-276). 
The legislator is a "best case" example of Herbert A. Simon's principle 
of "bounded rationality," expressed in the assertion that 
The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex 
problems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose 
solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real 
world—or even for a reasonable approximation to such objective ra­
tionality. (1957, p. 198) 
As Simon would have it, legislators can be expected to engage in satis­
ficing rather than maximizing behavior in the pursuit of information. 
Individual Behavior and Committee Structure 
A long-standing assumption in human affairs is that organizational 
structure affects individual behavior. From an international perspective 
U.S. legislatures may seem organizationally similar, but the members 
do work under a variety of structural conditions (Hedland, 1984). Per­
haps most distinct are the great differences in obligation, from full-time 
service in Congress and such states as California, to minimal part-time 
service in the least populated states. The committee systems vary sub­
stantially also, with great differences in the number of standing commit­
tees, the size of standing committees, the use of subcommittees, the im­
portance of the party caucus, the number of bills the committees 
process, and so forth. The extent to which such differences affect indi­
vidual behavior can serve as a basis for theory development in legis­
lative organization. 
The legislative environment may be seen as a continuous interplay 
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between institutional structure or procedure and individual adjustment 
and adaptation. The most important stress between structure and behav­
ior in American legislatures appears to be the great demand for legis­
lative action. The volume of demand for action exceeds the ability of 
most legislatures to supply the time and energy to respond. Normal pro­
cesses of representation (e.g., full deliberation, amending, voting) are 
often incompatible with swiftness of action. The fifty state legislatures 
offer an excellent opportunity to better understand the tensions that arise 
when legislators intend not to ratify, but to legislate. 
Organization of Chapters 
The next five chapters of this book are devoted to developing an under­
standing of rational decision making in U.S. legislative committee sys­
tems, beginning with the logic of individual behavior in a single 
committee, and ending with general questions of payoff and reward. 
Chapter one contains an introduction to the formal language and nota­
tion employed in more complex ways later in the book. Such material is 
presented within the context of a single committee, and it needs to be 
mastered before encountering a number of sections in other chapters. It 
is important to have a formal way of representing human preferences; 
otherwise, it becomes difficult if not impossible to assess the impact of 
institutional rules and structure upon human preferences, and to know 
how preferences relate to voting and agenda setting. 
In chapter two, the first chapter in which data are analyzed, a num­
ber of arguments are put forth relating to the distribution of agenda set­
ting, committee assignment accommodation, and sponsorship success. 
An empirical basis is established to illustrate the relationship of individ­
ual choice to legislative procedure and the existence of decentralized 
agenda setting. It is this relationship that serves as a central theme of the 
book. Chapter three balances the notion of decentralized commit­
tee/subcommittee decision making with party leadership and party cau­
cus decision making. Do legislators prefer standing committee decision 
outcomes to caucus outcomes? Chapter four raises the natural follow-up 
question of whether decentralized agenda setting pays dividends in the 
passage of legislation. A series of regression experiments are performed 
to answer this question. 
Chapters five and six are devoted to broader concerns relating to the 
influence of legislative lifestyle and career patterns. Chapter five ex­
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plores the extent to which the passage of legislation (or the passage rate) 
and the number of legislative workdays in the state capitol lead to over­
all legislator satisfaction with outcomes. To what extent do opportunity 
costs in the private sector offset benefits obtained in the public perfor­
mance of duties? In the final chapter of part two (chapter six), a review 
of the legislative turnover literature is provided together with a recent 
evaluation of legislative retirements in two states. Career patterns are 
changing in the state legislatures, and these changes may have an impact 
on legislator incentives for internal reorganization and efficiency. 
One of the more important conclusions resulting from the analysis 
provided in parts one and two of this book is that procedural efficiency 
is probably highly valued by most legislators. This may seem odd to 
many consumers of media commentary and coverage. Legislative ineffi­
ciency is a frequent accusation of frustrated chief executives and others 
who want particular results. Part three of this book is designed to ex­
plore methods of increasing procedural efficiency within legislative 
organizations. 
In chapter seven a number of conceptual distinctions are intro­
duced. Legislators are motivated, it is assumed, to reduce risks and to 
reduce decision costs. But these are not necessarily compatible goals. 
Are there optimal ways of organizing to minimize risks and costs? In 
chapter eight the notion of an "optimal committee system" is devel­
oped. Legislator survey results on committee structure are assessed in 
relationship to subcommittee use and chamber size. To what extent are 
legislators able to adapt to structural inefficiencies? 
A major source of risky and costly decision making may be found 
in the "complexity of decision making." How do legislators cope with 
complexity? Chapter nine assumes that legislators cope with complexity 
by finding ways of reducing it. Complexity is created in part by the 
sheer volume of legislation, and in part by the interpersonal nature of 
collective choice decision making. Legislators can reduce complexity 
by making appropriate committee organizational decisions. This chap­
ter links the structure of preferences to committee organization in order 
to better understand efficiency requirements. 
The final chapter describes a "scenario" for sponsorship success. 
There is also a counter scenario for sponsorship success. These two sce­
narios correspond to "efficient" and "inefficient" procedure in the pro­
cessing of legislation. They are keys to understanding the way in which 
the legislative committee game is played. 
Part One 
Rational Decision Making in

U.S. Legislative Committee 
Systems 

1 
Understanding Individual 
Preferences 
in a Committee 
The preferences of members of a single committee might seem fairly 
easy to comprehend. There is a literature, however, that attests to the 
superficiality of this view. The theoretical intricacies of game theory 
and social choice theory, the implications of the need for multidimen­
sional scaling of attitudes, and the inability to account for a high level of 
variance in most statistical models of human choice, all serve to point 
out complexity of human preference rather than simplicity. Neverthe­
less, the purpose of this chapter is to offer a way of comprehending indi­
vidual behavior in the legislative context of a single committee in order 
to better understand behavior in the context of a committee "system." 
To do so, we can first take up those restrictions or constraints most com­
mon to legislative committees and then we can explore the flexibilities 
within those constraints. 
Jurisdictional and Time Constraints 
Entire legislatures can have broad jurisdictions, but they are still limited 
by national boundaries, higher levels of government, or constitutional 
sanctions. The standing committees and subcommittees of legislatures, 
of course, have more limited jurisdictions. For each standing commit­
tee, only certain kinds of issues are eligible for action, and these issues 
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appear in the form of proposals, mainly bills or amendments to bills. 
For most legislative committees, the input of issues either in the form of 
bills or amendments to bills is open rather than fixed, subject mainly to 
the time available to consider them. Jurisdictional limits and available 
time act as two major constraints upon the introduction of issues and 
their consideration. 
Voting Procedures 
For the study of legislatures, a number of procedural assumptions are 
appropriate to most if not all situations. Among the most common rules 
of procedure are majority rule and binary voting. In tallying the vote, 
stated preferences of members are counted equally within the commit­
tee, and the alternative receiving the highest count is declared the win­
ning alternative. The preferences are almost always registered in the 
form of "preference to pass" some measure or "preference to defeat" 
it. Those whose preferences are counted consist of all members of the 
committee, or of all of those actually present to be counted. 
Within the above framework, there are two distinct voting proce­
dures, the amendment procedure, and the successive voting procedure 
(as made explicit in Farquharson, 1969; Brams, 1975). In the amend­
ment procedure, the practice is to put forward a primary proposal that 
will be voted on after one or more possible modifications through 
amendment. In the successive voting procedure, proposals are intro­
duced independently and disposed of one at a time. In most legislative 
situations, however, more than one proposal will be in the hopper at any 
given time, and members will have knowledge of what proposals are 
ready for consideration. In many cases amendments also are filed in ad­
vance of meetings, a tendency that increases perhaps with institutional­
ization and formality. 
Saliency, Separability, and Preference Maps 
To each member of a committee, the issues that come before it will have 
varying degrees of saliency. In other words, the member will want to 
win on some issues more than on others. For example, suppose that two 
bills were up for consideration, bills 35 and 36. A legislator may prefer 
to win on bill 35 more than on 36, in which case we can state: 
W(35) > W(36) 
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where " >  " substitutes for the phrase "is preferred to." To the legislator 
in question, bill 35 is more salient than bill 36. 
Since legislative committees utilize binary voting, in the sense that 
all members vote for pass or fail, our representation of member prefer­
ences need not be any more complex. Thus, if a member prefers that a 
bill pass rather than be defeated, we can state his preference: 
P > D 
If the member prefers that both bills 35 and 36 pass, his preferences 
may be represented as follows: 
W(35) > W(36) 
P P 
where P > D is implied in each case. 
Still we have an incomplete map of the individual's preferences. 
Further elaboration requires that we ask which of the remaining possible 
outcomes (PD, DP, DD) the member prefers and in what order. A full 
display of possible outcomes might produce: 
W(35) > W(36) 
P P Most preferred outcome 
P D Second preferred outcome 
D P Third preferred outcome 
D D Least preferred outcome 
In this example, the member prefers both bills to pass, but short of that 
he would prefer that bill 35 pass. If bill 35 does not pass he would still 
prefer that bill 36 pass. The least desirable outcome occurs when both 
bills are defeated. 
The example as it is constructed above represents preferences on 
two issues for a single individual. In this instance, the preferences on 
the two issues are separable; that is, preferences on one issue are not 
contingent upon the fate of the second issue. In contrast, the preferences 
in the following example are inseparable: 
W(35) > W(36) 
P P Most Preferred Outcome 
D D Second Preferred Outcome 
P D Third Preferred Outcome 
D P Least Preferred Outcome 
If bill 35 promotes banks and bill 36 promotes savings and loans firms, 
the above preferences suggest that the member most prefers to aid both 
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types of financial institutions (PP). However, if either bill does not pass, 
he would prefer the other not to pass also (DD) in order to preserve fair 
competition between banks and their savings and loans rivals. If neither 
of these outcomes is possible (both pass or both are defeated), he would 
still favor banks (PD) over savings and loans (DP). 
Situations that illustrate separable and inseparable preferences are 
common in legislatures. Unrelated bills normally will yield separable 
preferences unless such preferences become inseparable because of log­
rolling or bargaining. Inseparable preferences are expressed often in re­
lation to appropriations and pork barrel legislation. At the state level, 
for example, it is common for a legislator to oppose an increase in fund­
ing for the state university system unless the state four-year college sys­
tem is given a similar increase. In Congress, the omnibus bill is a classic 
example of inseparable preferences run amuck (Ferejohn, 1974). 
The preference maps illustrated in the above examples cover posi­
tions on two issues only. Such maps may be extended to any number of 
issues or proposals, with the number of possible outcomes increasing 
exponentially, or 2M where M is the number of proposals. Thus three 
proposals yield eight possible outcomes, and four proposals offer six­
teen possibilities. The preference maps become very complex very 
quickly as new proposals are added to the matrix. For three proposals 
only, a legislator might rank the outcomes in order of preference as 
follows: 
PPD Most Preferred Outcome 
PPP 
PDD 
PDP 
DPD 
DPP 
DDD 
DDP Least Preferred Outcome 
This is only one of 8! (the factorial) different rankings of these eight 
preference alternatives. 
Changing Preferences and Votes 
Legislators do change their preferences and votes. A most common 
cause is the introduction of new information. Legislators are exposed to 
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a great deal of information about the content and consequences of spe­
cific proposals, and they also learn about who does and does not support 
each proposal. Such information frequently will change the preferences 
of members, and often their votes as well. It is estimated, for example, 
that state legislators spend an average of two hours a day obtaining 
information about proposals in their committees and another hour 
finding out how other members feel about the issues (Francis and 
Riddlesperger, 1982). 
Members may change their votes without changing their prefer­
ences. Events of this kind occur when legislators become involved in 
vote trading. A member votes for a colleague's proposal only because a 
reciprocal vote-favor is expected on another measure. Votes are at best 
"revealed" preferences, which may or may not correspond to "true" 
preferences. Along these lines it is customary to distinguish between 
"sincere" voting and "sophisticated" voting, where it is implied that 
sincere voting expresses true preferences in disregard of strategic con­
siderations. Sophisticated voting, in contrast, represents the calculation 
of a winning vote strategy in relation to some larger goal (Farquharson, 
1969; Riker & Ordeshook, 1973). 
Sophisticated voting occurs when members estimate that prefer­
ences of others on the issues are inseparable. For example, if an at­
tempt is made to include funding for a new optometry school in the 
higher education bill, the sponsor of the higher education bill might vote 
against his own wishes in support of optometry funding in order to pre­
serve majority support for the remainder of the general bill. If he 
thought that other members would vote their original intentions, unin­
fluenced by the optometry amendment, then there would be no need to 
cast a sophisticated vote. It might be noted that the sophisticated vote is 
very much like a vote-trade, except that there is no concrete transaction. 
Setting the Agenda 
There are two major reasons why setting the agenda is so important in 
legislative committees. First, the order in which issues are taken up 
makes a difference in the way members vote. Second, due to the 
crowded agenda, many issues at the tail end will never be considered. 
While these observations may seem obvious, it will be helpful here to 
clarify their theoretical and practical underpinnings. 
When we examine the true preferences of individuals with respect 
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to a set of proposals, it will be found that //"the preferences are sepa­
rable, the individuals will choose to vote the same way on each proposal 
regardless of the order in which the proposals are decided. As each new 
issue comes up, the members need not regret their previous votes. The 
issues can be separable in both the amendment procedure and the suc­
cessive voting procedure. A member who offers a bill enforcing the use 
of automobile seatbelts, for example, may prefer that it pass with or 
without proposed amendments that would alter the severity of the pen­
alty. The outcome of that entire issue may have no effect upon the mem­
ber's position on a toxic waste law. 
The neatness of separable preferences can be thwarted, however, by 
members who logroll or vote trade on the issues. Opponents of the seat-
belt law might change their vote to support it in exchange for other 
members' support on the toxic waste bill. In such a case, the opponents 
might decide to vote for the toxic waste bill if and only if the seatbelt bill 
is passed. In the same manner, the amendment process can be altered by 
trades in which, for example, a member agrees to support the amend­
ment of a colleague in exchange for support of his own amendment. It is 
evident that such trades require an element of "trust," and that the order 
of the agenda is relevant to the interested parties. A member would pre­
fer to have the bill most salient to him appear first. 
Vote trading can have the affect of making separable preferences 
inseparable, but it is very likely that many of the preferences over pro­
posed legislation are inseparable in the first place. The most preferred 
outcome on one issue will depend on the fate of another issue. When 
preferences are inseparable, the order of the agenda is a crucial matter. 
The beauty of the amendment process is that members are able to insert 
their most preferred alternative (the bill with an amendment) at the top 
of the agenda prior to voting on a much less preferred alternative (the 
bill without the amendment). As one would expect, legislators fre­
quently are opposed to legislation unless their own amendments are ac­
cepted. Such amendments at the same time may turn others against the 
legislation. 
The ramifications of agenda setting in this context can be seen viv­
idly in Congress. Ferejohn's 1974 evaluation of public works projects in 
the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Bill of 1968 paints 
a convincing picture of how bills win acceptance in standing commit­
tees—by allocating projects to the states of committee members. Al­
though the projects are not necessarily inserted by formal amendment, it 
is in fact the formal power of amendment and vote that encourages a 
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distribution of benefits among committee or subcommittee members. In 
contrast, we might note how the Committee of the Whole conducts its 
business on the floor of the House. Normally, the leadership adopts a 
highly restrictive amendment policy because it thinks that majority sup­
port has been achieved. Further amendment might well destabilize the 
coalition. As Riker and Ordeshook (1973; p. 100) have pointed out, the 
amendment process does allow manipulation through the introduction 
of paradoxes (i.e., cyclical majorities). 
The order in which legislation is considered is important not only in 
the amendment process but also in the processing of separate bills. The 
vote of a legislator on one bill may depend upon the outcome of another 
bill. A state legislator may feel the need to increase state revenue, and if 
that feeling is broadly shared, there will probably be several bills 
proposing tax increases. The legislator may prefer most an increase in 
the sales tax only but, failing that, he or she may prefer an increase sup­
ported by one of the other measures. For strategic reasons, the legislator 
may prefer to vote on the sales tax increase first, calculating that if it 
passes, the other measures will not be successful. 
In sum, it can be seen from the above that preferences may be in­
separable either because of vote trading or the actual nature of original 
preferences, and that such conditions may exist in both the amendment 
process and the successive voting procedure. Whenever preferences are 
inseparable, the order of the agenda is important. It is difficult to know 
just how often inseparable preferences characterize members' positions, 
but it seems clear that the phenomenon is common if not dominant. 
Finally, it is apparent that under the busy conditions of many legis­
latures, much legislation is never given serious consideration. Moving 
legislation to a formal hearing may be more difficult for a legislator than 
getting it approved once a hearing is granted. In this context, the formal 
organization of the legislature becomes very important. The efficiency 
with which legislative proposals are processed will have a bearing on 
the extent to which rank-and-file members are able to act effectively in 
the pursuit of their own favored legislation. In practical terms, in most 
American legislatures, this type of efficiency is affected by the standing 
committee and subcommittee structure and associated chamber rules. 
The Internal Forces for 
Decentralized Agenda Setting 
in American Legislative 
Committee Systems 
The argument can be made that standing committees in American legis­
latures are created to serve the goals of majority party leaders (Liebo­
witz and Tollison, 1980). The argument assumes that majority party 
leaders have an agenda and that they seek to maximize the number of 
agenda items that receive favorable action. Since the available hearing 
time for agenda items is usually insufficient to consider every leadership 
agenda item in full forum, the leaders will prefer to create committees to 
expedite the processing of legislation. The committees can handle legis­
lation simultaneously, and floor action can be limited to little more than 
a simple ratification of committee decisions. In this sense leaders may 
find it rational to "manage by committee." 
An alternative argument is that standing committees are created in­
stead to satisfy the demands of rank-and-file legislators. Each member 
of the legislature has an agenda (changing and overlapping), and each 
member seeks to maximize the success of his or her agenda. When it is 
evident that a full forum of the legislature can consider only a small 
fraction of the total number of items on the agenda of N members, most 
of the members will favor the creation of standing committees. Those 
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least likely to favor the committees will be those with the greatest ability 
to get their issues on the front end of the agenda. By this reasoning 
the majority party leaders would be the most resistant to standing 
committees. 
While the second argument appears to run contrary to the Liebo­
witz-Tollison thesis, the contradiction can be resolved by assuming, as 
most observers would, that the legislative "game" is not in any strict 
sense a "zero-sum" game. There are benefits in excess of costs to be 
had by all, or at least by a majority. The party leaders need the commit­
tee system to process their agenda, and perhaps the rank-and-file mem­
bers need it even more. When legislatures do form committees, it is an 
open question whether they are formed as concessions to rank-and-file 
members or as masterpieces of leadership strategy. 
Two Leadership Approaches 
The first type of leadership management, put forth in a thesis by 
Liebowitz and Tollison, implies that the majority leaders have more 
than a limited interest in efficiently expediting legislation and that they 
would prefer a system just efficient enough to secure passage of their 
own agendas. To do this they need to form coalitions with the appropri­
ate committee chairs and to have supporters on key standing commit­
tees. Beyond that, it could be in the interest of the leaders to tolerate a 
highly cumbersome structure through which will filter only those items 
that are placed at the front end of the agenda. A congested schedule and 
a chair-dominated committee agenda would seem to advance leadership 
interests. 
In a second type of management, the leaders build coalitions by 
honoring as many members' requests for chair appointments and com­
mittee assignments as possible—without any intent by leadership to 
block the proposals of colleagues. In fact, the intent is much in the spirit 
of "universalism" and "reciprocity" (Weingast, 1979; Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1981). The omnibus bill may have a piece for everyone, and 
what the committee produces the committee gets. In Lowi's sense of the 
term, the committees or subcommittees make the "distributive" deci­
sions. In return, the party leaders may get their way on major re­
distributive and regulatory issues. As Weingast has shown under 
reasonable assumptions, winning coalitions are not stable and the un­
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certainties of pure majority rule politics may lead members to prefer a 
system with greater stability. Such a system is one where the norm of 
reciprocity prevails.1 
In spite of the likelihood that both leaders and followers will prefer 
that standing committees process legislation, there is a natural tension 
that arises because of widespread membership demands to influence the 
agenda. The remainder of this analysis explores both the logic of indi­
vidual choice and the weight of empirical evidence leading to or sug­
gesting decentralized agenda setting. While much of the earlier work in 
this area has focused on Congress, data in this analysis are drawn pri­
marily from state legislative sources. 
The Rank-and-File Perspective 
Liebowitz and Tollison suggested that an appropriate goal of a party 
leader is to maximize the passage rate of proposals on his or her 
agenda, where say, P = w/m, the number of wins divided by the num­
ber of personal agenda items. It is evident, however, that the number of 
wins is not as important as the value of the wins, or U(w), and that in 
fact a legislator would attempt to maximize U(w) rather than w/m. The 
question then becomes one of determining how a legislator goes about 
maximizing U(w). One way to do it is first to guarantee that all personal 
agenda items will at least be considered. Liebowitz and Tollison cor­
rectly suggest that the leaders need a committee system to guarantee 
consideration. 
The same reasoning applies to rank-and-file members. They want 
to maximize the number of personal agenda items considered because 
doing so will increase the total value of their wins. Even more so than 
the party leaders, rank-and-file members will find the goal of maximiz­
ing personal agenda consideration particularly attractive. Such a goal 
can be fulfilled largely through early organizational decisions to expe­
1. The notion of reciprocity as it is used in this study refers to mutual accommodation 
among members, both explicit and implicit, ranging from obvious vote swapping to 
understandings that require no visible negotiations. Most of the empirical and theoretical 
predecessors on this topic focus on the U.S. Congress, beginning perhaps with the study 
of U.S. Senate folkways by Matthews (1960), the work of Clapp (1964), the analysis of 
"distributive, regulatory, and redistributive" decision loci by Lowi (1964), Fenno's study 
of the House Appropriations Committee (1962) and Ferejohn's study of rivers and harbors 
legislation (1974). At the state level, reciprocity has been examined also (e.g., Wahlke et 
al., 1962) but generally only in relation to the identification of norms. 
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dite bill processing. In the battle to get one's agenda accepted, there is a 
two-step strategy. The first step is to get as many items considered as 
possible through early favorable organizational decisions, including 
committee assignments. The second step is to fight harder for those 
items that have greater utility. 
Do rank-and-file members have an agenda? Everyone has served on 
committees where they do not. But the modern national and state legis­
latures in the United States are thriving law production centers, and 
typically only the unusual legislator lacks an agenda. Generally, such an 
agenda is reflected in bill sponsorship—not completely nor precisely, 
but enough so that a sponsorship index for most legislative chambers 
can be highly reflective of what legislators are doing. 
As suggestive examples we can examine a number of part-time leg­
islatures, where one might expect that there would be more legislators 
without a sponsorship agenda. In a recent study of the lower chambers 
of South Carolina and Texas during the 1977 sessions, it was found that 
only 6.8 percent and 1.3 percent, respectively, did not serve as first au­
thor of legislation (Hamm, et al., 1983). In the 1981 sessions of Indiana 
and Missouri, senate sponsorship was distributed among almost all 
members, such that: 
Indiana Missouri 
Number of Members in Chamber 49 33 
Number who Sponsored Bills 49 32 
Number of Sponsorships per 
Member (Mean) 25.7 15.1 
In the larger house chambers of each state we find a similar pattern: 
Indiana Missouri 
Number of Members in Chamber 99 163 
Number who Sponsored Bills 97 148 
Number of Sponsorships per 
Member (Mean) 11.7 
The above information applies only to bills in the house of origin and 
each bill is identified as having one or two principal sponsors. Many 
members will sponsor legislation sent over from the other chamber, and 
in states such as Missouri many members other than the first and second 
"author" will sign on as sponsor. In other words, the mean sponsorship 
values above are probably low estimates in these states. 
The point of the above examples is not to claim that the sponsorship 
6.1 
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Table 2.1 Minimum Estimate of Bill Sponsorship Rate (Number of 
Bills Introduced in Chamber of Origin Divided by the 
Number of Members in Chamber). 
State House Senate State House Senate 
Alabama 10.86 19.09 Montana 8.76 9.72 
Alaska 26.28 51.85 Nebraska 11 .47 
Arizona 8.27 13.67 Nevada 17.75 35.85 
Arkansas 10.18 17.97 New Hampshire 2.40 13.61 
California 28.79 32.03 New Jersey 10.59 14.37 
Colorado 9.60 14.91 New Mexico 10.33 11.62 
Connecticut 15.96 41.80 New York 62.17 120.17 
Delaware 11.85 18.29 North Carolina 11.63 15.44 
Florida 9.94 27.38 North Dakota 6.75 8.82 
Georgia 6.37 8.18 Ohio 8.08 12.30 
Hawaii 38.08 85.24 Oklahoma 4.72 7.56 
Idaho 6.61 6.80 Oregon 22.80 34.20 
Illinois 11.37 21.58 Pennsylvania 13.46 34.50 
Indiana 11.45 10.12 Rhode Island 14.24 23.80 
Iowa 8.78 11.58 South Carolina 6.60 10.48 
Kansas 4.87 12.08 South Dakota 5.47 7.09 
Kentucky 8.33 10.63 Tennessee 14.55 44.12 
Louisiana 18.28 28.97 Texas 16.13 41.71 
Maine 7.95 13.15 Utah 5.40 10.66 
Maryland 14.32 25.49 Vermont 3.30 6.23 
Massachusetts 46.80 61.45 Virginia 18.37 21.15 
Michigan 12.45 16.05 Washington 7.70 27.84 
Minnesota 11.49 22.03 West Virginia 11.00 21.14 
Mississippi i 12.43 21.77 Wisconsin 11.85 25.70 
Missouri 5.54 13.88 Wyoming 8.73 8.53 
data can be taken at face value, for it is well known that outside spon­
sors are important, and furthermore that in some states, measurement is 
confused by committee sponsorship or other unusual practices. The 
point to be made is that most members have a sponsorship agenda. If 
getting one's bills passed isn't the name of the game, it is certainly an 
important part of the game. 
The collection of individual sponsorship information is a tedious 
and costly enterprise and will need to be expanded in future work. One 
can infer the minimum sponsorship rate, however, by knowing the num­
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ber of bills and the number of members, since the bills in every state 
must have sponsors who are legislators. Table 2.1 illustrates bills per 
member for each chamber, utilizing only bills in the chamber of origin. 
The inferred minimal sponsorship mean tends to be higher in smaller 
chambers but also in states with longer sessions, such as New York and 
California. The median senate has a minimum per member sponsorship 
rate of 18.1, and the median house rate is 10.9. 
Given the above description, a reasonable estimate of an agenda 
profile for a legislator might be portrayed as follows: 
Proposals in Order of Value 
a b c d e f g h 
P P P P P P P  P Most Preferred Outcome 
P P P P P P P  D Second Preferred Outcome 
P P P P P P D  P Third Preferred Outcome 
D D D D D D D  D Least Preferred Outcome 
P = PASS 
D = DEFEAT 
The legislator in this example has eight agenda items and his most pre­
ferred outcome is that they all pass. Short of that, he prefers that all pass 
but the last item, and so on. It is expected that most legislators have 
personal agenda profiles of this sort, loaded with "P's" at the top and 
left. If we couple this picture with the great number of bills introduced 
in the modern American legislature, it seems fair to assume that an effi­
cient agenda processing system is in high demand, and that those rank-
and-file members with a sizeable agenda have the greatest need for an 
accommodating committee structure. 
The Committee Assignment Process 
Committee assignments are crucial because most legislators have an 
agenda that will be facilitated if they receive their most preferred posi­
tions. Perhaps the most complete treatment of the committee assign­
ment process in Congress was developed by Shepsle (1978; also see 
Rohde and Shepsle, 1973), who fashioned the phrase, "interest­
advocacy-accommodation syndrome." In a multisession examination 
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of legislators' backgrounds, requests, and assignments, Shepsle was 
able to show that members' requests reflected their personal back­
ground, training, and experience, and the makeup of their constituency. 
Furthermore, the leaders (or the committee making the assignment) 
took into account these factors and made every attempt to accommodate 
members' requests. To maximize accommodation for their requests, 
most members actively seek supporters among their state delegation, 
the appropriate committee personnel, and lobbies. All of this process 
occurs within the generous confines of the "seniority system." 
In the American states, where seniority norms are much less a fac­
tor, accommodation would appear to be the rule. The chamber officers 
and party leaders have the individual or shared authority to make stand­
ing committee and chair appointments in almost every chamber (See 
Council of State Governments, 1981, p. 115). In a national survey 
(1981), legislators from each chamber were asked to respond to the 
question: 
"How pleased have you been with your committee/subcommittee 
assignments?" 
The three response categories yielded the following frequencies: 
1. "Pleased" 1,657(83.5%) 
2. "Neither Pleased nor Displeased" 282 (14.2%) 
3. "Displeased" 46 (2.3%) 
Majority and minority party legislators alike are pleased with their 
standing committee assignments. On a scale of 1 to 3 as above, the two 
groups average 1.15 (N=1290) and 1.26 (N=695) respectively. When 
five out of six legislators are "pleased" with their committee assign­
ments (and only one out of forty "displeased"), it is pretty good evi­
dence that the leaders are attempting to accommodate them. Satisfaction 
is not confined to experienced members. Over 80 percent of members in 
their first or second year of service indicated they were pleased with 
their assignments. Finally, a majority of members in every chamber 
(N=99) indicated that they were "pleased" with their assignments. 
Note that the above survey item does not ask legislators whether 
they were pleased with their experience on the committees, or with the 
outcomes, but only whether they were pleased with their "assign­
ments." It follows then, assuming truthfulness, that they were accom­
modated by the leadership. It is possible, of course, that legislators tem­
pered their committee assignment requests to match their expectations 
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Table 2.2 Tendency of Legislators to Sponsor Bills That Are 
Assigned to Their Own Committees 
% Assigned to Expected 
Own Committees % 
Indiana 
House 31 % 9% 
Senate 45% 27% 
Missouri 
House 32% 12% 
Senate 46% 20% 
The "expected" percent is simply the average number of committee assignments divided by the 
number of committees. 
of success in receiving those assignments. The survey measure of com­
mittee assignment satisfaction does not distinguish between requests 
and true preferences. 
Accommodation of members' committee interests in the assign­
ment phase has a number of important implications. First, members are 
able to sort themselves out according to natural diversities of interest. 
For Congress, at least, this means a quite heterogeneous assortment of 
requests (Shepsle, 1978, p. 47), and there is little reason to suspect the 
states are much different. Basically, there will be an abundance of re­
quests for a small number of powerful standing committees, almost al­
ways including those dealing with appropriations, taxation, or budget­
ing; but beyond the prime committees, interests will be scattered, suited 
to personal background and constituency makeup. 
A second implication is that members are more likely to be in a 
position to promote important parts of their agenda. If we assume that 
members will have an agenda that corresponds to their personal or con­
stituency interests, and that the standing committee assignments will 
correspond also, then we would expect that members would be situated 
on committees to promote their agenda—on the "inside" rather than the 
outside. We should expect, for example, that members would sponsor 
legislative measures that go disproportionately to the committees on 
which they serve. This latter point seems simple enough, but the pub­
lished literature does not offer us any enlightenment. 
An examination of both chambers of Indiana and Missouri can 
serve as an early confirmation. As illustrated in Table 2.2, the members 
do in fact sponsor bills that go much more often than chance would 
allow to the committees on which they serve. For example, if committee 
assignment made no difference, Indiana House members would see in 
28 Rational Decision Making by Committee 
committee only about 9 percent of the legislation they personally spon­
sored. In fact they see 31 percent of such legislation come to their own 
committees. The difference is consistent for all four chambers of the 
two states. 
The data in Table 2.2 do not establish cause and effect. It is entirely 
possible that the pattern results because members of a committee are 
approached more often by lobbyists who expect their bills to be as­
signed to the members' committee. The truth probably should include 
both explanations. Legislators and lobbyists alike realize the importance 
of seeking out a base of support in standing committees. Perception on 
this matter is sharpened by entertaining the opposite case. That is, if 
members sponsored less than expected proportions of bills assigned to 
their own committees, then we might infer that they were dissatisfied 
with their committee assignments—that their interests in fact lie 
elsewhere. 
Legislators have individual agendas, and as a group they have het­
erogeneous interests. Such heterogeneity is reflected in their agendas 
and in their standing committee assignment requests. Because mem­
bers' requests are likely to be accommodated, the proposals that they 
'sponsor or author are likely to appear in the committees on which they 
serve. These proposals also are likely to be among those they consider 
most salient. Thus we would expect that members will prefer most to 
win on issues assigned to their own committees. If this is the case, what 
further action appears rational? 
One possible consequence is that members will decide that the 
standing committees should have their way. Nonmembers will approve 
committee members' recommendations if it can be assumed that those 
committee members will reciprocate on later proposals. This amounts to 
a kind of cooperative, nonzero-sum game. In its extreme form, mem­
bers would prefer to win on their committee bills more than on all other 
bills taken together. Such feelings may be common in many legislatures 
among members of important committees—Ways and Means, for ex­
ample, or Appropriations. Conversely, we would expect that other 
members would be less generous toward committees of such overriding 
importance. 
Accommodation in the committee assignment process can lead also 
to a structural change in the size of committees. While members' re­
quests for committee assignments will be diverse in nature, it is inevi­
table that some committees will be more popular than others and that 
there will be pressure to enlarge the most popular committees. This 
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tendency has been documented, for example, for the U.S. House of 
Representatives (Westefield, 1974). Enlarging the popular committees 
will increase the number of committee assignments per member unless 
offsetting reductions are made in other committees. Table 2.3 illustrates 
the pattern for 101 U.S. chambers by providing the mean standing com­
mittee size, the standard deviation, and the name and size of the largest 
committee in each chamber. 
As may be observed, only a few chambers in 1981 utilized a uni­
form committee size (i.e., standard deviation = 0), although several 
chambers made only one or two exceptions. Exceptions are made most 
often for committees dealing with appropriations and finance. Likewise, 
the largest committee in each chamber is usually a committee that di­
rectly influences the public purse. The popularity of such committees is 
well documented for Congress, and while broad-based evidence on 
transfers and requests is yet not available for states, few seasoned ob­
servers would expect contrary patterns. The present data illustrating 
larger memberships for such committees offers confirmation. 
Structural accommodation of the kind described above allows 
members to sort themselves out in a manner more commensurate with 
their interests. As a consequence, the notion of reciprocity among com­
mittees makes more sense. The so-called important committees have 
larger memberships, and thus there will be more members who would 
find the notion of committee rule and reciprocity desirable. 
Is there a final payoff in this system of accommodation? That is, do 
members of committees experience greater success with their legislation 
when in fact it is assigned to their own committees? Are such proposals 
enacted more often than those that do not have internal committee spon­
sors? It seems obvious that bills with internal sponsors would have a 
better chance of moving forward, but does the final payoff to members 
justify the effort? Table 2.4 illustrates that in all four chambers of the 
two test states, Indiana and Missouri, bills sponsored by members on 
the committee to which they are assigned have greater success. 
The data in Table 2.4 are specified to answer the kind of question a 
legislator might ask: "How much better are my chances of getting bills 
approved if they are sent to my own committees?" As can be seen, 
chances of committee approval are approximately 55 to 60 percent in 
the senates and nearly 50 percent in the house chambers when the mem­
ber is an internal sponsor. If the member is not an internal sponsor, the 
committee approval rate drops off from 12 to 19 percent. The advantage 
of internal sponsorship carries through to enactment. 
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Table 2.4 Successful Sponsorships: Percent Leading to Committee 
Approval or Enactment 
Sponsorships in Other 
Own Committees Sponsorships 
Indiana House N = 343 N = 750 
Success in Committee 46.7% (160) 27.9% (209) 
Successful Enactment 23.3% (80) 13.9% (104) 
Indiana Senate N = 333 N = 405 
Success in Committee 54.7% (182) 40.2% (163) 
Successful Enactment 40.5% (135) 26.9% (109) 
Missouri House N = 315 N = 684 
Success in Committee 48.9% (154) 36.3% (248) 
Successful Enactment 11.7% (37) 5.3% (36) 
Missouri Senate N = 235 N = 259 
Success in Committee 60.1% (143) 44.8% (116) 
Successful Enactment 21.7% (51) 14.3% (37) 
Number of cases given within parentheses. Data are derived from the official Indexes of the 
Journals of each state. Note that the above figures refer to the number of sponsorships (one or two 
named sponsors for each bill) and not the number of bills. 
Is internal committee sponsorship an advantage even after bills 
leave the original committee? In Indiana, the differences are slight. In 
the Indiana House, one-half of the bills approved by committee are en­
acted, showing no delayed effect of internal committee sponsorship. In 
the Indiana Senate, internally sponsored bills fare somewhat better 
(74% to 67%). In Missouri, the internal sponsorships yield a slight ad­
vantage in the Senate (36 to 31%), and in the House a substantial advan­
tage (24 to 15%). In sum, it appears that most of the advantage is gained 
in the original committee decision making. Smaller increments in the 
success differential later in the process may be due to the possibility that 
"smart" or better legislation will tend to have internal committee 
sponsors. 
Jurisdictions and the Separability of Issues 
The varied origins of standing committee jurisdiction defy a complete 
listing, but in general it seems that most committees are formed to cor­
respond to executive functions and agencies, or to capture important 
clusters of activities in need of regulation and/or subsidy. No doubt 
these are important considerations, but to divide up the subject matter is 
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to impose a set of values about what makes sense in the formulation of 
policy. Such values may be preimposed by constitution or statute, or 
they may be subject to the whims of legislative leaders at the beginning 
of each legislative session. The internal functioning of the legislature is 
as important as its relationship to its environment. 
Why are standing committees not simply numbered rather than 
named, and the bills assigned randomly as they appear? Members would 
then serve on committees of about equal importance, and the workload 
of each committee would be about the same. Of course one important 
defect in this scheme would be lack of subject-matter expertise. Not 
only would members be unable to choose committees for which they 
had the best qualifications, but they would also miss the specialized 
training of specialized committees. Many observers would reject the 
scheme for these reasons alone. 
Another important defect would result from the assignment of re­
lated proposals to different committees. A bicameral system is prone to 
duplication of effort as it is, but if the duplication were rampant within 
chambers, the cost effectiveness of the system might be unbearable. In 
practice, related bills normally are assigned to the same committee. 
Subject-matter designations, as employed by legislatures, provide a way 
of placing related legislation in the same hands. A more sophisticated 
way of describing this process is to say that legislation involving insep­
arable preferences would be placed in the same committee. 
Committee jurisdictions may be divided in a number of ways, and 
one way is to keep in mind the separability or inseparability of issues. 
Issues with separable preferences can go to different committees, be­
cause their outcomes seem unrelated. Issues with inseparable prefer­
ences can go to the same committee to encourage resolution at the com­
mittee level rather than on the floor. The standing committees make it 
possible for members to work with separable subsets of inseparable 
preferences. 
If proposals within a standing committee do exhibit separable pref­
erences, they can be assigned to appropriate subcommittees. When pro­
posals of different committees reach the floor of the chamber, they will 
tend to be characterized by separable preferences. If the preferences are 
separable, the order in which proposals from different standing commit­
tees appear on the floor will not influence member preferences, and 
sophisticated voting across separate bills will be unnecessary. For any 
given proposal, of course, amendments can complicate matters. It is also 
possible that vote trading can tie together otherwise separable issues. 
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Much of the reciprocity that may develop among standing commit­
tees may relate to the defeat of legislation. In other words, members 
seldom challenge either the negative vote of the committee or its deci­
sion to sit on the legislation. But even for legislation that reaches the 
floor, members may reason that since it is unrelated to their most salient 
issues, the other committees should be allowed to have their way. 
The separability argument can be carried too far. It is apparent that 
many proposals border on the jurisdictions of two or more committees 
and that such proposals will present special problems if the committees 
disagree. Governments must work also with a finite budget, and all leg­
islation that affects revenues or appropriations will affect that budget. In 
a strict logical sense, all proposals affecting the budget are related and 
would seem to stimulate inseparable preferences. Most legislatures il­
lustrate recognition of this interrelatedness by forming committees to 
oversee fiscal matters. Typically, for example, all matters that involve 
funding or a funding change must be sent to an appropriations commit­
tee. Congress separates authorization and appropriation decisions so 
that there are many authorization committees but only one appropria­
tions committee in each chamber. Many states utilize a second commit­
tee referral rule to accomplish the same. In Congress and in many state 
chambers the appropriations process has become decentralized through 
the use of subcommittees. In such cases it is common to find the crea­
tion of either a budget committee or an "executive" subcommittee in 
order to consider overall fiscal policy. In several states (Arkansas, Colo­
rado, Delaware, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) the 
two chambers consolidate the financing function through a "joint" fi­
nance committee, while allowing other functions to be carried out in the 
traditional bicameral two-stage process. 
The lower chamber of the state of Indiana offers an example of a 
strong ways and means committee. It receives directly or by recommit­
tal almost all tax and appropriation measures. The "subject index" of 
the 1981 session's Index to House and Senate Journals lists bills accord­
ing to topic. The committee received: 
a. All eight bills affecting local adjusted gross income taxes. 
b. All five bills affecting state adjusted income taxes (excludes one re­
organization bill). 
c. Twenty-seven of thirty bills allowing credits or exemptions to state 
adjusted gross income taxes. The committee was by-passed on one 
energy credit, one environmental credit, and one election campaign 
fund credit, only one of which passed the chamber. 
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d. Forty-two of the forty-four bills affecting property taxes (excludes 
two tax neutral bills). 
e. All five of the major budget bills. 
Clearance through the Ways and Means Committee is seldom breached, 
since it is the committee charged with resolving revenue-expenditure 
imbalances. Its twenty-two members thus deal with the inseparabilities 
of state revenue and appropriation measures. 
The sorting of issues into separable subsets may be illustrated by 
examining a particular subject such as "alcoholic beverages." In 1981, 
members of the Indiana House introduced nineteen bills on this subject. 
Two affected excise taxes and were sent directly to the Ways and Means 
Committee. Three involved the regulation of crimes and offenses and 
were sent directly to the Committee on Courts and Criminal Procedure. 
The remaining fourteen were proposals affecting licensing and permits 
and were sent to the Committee on Public Policy & Veterans Affairs. 
The latter committee obviously had more than one subject to manage, 
but it could divide into subcommittees if the chairman of the committee 
felt that the agenda required it. 
To take another example, there were nineteen proposals that fall 
under the heading of "solid waste." Seven of these bills affected taxes, 
financing methods, or state expenditures and were referred to the Ways 
and Means Committee. Another seven bills went to the Committee on 
Environmental Affairs. These bills affected hazardous waste treatment, 
recycling programs, and water pollution control. Each of the remaining 
five bills landed in a different committee: one regulating garbage refuse 
trucks was assigned to the Committee on Roads and Transportation; a 
second affecting the authority of the City of Indianapolis was assigned 
to the Committee on Urban Affairs; a third reestablishing a solid waste 
management study commission was sent to the Committee on Energy; a 
fourth affecting allowable per diem payments to regional water and solid 
waste boards was given to the Committee on County and Township; and 
a final bill affecting the authority of solid waste districts to issue bonds 
found its way to the Committee on Public Policy and Veterans Affairs. 
In sum, most assignments make sense in light of the separable versus 
inseparable distinction, but at times other factors are surely at work. 
Legislators sometimes insist on an assignment of a personal bill to their 
own committee, even if it more appropriately belongs elsewhere. Leg­
islative leaders are not above placing bills in committees where they 
feel the outcome will be more to their liking. And no doubt mistakes 
are made. 
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If legislators are able to create a standing committee system that 
divides the subject matter into separate bundles of issues, so that prefer­
ences of individuals are separable for proposals in different committees, 
then the potential for reciprocity among committees is enhanced. It is 
less likely to break down as the issues on the floor arise. As we noted 
above, if proposals on the floor exhibit separable preferences, the order 
in which they appear is not a factor, and sophisticated voting is not help­
ful. The proposals will be advanced according to committee recommen­
dations, unencumbered by policy ties to the proposals of other commit­
tees. Where this advancement does not occur, we would expect to find 
that there had been severe disagreement within the originating commit­
tee, and that such disagreement had been passed on to a floor fight. We 
might speculate that such a situation would stimulate logrolling for floor 
supremacy and that the chamber leadership would have an active role in 
determining the outcome. 
The traditional view is that committees and subcommittees serve as 
power bases for the chairs, allowing those in alliance with the majority 
party leaders to control particular areas of policy. Only in Congress, 
where seniority is very important, would we be likely to see the al­
liances break down. This analysis shows, however, that the internal 
forces for decentralized agenda setting in American legislatures are 
rooted in a logic of individual choice—that is, in individual pursuit of 
approval for legislative proposals. 
The pieces of the puzzle fit. Members receive committee assign­
ments in accordance with their preferences. They are likely to sponsor 
legislation assigned to their own committees. Legislative proposals as­
signed to the sponsor's committee are more likely to survive the com­
mittee and more likely to be enacted. These observations have been sup­
ported by direct evidence. In addition, we might infer that members' 
interests can be enhanced through norms of reciprocity among commit­
tees, and that reciprocity itself is enhanced when committees deal with 
"separate" bundles of issues. 
While tendencies toward decentralization are very strong in U.S. 
legislatures, the fifty states exhibit ample variety in this regard. The 
next chapter (chapter 3) contains an analysis of the relative importance 
of committee and party influence in each state. The next logical ques­
tion—Does decentralization pay dividends?—is the subject of chap­
ter 4. 
Party Leadership, 
Party Caucuses, and 
Standing Committees: 
Why Committee Outcomes 
Are Preferred in the 
United States 
The pressures for action in a legislative setting may create a number of 
tensions. Many scholars, for example, see a natural tension between the 
party officers and the committee chieftains (e.g., Huitt, 1961; Dodd and 
Oppenheimer, 1977, 21-53; Rosenthal, 1974, 57-58; Uslaner and 
Weber, 1977, 74-105). The seniority system no doubt heightens this 
tension in the U.S. Congress. For the states at least, the tensions arise 
more amorphously from inherent conflicts among demands for action, 
the scarcity of time and resources, and leadership versus rank-and-file 
intentions. How can the legislative party leaders resolve these tensions 
and conflicts? 
Party Leadership versus Committee Leadership 
One time-honored approach places emphasis on party leadership and 
discipline. The majority party leaders attempt to build a winning party 
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coalition, both in an active caucus and by assigning key members to im­
portant chair positions and committees. The party leadership's agenda 
takes precedence at every step, in committees, in caucus, and on the 
floor. Members are rewarded or punished in accordance with their de­
gree of support for "leadership" or "party" positions. The committees 
exist primarily to serve the agenda-processing needs of the majority party 
leadership (as assumed in the Liebowitz-Tollison thesis discussed in the 
previous chapter). In other words, in-depth committee consideration 
allows for easier ratification when bills reach the floor of the chamber. 
In a second, contrasting type of management, the leadership is not 
in a position (or does not choose) to develop or enforce a wide range of 
party policies. Instead it attempts to build up credits that will eventually 
aid the passage of its agenda. It does this in part by honoring as many 
members' requests for chair appointments and committee assignments 
as possible. By the beginning of the sessions, the party leaders (usually 
the speaker or majority leader, but also a "committee on committees" 
in many cases) pass out the chairmanship and assignment favors. The 
committees then act autonomously, and the chairs of committees pretty 
much determine the committee agenda. The party leaders must take 
their chances and rely upon the good will of the committee members for 
support on those items that head their leadership agenda. 
In reality we would expect most legislative systems to have less 
than extreme orientations, neither strictly centralized into a leadership 
agenda, nor strictly decentralized into a committee agenda. One possi­
bility, for example, is that the leadership will have a fairly short agenda 
and that, upon its likely accomplishment, other noncontradictory de­
mands will be accommodated. Another possibility is that there will be 
an implicit understanding of reciprocation. The party leaders will get 
their way on major party issues relating to, say, fiscal policy, but the 
committees will get their way on everything else. In other states there 
may be a continuous interplay between the leadership, the caucus, and 
the committees. 
There is reason to speculate, however, that in recent years the trend 
has been toward committee-oriented decision making. The pressures 
created by the increased volume of legislation (Rosenthal and Forth, 
1978), the often cited decline of party organization in campaign man­
agement (e.g., Agranoff, 1972), and the increase in subcommittee im­
portance or use, all suggest that the parties in legislatures may be losing 
ground to the committees. The purpose of this chapter is to examine 
present patterns of decision making in U.S. state legislatures, where 
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less is known, and to assess three factors related to this more general 
concern: 
1.	 Party leadership accommodation and committee autonomy. 
2.	 Membership views of where "significant" decisions are made. 
3.	 Membership satisfaction with party caucus and standing committee 
decisions. 
Accommodation and Autonomy 
The mere existence of standing committees to some extent foretells the 
expansion of agenda setting to those other than the elected party leader­
ship. Nevertheless, it is still possible that accommodation in the com­
mittee assignment process, as discussed in the last chapter, does not 
lead to very much autonomy at the committee level. Nationwide survey 
evidence, however, demonstrates that the agenda-setting power of the 
standing committee chairman is widely recognized. Four out of five re­
spondents from a survey of approximately two thousand state legislators 
indicate that: 
"A chairman usually has almost full control over the committee 
agenda." 
In only two of ninety-nine chambers (the Massachusetts House and the 
South Carolina Senate) did more than half the respondents indicate that 
the chair did not have full control of the agenda. In only two additional 
states (Illinois and Tennessee) did more than one-third in both chambers 
indicate that the chair had less than full control of the agenda. In other 
words, chair domination of the agenda is nearly universal—recognized 
by a substantial majority of respondents in almost every chamber. 
A great many committees also employ subcommittees. More than 
two-thirds of the respondents in the survey indicated that 
"Subcommittees are used on a regular basis in many committees" 
or that 
"Subcommittees are an official part of my chamber rules and at least 
some committees are required to use them." 
While in most states (if not all states) we would not expect the degree of 
subcommittee autonomy that has been reported for Congress, the use of 
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subcommittees does tend to disperse even further the power of agenda 
setting. Subcommittee chairs will have some control over the order in 
which issues are considered, and they may possibly be in a position to 
keep proposals from active consideration. 
The fact that the chairs determine the agenda within the standing 
committees does not mean that they necessarily deviate from the wishes 
of the elected party leaders. Nor does it mean necessarily that they get 
their way on those issues that they bring before the committee. But in 
either case it seems clear that substantial decision-making authority is 
delegated to the committees. The memberships of committees are devel­
oped in the first instance on a cooperative bipartisan basis, at least to the 
extent of allowing even most minority party members to receive desir­
able committee assignments. 
When proposals are sent to standing committees, business is likely 
to be conducted with less partisanship than on the floor of the chamber, 
and to some extent this factor may undermine party discipline or leader­
ship positions on issues. In studies of several national legislatures (the 
U.S., Britain, Canada, India, Italy, West Germany, the Philippines, and 
Chile), for example, it has been observed that partisanship is less a fac­
tor in committee decision making than in full chamber decision making 
(Lees, et al., 1979, p. 424). The same phenomenon occurs in state leg­
islatures. Legislators were questioned: 
"Where would you say partisanship is most evident in your 
chamber?" 
The responses distributed as follows (N > 2000): 
Duringfloor proceedings 73.5% 
During committee proceedings 14.3% 
During subcommittee proceedings 1.7% 
Not evident in my chamber 10.5% 
Importantly, the committee system can encourage nonpartisan or bipar­
tisan decision making. 
None of the above is to deny that partisanship plays an important 
role. The standing committee chairs are appointed from the majority 
party (with few exceptions), and the majority party will have a majority 
in every committee. Minority party members are going to be less satis­
fied than majority members with committee decisions. There are other 
factors, however, that may modify the extent of partisanship. For ex­
ample, between one-third and two-thirds of the states are normally 
 41 Leadership, Caucuses, and Standing Committees
under divided control. If a stalemate is to be avoided, the leaders may 
need to seek bipartisan cooperation. 
The principal factor that reduces partisanship, however, is probably 
the task orientation of the smaller group. As a problem solving unit, 
partisanship is less often a helpful way of disposing of an issue or pro­
posal. Hamm has shown, for example, that legislators frequently do 
change their votes between the committee and floor actions on a mea­
sure, even when the bill has not been amended. These changes tend to 
be in the direction of partisan voting (Hamm, 1982). One reason a legis­
lator may change votes between the committee and floor stages is that 
the caucus or leadership of the party may intervene. The legislator may 
feel subsequently that it is necessary to support the "party" when the 
proposal comes to a final vote. 
Importance of Leadership, Caucus, 
and Committee Decisions 
Previous evidence suggests that leaders do what they can to accommo­
date rank-and-file members in the committee assignment process. There 
is still the question, however, of whether the committees really make 
important decisions. In the internal organization of the chamber it is 
possible that much of the decision-making power rests in the hands of 
the majority party leadership and the majority party caucus. The com­
mittees may be left with little more than the details, or they may serve 
simply as sounding boards for the leadership. One way to examine this 
question is to evaluate the perceptions of the legislative participants. 
Legislators were asked: 
"In your legislature where would you say the most significant deci­
sions are made?" 
The choices available were (See Appendix 9.1): 
1. Office of Presiding Officers or Majority Leaders 
2. Regular Committee Meetings 
3. Party Caucus 
4. In Governor's Office 
5. On the Floor 
6. In Policy Committee 
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7.	 In Subcommittees 
8.	 Pre-legislative Session 
9.	 Other 
In this section we need to assess the responses only to the first three 
choices. They are in fact the most often selected and they do focus upon 
the party and committee responsibilities. In the survey, legislators were 
asked to select the top three decision-making loci, in rank order if pos­
sible. For the purposes of this particular analysis, the judgments are ac­
cumulated on a chamber by chamber basis. A decision "arena" is high­
lighted only when at least 50 percent of majority party respondents 
selected it as one of the three principal centers of important decision 
making. To rule out the possibility of confusion of minority with major­
ity party organization, only responses of majority party members will 
be utilized. 
The 50 percent criterion was met by the "party caucus" item in 50 
of the 99 chambers. The chamber party "leadership" response met the 
criterion in 67 chambers, and the "regular committee meetings" were 
seen as important by at least half the majority party respondents in 
81 chambers. We would expect that the influence of legislative party 
organization would be most prevalent in those states in which members 
see significant decisions made by the party leadership, the party caucus, 
or both. 
In Figure 3.1 the states and chambers are grouped according to the 
significance of the three decision-making centers. Several important 
features of the classification emerge: 
1.	 At the top left are those chambers in which the committees are 
dominant and no appreciable party influence is apparent. These fif­
teen chambers are mostly in states with a tradition of one-party 
dominance (or no parties, as in Nebraska). 
2.	 A second group of twenty-nine chambers illustrates the importance 
of committee and party leadership decision making, but not the 
party caucus. Here again, these chambers are almost entirely in 
states with either a dominant party or a lopsided party advantage in 
the legislative session of that year (1981). In such states the party 
leadership does not work through the caucus—which may be large 
and unwieldy if not superfluous—but through the committees and 
committee chairs. 
3.	 In contrast to the committee-oriented chambers are the chambers 
that appear to be principally party-oriented, especially those in 
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which both the caucus and leadership are seen as important. In the 
latter group are primarily those chambers from states with long tra­
ditions of party competition and government—New York, Pennsyl­
vania, New Jersey, Indiana, Illinois, Connecticut, and so forth. In 
such chambers the leadership is more likely to work consistently 
through the caucus. The committees are less important. Only eigh­
teen of the ninety-nine chambers are in this group, and two-thirds of 
this number are the smaller state senates. In the larger house cham­
bers, the leadership apparently relies more often upon committee 
management of legislation. 
4.	 Somewhat more complex are the twenty-one chambers in which all 
three decision-making loci are seen as important. Two-thirds of 
these chambers are house chambers. We may surmise that in these 
chambers the leadership exerts its influence through, and works 
with, both the party caucus and the standing committees, but that 
the caucus and committees have the ability to act autonomously 
from time to time. The states in this group tend to have two com­
petitive parties, each having a sizeable share of the seats. 
5.	 In the final group are the chambers in which the committees and 
majority caucuses are seen as important decision-making centers, 
but the leadership is not so seen in any independent sense. Most of 
these chambers have relatively few members and can operate more 
informally than could more numerous memberships. The party 
leadership may blend inconspicuously into the party caucus pro­
ceedings, wherein perhaps committee chairs vociferously announce 
their intentions. It is evident that the major industrial states do not 
have chambers in this category. The chambers in contrast represent 
more rural states, where perhaps the legislative environment encour­
ages a less demanding leadership. It is also possible that the governor 
in some states displaces the role of the internal party leadership, but 
additional evidence did not support this explanation. 
In sum, the balance of committee or party oriented decision making 
varies considerably among the states. The majority caucus is passive in 
most southern states as well as in several other states with a single domi­
nant party. In many of these same states, however, the party leadership 
is very active and engages in important decision making. We can specu­
late that in such cases the leadership exercises control, to the extent that 
it can, through the committee system, but that the relationship is recip­
rocal. In a few states both the caucus and the committees are important 
decision-making centers, and an active leadership must deal with both. 
Fig. 3.1 Classification of State Chambers According to Importance 
of Party and Committee Decision Making (Criterion: 
50% of majority party respondents selected survey item) 
COMMITTEES 
(15) 
Arkansas (H,S) 
Georgia (S) 
Hawaii (S) 
Louisiana (H,S) 
Kentucky (S) 
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COMMITTEES 
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Alabama (H,S) Florida (S) 
Georgia (H) Hawaii (H) 
Maine (H) Massachusetts (H) 
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Rhode Island (H) Tenn. (H,S) 
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Virginia (H,S) W. Virginia (H) 
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COMMITTEES ­
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LEADERSHIP 
CAUCUS 
(12) 
California (H,S)

Connecticut (H)
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Indiana (S)

Iowa (H)

New Jersey (H,S)
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Ohio (S)
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•^CAUCUS 
Arizona (H,S) Colorado (H) Connecticut (S) 
Delaware (H) Idaho (H) Indiana (H) Iowa (S) 
Kansas (H,S) Minnesota (H,S) Montana (H) 
New York (H) North Dakota (H) Oklahoma (H) 
Pennsylvania (H) Utah (H) Washington, (H,S) 
West Virginia (S) 
COMMITTEES - -^CAUCUS 
(16) 
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Figure 3.1 illustrates one way to interpret the data. When multiple cen­
ters of decision making are seen as important in a chamber, the influ­
ence patterns are reciprocal and not reflective of dominant-submissive 
relationships. 
Figure 3.1 is constructed from selected data, the responses of ma­
jority party members only, and the consensus responses (50% agree­
ment) when aggregated at the chamber level. A somewhat different ap­
proach can be taken by examining three alternative dependent variables: 
1.	 The percent of majority party respondents from each chamber who 
indicate that significant decisions are made by the party caucus. (Yj) 
2.	 The percent in each chamber who indicate that significant decisions 
are made by the party leadership. (Y2) 
3.	 The percent in each chamber who indicate that significant decisions 
are made by regular committees. (Y3) 
We might assume that the perceptions that elicit these responses are in­
fluenced by actual decision-making activity in the chambers, not neces­
sarily in specific cases but in the statistical aggregate. In turn, the type 
of decision making that legislators adopt may be influenced by specific 
structural conditions. The two structural features of legislatures that ap­
pear to have an impact on the type of legislative decision making that 
the chambers adopt are: 
1.	 The share of the seats held by the majority party (%MAJ) 
2.	 The number of members in the chamber (CHSIZE) 
For each dependent variable, Y,, Y2, and Y3, the OLS model 
Y,; = a + bx (%MAJ) + b2 (CHSIZE) + ex	 3.1 
may be employed to test for whether there is a statistically discernible 
impact upon perceptions of where significant decisions are made. An 
asterisk is inserted in Table 3.1 to indicate which of these terms had a 
significant t value (t > 2.0) in each of the three applications. 
The results suggest that the party caucuses are most important in 
small chambers with evenly matched parties. They are least important 
in large chambers with a dominant party. The party leadership appears 
to gain significance in larger chambers, but does not fare as well in a 
dominant party. In such dominant parties the committees take on added 
importance. 
To counterbalance the decentralizing effect of committee organiza­
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Table 3.1 Influence of Majority Party Advantage and Chamber Size 
on Party and Committee Decision Making (r values, 
N = 98) 
% of Responses Indicating 
"Significant Decisions" Made by 
Party
Caucus
Yj
 Party
 Leadership
 F2
 Regular 
Committees 
Y3 
% of Members 
Majority Party
Chamber Size
in 
 - .576*
 - .205*
 - .218*
 .262*
 .240* 
 .061 
R2 .383 .112 .06 
tion, majority leaders may choose to work through a party caucus. The 
evidence suggests, however, that they do not do this as often in cham­
bers with large memberships, especially when their party owns a high 
proportion of the seats. In large memberships, the caucus setting is 
somewhat cumbersome and too time-consuming to process very much 
legislation. When one party dominates the seat distribution in the cham­
ber, it dominates also the seat distribution in committees, and no doubt 
it is easier for the majority party position to win in committees. As a 
consequence, the need for an active party caucus is less. In some cases 
the minority party is nonexistent, or nearly so, and thus a majority party 
caucus is at best unnecessary. 
Ratings of Caucus and Committee Outcomes 
The foregoing analysis offers statistical confirmation that legislative 
leaders tend to employ caucus meetings when there is some rational ex­
pectation of gain—when the caucus will aid in the passage of the 
leadership agenda. The caucus seems to be more helpful in smaller 
chambers where the proceedings are perhaps less cumbersome, and in 
those parties with a small plurality where committee decisions are more 
likely to run contrary to leadership preferences. To examine caucus and 
committee decision making in greater depth, we can evaluate only those 
fifty chambers (appearing in Figure 3.1) with an "important" majority 
party caucus. 
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In the national survey, state legislators were asked to respond to two 
related items: 
1.	 How satisfied were you with those bills that were passed or recom­
mended favorably by the following units of your legislature? 
2.	 How satisfied were you with the decisions not to consider, recom­
mend unfavorably, or defeat bills by the following units? 
The organizational units in question were: 
•	 Committee A (Named earlier by respondent, respondent is a 
member) 
•	 Committee B (Named earlier by respondent, respondent is a 
member) 
•	 In General, My Committees (If respondent has more than two) 
•	 The Other Committees of the Chamber 
•	 My Party Caucus 
•	 My Chamber as a Whole 
Each respondent was asked to indicate his or her "degree of satisfac­
tion" by selecting one of five responses, "very high," "high," "me­
dium," "low," and "very low," which were displayed in a Likert-type 
format for each of the above named organizational units. The response 
categories were given numeric scores of one through five. 
The two organizational units of concern here are "My Party Cau­
cus" and "In General, My Committees." Legislator responses to these 
two items can serve as their satisfaction ratings of the decisions made by 
each unit. For purposes of illustration, each of the fifty selected cham­
bers may be assessed by subtracting the mean committee satisfaction 
rating from the mean majority party caucus satisfaction rating. The re­
sults of the calculations for decisions to pass legislation and decisions to 
defeat legislation are presented in Table 3.2. As may be seen, in most 
cases (71%) majority party legislators register greater satisfaction with 
their committee decisions. In fewer cases (15%) greater preference for 
their majority caucus decisions is shown, and in some instances (14%) 
no difference is recorded. 
How are these results to be interpreted? We have isolated those 
chambers in which the majority party caucus is considered an important 
decision-making center, yet in most of these same chambers it appears 
that legislators of the majority party are more satisfied with the deci­
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Table 3.2 Satisfaction Ratings: Mean Differences between Party 
Caucus and Committees for Fifty Chambers in Which Party 
Caucus 
State 
Alaska 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Connecticut 
Delaware 
Idaho 
Illinois 
Indiana 
Iowa 
Kansas 
Kentucky 
Maine 
Michigan 
Minnesota 
Montana 
New Jersey 
New York 
North Dakota 
Ohio 
Oklahoma 
Pennsylvania 
South Dakota 
Utah 
Vermont 
Washington 
West Virginia 
Wisconsin 
Wyoming 
Is Important. * (Majority Party Responses 
House	 Senate 
Decisions to Decisions 
Only) 
to 
Pass 
- .33 
- . 33 
- .11 
- .55 
-1 .00 
- . 50 
- . 64 
- . 50 
- .19 
- .58 
- . 14 
- .31 
.00 
- . 92 
- . 04 
- .08 
- .25 
+ .25 
+ .04 
- .18 
- .08 
- .47 
- . 94 
Defeat 
- .58 
- .06 
+ .11 
- .81 
- . 20 
- .91 
- .46 
- .62 
- .33 
- .38 
- .23 
+ .29 
- .41 
- .15 
- .15 
+ .07 
- .21 
.00 
- . 44 
- . 10 
- .32 
- .17 
- . 63 
Pass Defeat 
- .33 .00 
.00 - . 5 0 
-1.00 - . 90 
- .42 .00 
- .25 .00 
+ .27 - . 04 
.00 .00 
- .11 - .07 
+ .29 - .13 
- .08 - .18 
.00 - .33 
- .67 -1.33 
- . 50 .00 
-1.00 - .71 
- .71 - . 14 
+ .67 + .67 
- .29 - .23 
+ .33 - .33 
- . 80 - .33 
+ .20 .00 
- .15 + .04 
- .23 - . 04 
- . 63 - .33 
+ .10	 + .14 
.00 .00 
.00 .00 
-1.11 -1.31 
* Satisfaction ratings of decisions to pass and decisions to defeat are utilized. For each chamber 
the ratings are averaged for those referring to the party caucus and those referring to the committees. 
The mean committee rating is subtracted fromi the mean party caucus rating, thus, a negative sign 
means that the committee decisions were more preferred. These quantities are given to illustrate an 
overall pattern, and not to indicate exact magnitudes. 
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sions of committees. The simplest answer to this puzzle is that in com­
mittees legislators as a whole have more input into the decisions, and 
thus it follows that in a random sample survey of this kind, members of 
the majority party would register greater satisfaction with the committee 
decisions. The party caucus tends to be a more centralized form of deci­
sion making. 
Evidence presented earlier, however, suggested that the committee 
chairs had almost complete control over the agenda. Would not mem­
bers find this just as frustrating? Some members do, but an examination 
of the data reveals first, that more than half of the majority party respon­
dents served as a committee chair, and second, that when comparing 
members who were committee chairs with those who were not, the pref­
erence ratings were almost identical. Both groups are more satisfied 
with committee decisions. 
Implicit in the above explanation is the assumption that individual 
input leads to satisfaction. It is reasonable to expect that because stand­
ing committees (and their subcommittees) have fewer members than the 
majority caucus, the members will have more input into the committee 
decisions. There is still the possibility, however, that the party caucus 
will actually improve upon the committee decisions. It seems unlikely 
that many legislators will see the caucus in this light, though, since the 
accommodating committee assignment process allows them to sort 
themselves out into "communities of interest." These communities of 
interest are able to locate highly preferred policy alternatives, and the 
alternatives are more likely to be diluted, if changed at all, at the caucus 
stage. Bills do not reach the caucus for approval, normally, unless they 
are approved by the committee, and from the perspective of the respec­
tive committee members, the caucus is more likely to impose a "differ­
ent" view, not an improvement. 
The above evaluation does not apply to members of the minority 
party in each chamber. An overall comparison of majority and minority 
member satisfaction with decisions to pass and decisions to defeat legis­
lation may be accomplished by asking what percent in each group rated: 
1. Committee outcomes higher than caucus outcomes. 
2. Committee outcomes the same as caucus outcomes. 
3. Caucus outcomes higher than committee outcomes. 
The results displayed in Table 3.3 illustrate that minority party members 
do tend to favor their party caucus outcomes. Over 40 percent prefer 
caucus outcomes, another 30 percent are indifferent, and between 25 
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Table 3.3 Comparison of Majority and Minority Party Member 
Preferences for Committee versus Caucus Outcomes 
Outcome Preference 
Decision Committee Indifferent Caucus 
Type (OP) (C = P) (P>C) 
Decisions Majority 416 407 154 
to Pass 42.58% 41.66% 15.76% 
Minority 162 158 238 
29.03% 28.32% 42.65% 
Decisions Majority 329 451 130 
to Defeat 36.15% 49.56% 14.29% 
Minority 126 160 230 
24.42% 31.01% 44.57% 
Cases are excluded from this table when legislators did not respond to both questions—as would 
be appropriate if their chamber party did not have a caucus. 
and 30 percent prefer committee outcomes. In contrast, only 15 percent 
of majority party members prefer caucus outcomes. 
Conclusion 
The elected leaders in the legislative chambers have a number of impor­
tant choices to make in the management of legislative business. One of 
these is the manner in which committee positions are filled. Will the 
party leaders attempt to build a cohesive winning coalition that rewards 
primarily members of the coalition? Or will they attempt to accommo­
date the members of the coalition? Or will they attempt to accommodate 
the members by passing out as many "favors" as possible at the begin­
ning of the legislative session? The evidence suggests that for commit­
tee assignments the latter approach is usually selected. A great majority 
of members of both parties receive committee assignments they con­
sider desirable. In most cases the leaders also have the flexibility to vary 
the size of committees and to increase the number of committees. By 
increasing the membership of the more popular committees and by in­
creasing the number of committee chairmanships, more members are 
accommodated, and as the party leaders may hope, more members 
are indebted to them for future support. 
Coalition favoritism in state legislative chambers is probably more 
apparent in the choices to fill committee chair positions. Within the com­
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mittees, the committee chairs control the agenda. Since the most signifi­
cant committees, such as appropriations or ways and means, tend to be 
the busiest and receive the most proposals, the chairs will have ample 
opportunity to be selective and to enhance the coalition interests. Work­
ing in the opposite direction, however, are the decentralizing forces of 
the standing committee organization. The assignment process allows 
members to sort themselves out into communities of interest—agricul­
ture, primary and secondary education, health and hospitals, banking, 
insurance, and so forth. For example, legislators were asked to indicate 
for two of their committees whether "Members of the committee share a 
similar perspective to a greater degree than do members of my chamber 
as a whole." In nearly half the cases, legislators gave a positive response. 
(This was not a forced choice response of yes or no. Members were asked 
to check this item if they thought it applied to their experience.) 
The style of leadership management is no doubt in part a function 
of elementary features of chamber and party structure. In many cham­
bers the lack of party competition leads to a lack of party control, thus 
an increase in party control would depend upon a prior increase in elec­
tion competition. This "problem" is not a new one, and many observers 
would no doubt point out that the magnitude of it was perhaps equally 
great thirty years ago when the southern states had fewer Republican 
officeholders. Chamber size may be a more recent impediment to party 
control, due mainly to the enormous increase in bill introduction. With 
more numerous and diverse demands for action the leaders have found it 
necessary to rely to a greater extent on the standing committees or com­
mittee chairs. 
The party caucus is a principal instrument for exercising party con­
trol, and it is an important center of decision making in about half the 
state chambers. In most of these chambers, however, the majority mem­
bers are more satisfied with their standing committee decisions than 
with their caucus decisions. It has been suggested that this may be due 
in part to greater individual input in standing committees and to the ten­
dency to form "communities of interest." These are the forces that can 
undermine party leadership control, especially if a norm of reciprocity 
develops among committees that bypasses leadership preferences. Fur­
ther understanding of these relationships can be achieved perhaps by an 
in-depth study of fewer states, comparing states in which the party cau­
cus is particularly successful (e.g., Pennsylvania) with those in which it 
does not succeed so well. 
Does Decentralized Agenda 
Setting Pay Dividends? 
In legislatures it is important to understand whether the organizations 
manage the agenda in a centralized or decentralized fashion. Except in 
Nebraska, centralization means a strong role for the party leadership, 
perhaps aided by the party caucus which can intervene between commit­
tee and floor decisions. Decentralization means that agenda setting is 
delegated away from the leadership to the standing committees and even 
to the subcommittees. 
The analysis of legislative decision making does not deny the cru­
cial role that the chief executive may have in agenda setting. Active gov­
ernors and presidents usually get their concerns near the top of the legis­
lative agenda. Various forms of the veto power put the chief executive 
in a strong position. In evaluating the powers of state governors, for 
example, Schlesinger (1965) and Dometrius (1979) give substantial 
weight to the legislative powers of governors. The impact of the chief 
executive, however, is often exaggerated. The major concerns of the 
chief executive are usually the major concerns of many if not most leg­
islators. President Carter's energy legislation was no surprise to Con­
gress, and members of Congress promptly dismantled it and constructed 
their own versions. 
Evidence presented earlier has illustrated that members of legis­
latures do have their individual agendas and that they locate on commit­
tees likely to receive such items for consideration. Such a strategy ap­
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pears to pay dividends to the extent that bills are more likely to emerge 
from committee when there are internal sponsors and to the extent that 
such bills are more likely to be enacted into law. Logic suggests that 
even greater dividends result wben reciprocity among committees is 
strong. In the extreme, such decentralized agenda setting and reciproc­
ity may extend to the subcommittees. The neatness of these organiza­
tional arrangements can break down, of course, if jurisdictional bounda­
ries are messy, or if preferences are inseparable across issues in different 
committees or subcommittees. Congress has had such problems, for ex­
ample, in energy and environmental legislation. 
In a decentralized committee system, where agenda setting occurs 
in standing committees and subcommittees and where some degree of 
reciprocity exists, we might expect that legislation would have a greater 
chance of success. The chamber passage rate, for example, would tend 
to be higher in decentralized systems. The empirical question may be 
stated precisely: 
Does centralization (or decentralization) have a statistically discern-
able impact upon chamber passage rates? 
If centralization does have an impact, to what extent are legislators cor­
respondingly less satisfied with the decisions of the chamber? 
The Bill Passage Rate 
The magnitude of state legislative agendas is illustrated in Table 4.1, 
which contains a listing of the number of house and senate bills in each 
of fifty states, along with the number and percentage that pass each 
chamber (the figures do not include resolutions or special session legis­
lation). Although a major proportion of the bills introduced are offered 
in the first instance by lobbyists and representatives of other governmen­
tal units, to obtain official standing they must receive the sponsorship of 
at least one legislator. Furthermore, with modern bill drafting services, 
legislators themselves are more able to take the initiative. Regardless of 
the origins of legislation, the fact is that most legislators want to initiate 
changes in the status quo. The agenda for most legislators is an agenda 
for change—bills for their district, from their campaign, from suppor­
tive interest groups, or for future credit claims on popular positions. 
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Centralization 
In general scholarly use, "centralization" normally refers to concentra­
tion of power or influence; it may be expressed in a number of other 
ways to suit specific language needs or personal preference. In bu­
reaucracies, decentralization often means the delegation of decision-
making authority to lower-level units. Corporations frequently cen­
tralize or decentralize through reorganization into a fewer or greater 
number of functional units. "Centralized decision making" usually 
means that decisions are made by few, whereas "decentralized decision 
making" usually means that decisions are made by many. In the legis­
lative context, various types of decision making (e.g., gubernatorial, 
caucus, committee, subcommittee) may be indicative of greater or 
lesser centralization. 
In the 1981 nationwide survey, state legislators were asked to indi­
cate where they thought the most "significant decisions" were made. 
The question and results are illustrated in Table 4.2, which displays the 
total number of first, second, and third choices for each of eight catego­
ries of response. These responses can serve as the data base for develop­
ing a scale or index of centralization. Alternative procedures may be 
Table 4.2 Legislator Perceptions of Significant Decision-Making 
Loci (Frequencies) 
Q.	 In your legislature, where would you say the most significant decisions are 
made? Please use the numbers 1, 2, and 3 to order your top three choices, 
where " 1  " is your first choice. 
First Second Third 
Item Choice Choice Choice 
Office of presiding officers or 686 329 198 
majority leaders 
Regular committee meetings 496 459 338 
Party caucus 340 291 307 
In governor's office 171 270 215 
On the floor 127 161 369 
In policy committee 89 129 101 
In subcommittees 44 95 106 
Prelegislative session 20 43 41 
Other or missing * 55 251 353 
* Includes scattered responses and missing data. Most responses in this category in the second 
and third columns are "missing" (e.g., many legislators simply checked one item). 
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utilized to measure centralization. The one adopted here requires the use 
of parallelogram scaling of legislator responses for each chamber. 
The scaling technique is explained in full in an earlier work (Ja­
coby and Francis, 1985). Briefly, the procedure (see Torgerson, 1958; 
Coombs, 1964) in this application utilizes the modal response set for 
each legislative chamber to reflect the three most "significant" decision-
making loci. The modal response sets for all senate chambers are com­
pared to all possible orderings of the response categories to achieve the 
most internally consistent scale alternative. The same procedure was ap­
plied to the house chambers. The final scale of items for both sets of 
chambers was identical, so that the ordinal arrangement turned out to be: 
1. Governor's Office MOST CENTRALIZED 
2. Office of Presiding Officers or Majority Leaders 
3. Party Caucus 
4. Regular Committee Meetings 
5. On the Floor 
6. Subcommittees LEAST CENTRALIZED 
This result corresponds very well to an earlier three-point index of cen­
tralization constructed strictly on the basis of author judgment (Francis, 
1967), where high centralization meant that significant decisions were 
said to occur in the governor's office or in policy committee, mod­
erate centralization meant they were said to occur in party caucus, and 
low centralization meant that they were said to occur in regular commit­
tee meetings or on the floor. In this modern version, two new items are 
added: 
1. Office of Presiding Officers or Majority Leaders 
2. Subcommittees 
One item, "in policy committee" does not scale well due to different 
meanings in different states and it is used only to modify the results in 
two .state chambers, the Alaska and Oklahoma senates, where it appears 
the policy committees were leadership committees in 1981. The cen­
tralization scores for this ordinal scale are given in Table 4.3. 
The modal response set of the three most significant decision-
making centers introduces a more sophisticated way of viewing cen­
tralization. Centralization is seen as a balance of different decision loci 
and not simply as the identification of a single important focus of 
activity. As a confirmation of this perspective, a second measure of 
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Table 4.3 Decision-Making Centralization Scores for State 
Legislative Chambers 
Scale 
Score House Chambers Senate Chambers 
1 Alaska, Oklahoma 
2 Alaska Delaware Indiana Illinois Indiana Iowa Michigan 
Iowa Maine New Jersey Minnesota New Jersey 
Pennsylvania South Dakota Pennsylvania Rhode Island 
Illinois Massachusetts South Dakota Kentucky New 
Michigan Minnesota North Mexico North Carolina Oregon 
Carolina Ohio Rhode Island Texas Virginia Massachusetts 
Tennessee Vermont Hawaii 
Maryland West Virginia 
California Oklahoma 
Arizona Colorado Connecticut Arizona Connecticut Idaho 
Idaho New York North Dakota Kansas Maine Montana New 
Utah Washington Wisconsin York Ohio Tennessee 
Kansas Washington California Hawaii 
Kentucky Montana New Colorado Delaware Mississippi 
Mexico Wyoming Alabama North Dakota Utah West 
Florida Missouri New Virginia Wisconsin Wyoming 
Hampshire Oregon Texas Alabama Florida Missouri 
Arkansas Louisiana Mississippi Nevada New Hampshire 
Georgia Louisiana Vermont 
Maryland 
Nebraska 
5 Georgia Nevada South Carolina Arkansas South Carolina 
Virginia 
For exact pattern distinctions see Jacoby and Francis (1985, p 303). A scale score of 1 signifies 
high centralization and a scale score of 5 indicates low centralization. 
centralization-decentralization was employed on an experimental basis. 
In this alternative scheme, decentralization was indexed simply by what 
proportion of the time legislators gave "committee" or "subcommit­
tee" responses as their first, second, or third choice (weighted accord­
ingly). The alternative measure did not prove robust in further evalua­
tion (i.e., did not perform well in regression experiments). 
Control Variables 
The degree of centralization is only one of several factors that may 
affect the passage rate of legislative proposals. Included among the pos­
sible influences are: 
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1. Domination by the chair of the committee. 
2. Committee scheduling and attendance problems. 
3. Number of bills introduced. 
4. Percent of members in the majority party. 
The committee chairs play a key role in delaying legislation or moving it 
forward. As we saw earlier, key chairmen may form a management 
coalition with the elected leadership in order to promote and screen leg­
islation. In the national survey, state legislators were asked to indicate 
whether the following statement characterized the way committees were 
managed in their chamber: 
Most committees are dominated by the chairman. 
Approximately 39 percent of the respondents indicated agreement with 
this item (See Appendix). We would expect that where the chairs domi­
nate the committees the rank-and-file members would get their way less 
often and that legislation sponsored by them would have less success in 
moving to the next stage. In addition, the chairs may be in a governing 
coalition with the party leaders to restrict the legislative output. Chair 
domination can be measured for present purposes by calculating the 
percent of respondents from each chamber who endorsed the above 
statement. 
The passage rate is likely to be affected also by the "procedural 
efficiency" of committee operations. Efficiency problems are indexed 
by another survey item in which legislators are asked whether: 
For many members the schedule of meetings (committee-
subcommittee) creates attendance problems. 
As illustrated in Table 4.4, a substantial percent (43) of the legislators 
throughout the country indicated that this was a problem, and it was a 
problem recognized by both majority and minority party members. Pro­
cedural problems are indexed accordingly by the percent of members in 
each chamber who agree with the above statement. 
While party discipline in most state legislatures is exercised only to 
a moderate degree, it would nevertheless seem to be an advantage for a 
majority member to have a sizeable plurality of party colleagues. The 
chamber plurality is no doubt reflected in committee and subcommittee 
memberships as well. Conventional wisdom on political party systems, 
however, would suggest that as one party becomes more dominant it 
tends to experience more factionalism. In a legislative setting it is ap­
parent also that minority parties act with greater solidarity, and there is 
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Table 4.4 Identification of Committee System Problems 
All Majority Minority 
Problem Members Members Members 
Most members receive 13 14 13 
too many committee 
assignments. 
Many committees are too large 10 9 12 
to work effectively. 
For many members the sched­ 43 42 47 
ule of meetings (committee/ 
subcommittee) creates atten­
dance problems. 
Range of n = 1993-1999 for all members, 1301-1306 for majority members, 691-693 for 
minority party members. 
some evidence to suggest that as a majority party increases in numbers 
beyond a safe margin it begins to have factional difficulties. The evi­
dence in Figure 4.1 confirms this view to a point, but as we can see, 
parties with over 90 percent of the chamber membership seem to experi­
ence less factionalism. The drop in perceived factionalism in over­
whelming majorities may be due to a number of factors, including the 
hopeless position of dissenters and the tendency to decentralize. In any 
SP 50 ­
«§ 30 ­
•2 20 ­
10 ­
0-30 
Percentage in Party (Midpoints) 
Fig. 4.1 Percentage of Legislator Responses Indicating Factional 
Conflict, by Representation of Their Parties in the 
Legislature 
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case, it is difficult to know whether such factionalism offsets the advan­
tage of greater party pluralities in the various decision-making arenas. 
The sheer volume of legislation can make it less likely that any 
single bill will pass. Most states are inundated by legislation, but some 
are inundated more than others. Legislators in most states do not have 
time to consider every piece of legislation. Thus, in order to understand 
the impact of centralization upon the passage rate, it is necessary to con­
trol for volume, which is expressed as the "number of bills introduced 
in the chamber of origin." 
The Statistical Model 
Letting the passage rate of bills in the house of origin serve as the de­
pendent variable, the ordinary least squares model under investigation 
may be stated as: 
%PASS = a + b, (CENTR) + b2(CHDOM) 4- b3 (SCHED) 
+ b4 (#BILLS) + b5 (%MAJ) + e 
where the centralization scale is employed as the first regressor and all 
impacts except possibly majority party percent (%MAJ) are expected to 
depress the passage rate. 
As we can observe in Table 4.5, all variables except perhaps "ma­
jority percent" exhibit a statistically discernable impact (normal crite­
ria: t > 2.0 and p < .05) upon the chamber passage rate. Most impor­
tant for the thesis developed here, centralization (as measured by the 
scaling procedure) appears to have a negative impact upon the passage 
rate. Decentralized decision making, we might speculate, is likely to be 
Table 4.5 Variables Affecting the Chamber Passage Rate 
Standard-
Variable b t ratio prob. ized Beta 
Centralization -.03791 -2.31 .0234 -.201 
Chair -.26376 -2.25 .0271 - .215 
domination 
Scheduling -.15999 -2.37 .0197 -.215 
problems 
Number of bills -.00004 -3.23 .0017 - .288 
Majority percent .19009 1.49 .1406 .133 
R2 = .350 Intercept = .41 N = 98 (Excludes Nebraska) 
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conducive to the formation of reciprocity norms and lead to higher pas­
sage rates. Predictably, chair domination, procedural inefficiency, and 
the volume of legislative proposals all have a negative impact upon the 
passage rate. 
Congressional scholars may see problems with the above thesis. 
For example, many have noted the rise in importance of subcommittees 
over the last twenty years, a rise highlighted perhaps by the internal re­
organizations in the House in the 1970s. At the same time, in both 
houses there have been declines in the number of bills passed and in the 
ratio of bills passed to bills introduced. Closer examination of data re­
ported in the work of Ornstein, et al. (1984), however, reveals a some­
what different picture. 
In both houses of Congress, the passage rate began to decline as 
early as 1950 and reached its low point in the early 1970s, just before 
the impact of the new emphasis upon subcommittee autonomy. During 
the same extended period, the content of legislation became much more 
detailed and complex. As recently as the Eighty-Seventh Congress 
(1961-62) approximately two thousand pages of bills were enacted, 
with an average of 2.3 pages per statute, but by the Ninety-Seventh Con­
gress (1981-82) over forty-three hundred pages of bills were enacted 
with an average of 9.2 pages per statute. The increase has been most 
dramatic since 1973, about the time when members began asserting 
their rights in committees and subcommittees. 
The passage rate is only one alternative for detecting the impact of 
reciprocal arrangements. Small subcommittees may have the capacity to 
merge varied interests in the group into fewer pieces of legislation. Al­
ternatively, there may be a "crowding-out" effect. Since bills are now 
more detailed, they take longer to negotiate and "mark up." Since there 
is a finite amount of time available, more bills will fail to receive a sub­
committee hearing. In any case, a test of the validity of these alternative 
explanations requires an examination of Congressional subcommittees 
and their success. 
Decentralization appears to produce greater output. In most states 
such output is detectable in the passage rate, while in Congress the vol­
ume of processed legislation is perhaps better indexed by the number of 
pages. The effects of decentralization are modified, of course, by other 
factors such as inefficiency. 
It is reasonable to question at this point in the analysis the overall 
significance of a measure such as the passage rate. After all, legislators 
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have official activities other than getting their bills passed. In Congress, 
constituency service and legislative oversight of administrative agencies 
are normally considered to be major categories of legislator responsi­
bility. The results of this study are consistent with the conclusions of 
Rosenthal and Forth (1978) and Elling (1979)—oversight is not very 
important when compared to "legislating" in the states. When surveyed 
legislators were asked to divide up their committee and subcommittee 
work into hours spent on each of several activities, they allocated only 
thirty minutes a day to "reviewing the conduct of administrative agen­
cies." In contrast they allocated nearly four hours a day to legislating, 
which includes (See Table 7.1 for detail): 
a. Obtaining information about proposals in order to understand their 
content. 
b. Finding out how other members feel about the issues. 
c. Hammering
mittees. 
 out workable compromises with members of com-
Only in Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, and New Mexico, and 
in the Michigan senate do respondents indicate they spend an hour a day 
reviewing administrative agencies (although see Hamm and Robertson, 
1981). These are also states (except Michigan) in which legislators spend 
much more time on committee work as a whole. 
In sum, state legislators spend the lion's share of their time work­
ing with legislation. The passage rate focuses directly on this activity 
by reflecting bill sponsorship success. Bill sponsorship success is de­
pressed by a number of structural factors, including the degree to which 
decision making is centralized, the degree to which the chairs dominate 
the committees, and the scheduling inefficiency of the organization. 
That is, even when we control statistically for the quantity of legislation 
introduced, each of these structural factors appears to have a net nega­
tive impact upon success rates. 
While individual sponsorship of bills in most states is a serious 
business, it is conceivable that the nature of legislative business in the 
states is evolving away from the traditional way of doing things. Spon­
sorship action may become secondary to committee negotiations on im­
portant legislation, or to the development of "committee" bills of om­
nibus proportions. In any case, the question deserves further analysis. A 
severe test can be applied by asking whether the "passage rate" is a 
major factor in the extent to which legislators are satisfied overall with 
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legislative session outcomes. Legislators come away from legislative 
sessions with varying degrees of satisfaction, depending in part on how 
the legislative experience measures up in comparison with other oppor­
tunities. These broader questions of satisfaction and career evaluation 
are taken up in the next section, part two of this book. 
Part Two 
Lifestyle and Career-Pattern 
Influences 

Costs and Benefits of 
Legislative Service 
The previous chapter identified a number of factors that lead to a higher 
success rate on legislative proposals, including procedural efficiency, 
decentralization, and a lack of committee chair domination. One severe 
limitation of such an approach, however, is that it provides only a mi­
croscopic view of what makes a difference in the conduct of legislative 
business. From the whole life perspective of the legislator, the benefits 
of greater success on legislation can be offset by the personal costs of 
achieving such success. This chapter and the next take into account the 
overall perspective of the legislator, whose responsibilities go well be­
yond the official duties of the job. 
More specifically, in this chapter the extent to which legislators are 
satisfied with legislative outcomes is shown to be a function of: 
1. Success rates on legislation. 
2. Number of workdays. 
These are seen as proxies for the benefits and costs of legislative ser­
vice. The number of workdays is important because legislators suffer 
opportunity costs in the nonpublic sector. 
When compared to the diversity of legislative practices throughout 
the world, the American state legislatures in many respects appear to be 
The author has published parts of this chapter in "Costs and Benefits of Legislative Ser­
vice in the American States." American Journal of Political Science (1985) 29:626-642. 
Published by University of Texas Press. 
70 Lifestyle and Career-Pattern Influences 
the institutional cousins of Congress. In at least one important respect, 
however, they do differ. Most state legislatures are still part-time legis­
latures. In two-thirds of the states there are constitutional limits to the 
length of the session and, in 1981, for example, only eleven states held 
more than one hundred session workdays, with Massachusetts topping 
the list at 177. It is true that the states do hold special sessions or assign 
interim committees to responsibilities that extend the duties of members 
beyond the regular session, and in the last twenty years we have also 
witnessed longer and more frequent sessions. Nevertheless, even now, 
most state legislators cannot rely on legislative compensation alone and 
have another occupation. 
Recent pressures toward professionalization and modernization 
have created a situation where legislators must consider carefully the 
costs and benefits of their endeavors. Essentially legislators are con­
cerned about the costs, or how much work they must put into the 
system to obtain the benefits derived from the legislation they sponsor. 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the significance of this 
cost-benefit perspective and to evaluate legislative practices that are re­
lated to it. 
To pursue the above purpose, this analysis relies upon three major 
sources of information, each of which applies to regular sessions only: 
1.	 The number of days spent in legislative session (workdays), ob­
tained by surveying legislative service personnel for a monthly 
breakdown of workdays (1981). 
2.	 The number of bills introduced and passed by each chamber, ob­
tained from official documents and qualified state librarians and 
legislative service personnel (1981). 
3.	 Questionnaire returns from over two thousand state legislators rep­
resenting all ninety-nine chambers (1981). 
4.	 Salary, compensation, and length of session information for two 
periods in time (early 1960s and early 1980s). 
These sources combine individual survey data with information taken 
from official and semiofficial records. 
Legislative Workdays 
The "costs" of legislative decision making refer to both the time and the 
energy members devote to their official duties, but measurement limita­
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tions usually require that we examine only time costs. With respect to 
time costs, state legislators may be quite different from their Con­
gressional counterparts. Members who enter Congress expect to be full-
time lawmakers, but most state legislators are so-called "citizen" legis­
lators. They have a private occupation, an income-producing activity 
that may be reduced by service in the state capital. For those who are 
not full-time "professional" legislators, the opportunity costs of serving 
in the state legislature are often substantial. The state income paid to 
state legislators is typically quite modest and, over and above expenses, 
is normally fixed. 
Because of opportunity costs, state legislators will be quite con­
cerned with the number of workdays required of them during the legis­
lative session. The actual number of regular session workdays estimated 
for each chamber is displayed in Table 5.1. As we can see, the number 
varies substantially in 1981—30 to 40 workdays in Florida, Georgia, 
New Jersey, Virginia, and Wyoming to 120 or more in Alaska, Califor­
nia, Massachusetts, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, and South Carolina. 
The mean number of workdays is 75, with a standard deviation of 32. 
These workdays, of course, fall within a much longer calendar period, 
ranging over the entire year in a few states. 
The measure employed in this study may be referred to as the num­
ber of regular session workdays. This information was obtained by sur­
veying legislative service personnel. They were provided with a chart so 
that they could indicate in detail the actual days per week their legis­
latures met. The great variety of legislative practices serves as a caution 
against using only the official starting and ending dates of the sessions. 
Vacation breaks, one-day, two-day, three-day, four-day, and full work 
weeks are all very common. The number of days a legislator is required 
to spend in the state capitol would seem to be the best indicator of stress 
that might arise due to occupational and other responsibilities in the 
home district. 
The tension between public and private occupational duties is re­
ported, for example, by Jewell (1982) in reflecting upon his personal 
interviews with 221 legislators in nine states: 
It was obvious from my interviews that it has become increasingly 
difficult for members to serve half-time. On the one hand, the pres­
sures of the legislative job push the members to enlarge their commit­
ment of time beyond 50-percent. On the other hand, members learn 
that it is very difficult to be a 50-percent teacher, or businessman, or 
lawyer. It is even more difficult to maintain an outside career when 
you can devote only 30 to 40 percent of your time to it. (p. 186) 
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Table 5.1 Number of Workdays , 1981: State Legislative Chambers 
State House Senate State House Senate 
Alabama 45 45 Montana 90 90 
* Alaska 120 120 Nebraska 90 
Arizona 64 64 Nevada 103 103 
Arkansas 47 42 New Hampshire 48 48 
* California 128 128 •New Jersey 32 32 
* Colorado 107 107 New Mexico 46 46 
Connecticut 95 95 •New York 69 69 
Delaware 52 52 •North Carolina 127 127 
Florida 32 26 North Dakota 60 60 
Georgia 40 40 *Ohio 125 116 
Hawaii 63 63 Oklahoma 86 86 
*Idaho 55 55 •Oregon 143 143 
•Illinois 83 82 •Pennsylvania 59 55 
Indiana 84 84 Rhode Island 67 67 
Iowa 85 86 •South Carolina 123 123 
* Kansas 82 82 South Dakota 42 42 
Kentucky 60 60 Tennessee 64 64 
Louisiana 54 48 Texas 83 83 
* Maine 103 103 Utah 45 45 
Maryland 65 65 Vermont 72 72 
* Massachusetts 177 176 Virginia 30 30 
* Michigan 108 105 Washington 72 72 
Minnesota 57 57 West Virginia 43 43 
Mississippi 70 70 •Wisconsin 61 64 
Missouri 97 97 Wyoming 40 40 
* No Session Limit Set Either by Constitution or Pay Structure 
Only twenty years ago most state legislatures met every other year, and 
usually for less time in the year that they did meet. By 1980, a mere 
handful of states still employed the biennial session. The tension be­
tween public and private responsibilities built up during this period. 
Many states now pay legislators more than they once did, but the differ­
ences are often unthinkingly exaggerated by not taking into account the 
purchasing power of the dollar and the additional number of days most 
legislators now devote to official business. New Hampshire still pays 
only $100 per year and Alabama $10 per day. As of 1981, no state paid 
as much as $30,000 per year in regular salary. A recent Congressional 
 73 Costs and Benefits of Legislative Service
Quarterly study, for example, noted that modest pay and longer sessions 
seem to be attracting a different type of legislator (CQ Weekly Report, 
1983, pp. 1768-769), those from modest-paying occupations and those 
young enough (or old enough) to find the salary level tolerable. 
Bill Passage Rates 
The "benefits" in legislative decision making are derived no doubt in a 
number of ways, but it is important to understand that in contrast to 
Congress a great proportion of legislative time in the states is spent in 
law production (Rosenthal and Forth, 1978). While casework and over­
sight are important, they are nevertheless not as central as law produc­
tion to the official duties of the state legislator. Because law production 
is so central, the agendas of the various participants become especially 
crucial. The agendas of the governor and chamber party leaders are 
most often at the front end of legislative business, but realistically, as 
previously shown, it would be better to assume that each member has an 
agenda or at least identifies with an agenda. The agendas of all legis­
lators may be seen as changing and overlapping and in competition for 
scarce time and attention. 
The passage rates necessarily have the weakness of indexing only 
the proportion of wins, not the value of such wins. Legislators may win 
on many minor proposals, but lose on a few major proposals. To acquire 
insight into this problem, it is possible to consult directly the responses 
of legislators to the following question: 
How satisfied were you with those bills that were passed or recom­
mended favorably by the following units of your legislature? 
The "unit" in question here is "my chamber as a whole," on which 
legislators registered a response on a five-point scale ranging from 
"very high" satisfaction to "very low" satisfaction (See Appendix). As 
a backup, legislators were also asked: 
How satisfied were you with the decisions not to consider, recom­
mend unfavorably, or defeat bills by the following units? 
The same response categories were provided. Examination of these sat­
isfaction levels should aid in understanding the impact of the number of 
session workdays and the bill passage rate. 
The number of legislative measures introduced or passed has served 
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as a form of evidence in several earlier studies of legislative behavior, 
both at the individual level (Matthews, 1959; Francis, 1962) and at the 
aggregate level (Hedlund and Hamm, 1978; Hedlund and Freeman, 
1981). Hedlund and Freeman, for example, discussed legislative "effi­
ciency" in terms of "bills passed per session day" or "bills introduced 
per session day." The present analysis differs from theirs in two re­
spects. First, session days are treated here as a separate variable (as a 
proxy for costs). Second, the number of bills passed are taken as a pro­
portion of the number introduced to offer the passage rate as a proxy for 
benefits. More formally, Hedlund and Freeman proposed that legislative 
efficiency (L) is a function of a number of variables, such that L = f(p/s, 
Us, . . .). Here it is suggested that legislative satisfaction level (T) is a 
function of a number of variables, such that T = / ( l/s,p/i, . . .), where 
s is the number of session days, p the number of bills passed, and i the 
number of bills introduced. 
Majority Party Satisfaction with Outcomes: A Test 
Since in all states but Nebraska the legislature is organized and con­
trolled by the majority party, member satisfaction with chamber out­
comes will be influenced by party status. For example, on a five-point 
scale of satisfaction with bills passed by the chamber, there was a 0.54 
scale difference between the mean score for minority members (n — 
650) and the mean score for majority members (n = 1268). Minority 
party members naturally are less satisfied with legislative outcomes. In 
the analysis to follow, only majority party responses will be evaluated. 
While minority party responses ultimately will need to be assessed, sev­
eral factors weigh in favor of examining majority party members only at 
this point. First, the response rate and/or the number of minority party 
members in many chambers yields too few observations for a chamber-
by-chamber aggregation. Second, inclusion of minority party responses 
can confound the analysis because of the adversarial partisan role such 
members may play. Third, it is the majority party and its leadership that 
run the chamber and manage its business, and thus it seems more impor­
tant to understand first their reactions to the environment. 
The purpose of this section is to evaluate the relationship between 
majority party satisfaction with outcomes and the actual days of legis­
lative work and the bill passage rate of each chamber. Each chamber is 
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assigned a mean satisfaction rating based upon majority party member 
responses to the previously illustrated survey questions. This will allow 
a direct comparison with other chamber-level data. The aggregated 
ratings are given in Table 5.2. Since it was not possible to measure 
workdays and the passage rate at the individual level, the satisfaction 
responses are aggregated. The purpose here is not to analyze individual 
satisfaction, but to confirm that the days of work and the bill passage 
rate are important characteristics of the legislative chamber. Accord­
ingly, ordinary least squares (OLS) provides appropriate estimates in 
the subsequent analysis. 
Variation in sample size from chamber to chamber, as detailed in 
Table 5.2, caused concern because of the possible impact upon residuals 
(i.e., variance inversely related to sample size), but application of the 
Goldfeld and Quandt (1965) test for heteroskedasticity indicated that 
weighted least squares (WLS) was not necessary and that the OLS esti­
mates would be appropriate. 
By choice this analysis controls for one of the more important 
variables determining legislator satisfaction with outcomes—that of 
majority-minority party status. In other words, beyond the impact of 
party status, what variables have an impact upon legislator satisfaction 
ratings of outcomes? In the initial preparatory analysis it was found that 
majority party satisfaction with decisions to pass or defeat bills corre­
lated negatively with the number of workdays (r = —0.43 and —0.40) 
and positively with the percentage of bills passed by the chamber (r = 
0.32 and 0.35). A check of the complete intercorrelation matrix com­
piled for this new data set revealed that these were the highest zero order 
correlations with "majority party satisfaction" in a pool of seventy-eight 
original and derived variables. Estimated in equation terms, we may let 
MAJSATP = Majority party member mean satisfaction rating for 
bills passed. 
MAJSATD = Majority party member mean satisfaction rating for 
decisions to defeat bills. 
WKDAYS = Number of 1981 regular session workdays (1980 for 
Kentucky). 
%PASS = Proportion of bills passing the chamber (includes 
bills from both houses here). 
where 
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(Mean Scores) * 
House: Decisions to Senate: Decisions to 
State Pass Not Pass Pop. Pass Not Pass 
Alabama 2.9(15) 3.1(13) 100 2.5(11) 2.6(9) 
Alaska 3.4(7) 3.0(7) 22 3.0(4) 3.3(4) 
Arizona 2.5(22) 2.5(20) 43 2.6(9) 2.7(9) 
Arkansas 2.7(22) 2.7(21) 93 2.3(8) 2.7(7) 
California 2.7(9) 2.4(9) 48 2.5(4) 2.5(4) 
Colorado 2.8(22) 2.8(19) 39 2.6(5) 2.6(5) 
Connecticut 2.7(12) 2.8(10) 83 2.3(7) 2.6(7) 
Delaware 2.6(14) 2.8(10) 25 2.8(4) 2.5(2) 
Florida 1.9(17) 1.8(14) 81 2.4(7) 2.3(7) 
Georgia 2.2(17) 2.3(16) 156 2.4(10) 2.7(9) 
Hawaii 2.8(16) 2.9(15) 39 2.4(9) 2.8(8) 
Idaho 2.4(29) 2.6(28) 56 2.2(13) 2.4(13) 
Illinois 2.7(16) 2.7(16) 91 2.0(3) 2.0(3) 
Indiana 2.5(19) 2.6(19) 63 2.1(14) 2.1(14) 
Iowa 2.8(18) 2.9(16) 58 2.3(12) 2.3(12) 
Kansas 2.7(22) 2.5(22) 72 2.5(12) 2.5(11) 
Kentucky 2.6(19) 2.5(15) 75 2.3(10) 2.5(11) 
Louisiana 2.4(14) 2.7(12) 95 2.0(9) 1.8(8) 
Maine 2.5(11) 2.5(11) 84 2.3(7) 2.6(7) 
Maryland 2.6(28) 2.6(27) 125 2.4(14) 2.2(13) 
Massachusetts 3.2(12) 3.0(12) 128 3.3(3) 3.3(3) 
Michigan 2.4(12) 2.8(11) 64 3.3(4) 2.7(3) 
Minnesota 2.3(9) 3.0(9) 70 2.4(10) 2.6(10) 
Mississippi 2.8(20) 3.0(19) 115 2.4(10) 2.3(9) 
Missouri 3.0(19) 3.0(18) 111 3.3(4) 2.7(3) 
Montana 2.5(24) 2.4(23) 57 2.3(7) 2.4(7) 
Nebraska 2.7(29) 3.1(20) 
Nevada 2.6(13) 2.5(12) 26 2.4(7) 2.9(7) 
New Hampshire 2.7(16) 2.5(14) 238 3.2(6) 2.7(6) 
New Jersey 2.8(13) 2.6(11) 44 2.1(7) 2.1(7) 
New Mexico 2.8(19) 2.9(17) 41 2.8(6) 2.8(5) 
New York 2.4(13) 2.6(14) 86 2.7(3) 2.7(3) 
North Carolina 2.4(21) 2.5(19) 95 2.5(11) 2.6(11) 
North Dakota 2.1(31) 2.3(27) 73 2.2(12) 2.3(11) 
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Table 5.2 (continued) 
House : Decisions to Senate: Decisions to 
State Pass Not Pass Pop. Pass Not Pass Pop 
Ohio 2.6(17) 2.6(12) 54 2.7(6) 2.5(6) 18 
Oklahoma 2.7(12) 2.6(12) 73 2.5(6) 2.7(6) 37 
Oregon 3.0(13) 3.2(13) 33 2.4(8) 2.7(7) 22 
Pennsylvania 2.4(8) 2.6(8) 103 2.6(5) 3.0(4) 25 
Rhode Island 2.4(18) 2.6(17) 82 2.5(6) 2.8(5) 43 
South Carolina 2.8(21) 2.8(19) 107 2.5(10) 2.8(10) 41 
South Dakota 2.3(26) 2.4(24) 49 2.4(14) 2.0(14) 25 
Tennessee 2.3(8) 2.5(8) 57 2.3(7) 2.5(6) 20 
Texas 2.6(19) 3.0(18) 114 2.8(10) 2.8(9) 23 
Utah 2.6(25) 2.6(25) 58 2.3(12) 2.3(11) 22 
Vermont 2.6(10) 3.0(8) 86 2.2(5) 2.3(3) 16 
Virginia 2.5(20) 2.5(19) 74 2.0(7) 2.1(7) 31 
Washington 2.4(19) 2.4(18) 56 2.2(10) 2.4(7) 25 
West Virginia 2.4(18) 2.5(17) 78 2.4(9) 2.6(9) 27 
Wisconsin 2.8(18) 2.8(20) 59 2.6(5) 2.6(5) 19 
Wyoming 2.4(26) 2.4(25) 39 2.5(10) 2.6(10) 19 
* In each case (n) = the number of respondents and the population is the number of majority party mem­
bers in the chamber. 
MAJSATP = 2.478 - .0036(WKDAYS) + .4203(%PASS) 5.1 
R2 = .232 t = -4 .33 t= 2.81 
N = 99 p < .001 p < .006 
B = - .389 B = .252 
MAJSATD = 2.603 - .0032(WKDAYS) + .4769(%PASS) 5.2 
R2 = .229 t = -3 .90 t = 3.28 
N = 99 p< .001 p < .001 
B = - .351 B < .295 
Thus, the fewer the workdays, the lower the time costs of participating 
in the legislature. The greater the passage rate, the greater the benefits 
achieved while participating. 
Examination of the above relationship for each chamber reveals 
only one severe outlier, that of the New Hampshire Senate. Respondents 
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of the Republican majority in this 23-member chamber (in 1981) con­
veyed dissatisfaction in spite of few workdays (48) and a high passage 
rate (.791). Whether the exception was caused by measurement or sam­
pling error (6 of 13 responded), or stochastic disturbances cannot be de­
termined, but as is normal the regression estimates are probably more 
accurate if the single case is set aside and the equations are restated 
as follows: 
MAJSATP = 2.496 - .0038(WKDAYS) 
+ .5027(%PASS) 
f —R2 = .291 
-4.83 t = 3.53 
N = 98 P < .001 P < .001 
B = -.417 B = .305 
MAJSATD = 2.613 - .0032(WKDAYS) 
+ .5071(%PASS) 
R2 = .241 t = -3 .99 t = 3.45 
N = 98 p < .001 p < .001 
B = - .357 B = .309 
The fact that the equation estimates for passed legislation and defeated 
legislation are so similar gives confirmation to the overall interpretation 
that the passage rate and the number of workdays are important in legis­
lator assessments of chamber success. It seems reasonable to speculate, 
however, that other factors are also at work. For example, constitutional 
or statutory limits, or even specific legislative rules, may influence the 
above stated relationships. As of 1981, there were seventeen states with­
out a constitutional or pay limit on the length of the legislative session 
(See Table 5.1). Of the remaining states, six had pay limits only, and 
twenty-seven had constitutional limits on either the number of calendar 
days, the number of legislative days, or both (Council of State Govern­
ments, 1980, pp. 108-109). 
The state chambers without a constitutional limit in 1981 spent an 
average of one hundred workdays in session, whereas those with limits 
held to an average of sixty-three regular session workdays. This rela­
tionship is expressed in a correlation of 0.55 between the number of 
workdays and the limit-versus-no-limit dichotomy. When controlling 
for the number of workdays, however, formal limits on the length of the 
session appear to have no direct impact upon chamber majority party 
satisfaction ratings. For example, the appropriate model of satisfaction 
with those that passed is: 
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.550 - .464 
Limit, (Yes/No) •WKDAYS *- MAJSATP | I 
-.268 (-.255) 
where it may be seen that it is the number of workdays that affects the 
ratings (N = 98). 
As a final consideration here we can determine whether a multi­
plicative term should be added to the above regression models. That is, 
we may wish to know whether the slope of the regression of satisfaction 
ratings on the passage rate increases or decreases with the number of 
workdays. If such an "interactive" effect is apparent, then the appropri­
ate multiplicative term should be added to the model. Letting the prod­
uct of the two regressors, WKDAYS and %PASS, be represented by the 
term DxP, the two resulting equations are: 
MAJSATP = 2.186 - .0077(WKDAYS) 
- .1587(%PASS) + .0087(DxP) 
R2 = .321 t = -4.05 t = - .491 t = 2.27 
N - 98 p < .001 p < .624 p < .026 
MAJSATD = 2.553 - .004(WKDAYS) 
+ .3851(%PASS) + .OO16(DXP) 
R2 = .234 / = -1 .96 t = 1.13 t = .40 
N = 98 P < .053 P < .263 P < .694 
The Goldfeld and Quandt test indicated that heteroskedasticity was not 
apparent in these equations. 
It may be observed that for decisions to defeat legislation, the mul­
tiplicative term is not significant (t - .40), and the adjusted multiple 
coefficient of determination remains virtually the same as it was before 
adding the new term. The ratings of satisfaction with passed legislation, 
however, do reveal both a significant multiplicative term and an im­
proved R2. The coefficients for the original independent terms are con­
ditional rather than general coefficients in these equations and must be 
interpreted as such (See Friedrich, 1982). Equation 5.5 suggests that the 
passage rate better explains majority member satisfaction in those states 
that have a greater number of workdays. The most apparent reason for 
this phenomenon is that in the chambers of a few states with short ses­
sions, the bill success rate may be high enough to signify a less careful 
approach to bill consideration. As a consequence, individuals in those 
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chambers may feel that the success of their own agenda is more than 
offset by the success of ill-advised legislation. If this interpretation is 
correct, the outlier senate of New Hampshire would serve as the ex­
treme case, where twenty-three members passed 685 bills (79%) in 
forty-eight workdays. Less obvious but similar patterns were noted 
for one or both chambers in New Mexico, Arkansas, Delaware, and 
Alabama. 
In summary, the previous analysis has demonstrated that the num­
ber of workdays and the passage rate are important factors in explaining 
majority party satisfaction with legislative outcomes. In the state legis­
lative context of mostly part-time service, the workdays create ample 
opportunity costs, and legislators will weigh their experience in light of 
these costs. The importance of the passage rate as an indicator of legis­
lator satisfaction may reflect also the specific nature of state legislative 
decision making, where law production is dominant. We would expect 
that legislators obtain gratification also by getting their "two cents 
worth" in omnibus bills, but the overall volume of processed legislation 
would imply that the so-called minor bills, by their very numbers, oc­
cupy a major share of the legislators' time and energy. 
Perhaps the most appropriate way to think of the "number of work­
days" and the "passage rate" is that they are proxies for the costs and 
benefits of legislative service. The principal cost to most state legis­
lators is the number of days they need to spend in the state capital. The 
principal benefit is their success rate on legislative proposals (and the 
kinds of rewards such success brings). A reasonable assumption about 
human behavior is that members of groups want the most benefits at the 
least cost, and the state legislature is no exception. 
The Dilemma 
The state legislature is distinguished often from Congress because of its 
part-time status. The distinction is of long-standing recognition, and 
most reformers have recommended an increase in the length of legis­
lative sessions. The study of the Citizens Conference on State Leg­
islatures, The Sometime Governments, for example, recommends the 
removal of constitutional restrictions on session time and interim work 
(1971, p. 156). Slowly but surely the transition from part-time to full-
time legislatures is occurring. Whether this evolution will continue to 
completion is difficult to determine. It is evident now that the transition 
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has brought with it a serious source of tension between public and pri­
vate employment. It has become very difficult to serve two masters, es­
pecially when each demands of the legislator better than 50 percent of 
his or her time. The impact of this phenomenon is illustrated dramati­
cally by the extent to which the days of work of legislators seem to influ­
ence negatively their evaluations of chamber performance. 
As suggested earlier, many legislators have opportunity costs that 
make lengthy service at the state capital undesirable. We might pre­
sume, of course, that higher salaries or compensation could offset these 
costs. Because many legislators are not willing to give up their private 
occupations or careers, it may be difficult to retain them at any cost. 
Continuance in public office is not assured. The trade-offs are illustrated 
in Figure 5.1 through indifference curves C,, C2, and C3. Following 
conventional economic analysis, any two points on a single indifference 
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curve are of equal value to the individual in question. Thus if a legis­
lator's indifference curve is C,, C2, or C3, he would need to receive a 
higher rate of pay as the number of workdays increases in order to offset 
the opportunity costs. 
In contrast, however, a substantial number of legislators may not 
have income producing activities in the private sector. It is in their inter­
est to increase total compensation. These "professional" legislators see 
the legislative position as a full-time job, and in the extreme they may 
be willing to accept a lower rate of pay in exchange for greater total 
compensation. The indifference curves for this type of legislator are il­
lustrated in Figure 5.1 (P,, P2, P3). In reality, of course, we would ex­
pect legislators to be arrayed in a continuum, from those with highly 
concave indifference curves to those with convex indifference curves, 
depending upon the extent of their opportunities in the private sector. 
To gain perspective, a twenty-two year period, from 1962 to 1984, 
should serve as an adequate span of time to note changes in compensa­
tion and legislative session obligations. During this period legislative 
compensation (salaries plus per diem) increased from a mean of $5,552 
to a mean of $10,296 in deflated dollars (by !/3, using cost of living in­
dex), or by 85.4 percent. But during approximately this same period, 
the number of days in legislative session (actual workdays not available) 
increased from a mean of 174 to a mean of 277, or an increase of 59.3 
percent. In aggregate terms, then, the real increase in pay was only 
about 26 percent. State-by-state detail reveals that compensation per 
day-in-session appears to have decreased in twenty-one states. In many 
states, therefore, compensation has not kept up with increases in legis­
lative obligation. In addition, in many states the increases in the rate of 
pay would seem inadequate to satisfy legislators with substantial oppor­
tunity costs. 
These results point to the need to examine more carefully the re­
cruitment and retirement patterns of legislators under emerging condi­
tions as the state legislatures become more "professional" in orienta­
tion. To shed some light on the subject, the following chapter is a study 
of retirement patterns in our two case study states, Indiana and Mis­
souri. A second concern is whether the legislative experience itself is 
rewarding enough to offset what may be the benefits of other endeavors. 
Self-Interest and 
Legislative Turnover 
Decisions of legislators to run for reelection or retire from office have 
attracted scholarly attention for a variety of reasons. In the study of 
Congress, for example, the goal of winning reelection has become the 
driving assumption in explaining much of Congressional behavior, in­
cluding the emphasis on casework, positioning on committees and sub­
committees, issue selection, expense allowances, and in general the 
success of members against most challengers (Fenno, 1973; Mayhew, 
1974; Kingdon, 1977, Fiorina, 1977). For Congress, the goal of win­
ning reelection, while not universally pursued by members (e.g., see 
Cooper and West, 1981; Hibbing, 1982), seems to be nevertheless a 
dominant motivation. Most observers of Congress worry about the lack 
of turnover and the "insulation" of members. 
Almost by tradition, the concern of state legislative observers has 
been the very opposite. High turnover rather than low turnover is the 
cause for concern. The historical basis for this concern is demonstrated 
in Ray's (1974) three-state study of Connecticut, Michigan, and Wis­
consin. He demonstrates that at the turn of the century the turnover rates 
in these three states were between 60 and 80 percent. By the 1930s the 
turnover rate in ten state houses was estimated at slightly less than 40 
Much of this chapter appeared in an article that was written while the book was in prog­
ress. See Wayne L. Francis and John R. Baker, "Why Do U.S. State Legislators Vacate 
Their Seats?" Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (1986): 119-126. 
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percent (Hyneman, 1938), but by the 1960s estimates were still in ex­
cess of 35 percent (Rosenthal, 1974b). In most recent years (1978-82), 
the rates have declined further, and as pointed out by Wiggins and 
Bernick (1977), the problem of turnover is no longer so apparent. Re­
cent data indicate that the turnover rate ranges from approximately 
25 to 32 percent (Council of State Governments, 1980-1984). Incen­
tives for reelection do vary considerably from state to state, and they 
may be changing as states make changes in compensation and session 
requirements. 
There are two basic reasons why scholars become concerned with 
high turnover. First, the legislature may lack the experienced members 
necessary to manage its business efficiently. Expertise is needed in com­
mittee negotiations, and in general it helps to have "a memory" of the 
procedures of government and of past decisions. Second, high turnover 
may reflect the inability to recruit or retain quality members, which sug­
gests further that there may be a problem in the incentive structure. That 
is, if members exit the legislature because they were defeated in the pri­
mary or general election, so be it. That is the way the game is played. 
But if they leave for other reasons, it will pay to take a closer look at the 
problem. 
One principal reason for a member to leave office voluntarily is to 
challenge another candidate for a more desirable position. In 1957, a 
four-state interview study of California, Ohio, New Jersey, and Ten­
nessee revealed that more than one-third of nearly five hundred legis­
lators had definite aspirations to higher office and another one-fourth 
thought that running for higher office was at least a possibility (Eulau, et 
al., in Marvick, 1961, p. 255). Following up on the careers of these 
members through 1971, Hain (1974) has shown that "progressive ambi­
tions" are highly related to age. More important for our purposes here is 
Hain's verification that a high percentage of state legislators in fact do 
seek "higher" office. In the original sample, 59 percent expressed pro­
gressive ambitions. Hain found that 44 percent actually did seek another 
office. 
Decisions to leave the legislature may be due to a number of fac­
tors. Blair and Henry (1981), for example, examined fifty-six voluntary 
retirees who did not run immediately for another office. They found that 
personal factors (especially family related) were the most frequently 
cited (82%), but that professional (48%) and political (23%) factors 
were apparent also. Even those who did run immediately for another 
office may have had other reasons for their exit. Thus, the decision to 
leave can be seen as a complex weighing of the costs and benefits of the 
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available alternatives. It is the purpose of this chapter to investigate this 
decision process. 
The 1981-82 memberships of the Indiana and Missouri legis­
latures provide the data for this examination. Serving in those years 
were 50 members of the Indiana senate and 99 members of the house. 
Missouri had 34 senate and 163 house members. Both chambers of In­
diana were controlled by Republicans, whereas the Democrats had their 
typical large majorities in the Missouri legislature. In 1981 the average 
number of "workdays" in all state legislatures was 75. Indiana had 84 
workdays and Missouri had 97. Annual legislative salaries plus ex­
penses were estimated at $11,000 for Indiana and $18,400 for Missouri. 
For all states the mean salary plus expense level is estimated at $13,500 
for 1981. Special sessions allow a per diem but no additional salary. In 
1981 Indiana spent three days in special session, whereas Missouri 
spent about ten days. Total compensation per day of work is estimated at 
$127 for Indiana and $129 for Missouri. 
Slightly more than 25 percent of the 1981-82 membership did not 
return for the 1983-84 term. Excluding those senators who were not up 
for reelection, 29 percent were either defeated or left office. By chamber 
these turnover figures are: 
Indiana House 26% 
Senate 36% (9 of 25) 
Missouri House 29% 
Senate 41% (7 of 17) 
In these two states a total of 89 members did not return for the 1983 
session. Of the 89, 63 left for reasons other than election defeat. In 
other words, about 71 percent of the turnover is due to reasons other 
than election defeat. This compares to 63 percent for the Blair and 
Henry data for Arkansas for 1970-78, 63-70 percent for the multistate 
data of Calvert (1979) for 1966-76, and 68.5 percent for the early 
Hyneman data. 
The sixty-three members of the Indiana and Missouri legislatures 
who voluntarily retired in 1982 were sent questionnaires in an attempt 
to evaluate their decisions. Of these members, forty-three (68%) re­
sponded satisfactorily.1 In the central question, legislators were asked to 
1. In Indiana 36% (9 of 25) of the voluntary retirees were from the minority party. This 
compares to 34% for the entire legislative membership. In Missouri 42% (16 of 38) were 
from the minority party, compared to 32% for the full membership. Among the returns 
from retired members, minority party members constituted 21% of the total for Indiana 
and 41% for Missouri. Although we might suspect that minority party members would 
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indicate which of the following reasons were appropriate in explaining 
their decision not to seek reelection: 
a. Decided to run for another office. 
b. Health or retirement. 
c. Dissatisfaction with legislative experience (or the legislature). 
d. Needed to spend more time in my private occupation or business. 
e. Was offered a more attractive career position. 
f. Family needs. 
g. Adverse political circumstances in my district. 
h. Other 
Respondents could give more than one reason, and more than half did. 
Where possible, responses in "h" were recoded in "a" through "g." 
In order to better comprehend the diverse responses to the above 
question, the results have been organized under five main categories: 
1. Opportunity Costs. 
2. Legislative Dissatisfaction. 
3. Career Ambitions. 
4. Health or Normal Retirement Age. 
5. Electoral Expectations. 
Opportunity costs are those benefits that legislators forego because 
they must serve in the legislature. Most legislators in the states under 
study (and probably in most other states as well) have private occupa­
tions or businesses that both produce income and require at least part of 
their time and energy. Workdays in the state capitol take legislators 
away from these income producing activities. Workdays in the state 
capitol also take many legislators away from their families and those 
benefits that come in the form of leisure and personal satisfaction in the 
home or family environment. 
Of the forty-three respondents in this study, seventeen were classi­
fied as indicating that opportunity costs were important in their deci­
sions to leave. The frequencies can be illustrated as follows: 
have greater reason to voluntarily retire, the above evidence gives only weak (if any) sup­
port to this notion. In examining reasons for retirement, as discussed later, majority-
minority status was not found to illustrate major differences with sufficient statistical cer­
tainty, although with a larger N a number of distinctions may emerge. 
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Business or Occupation Needs 9 
Family Needs 1 
Both _J 
17 
Several legislators were apparently in the position of having to give up 
one of three responsibilities. The legislative responsibility was infring­
ing upon both the family and the private business of the member. In 
only one case were family needs named without also naming the need to 
spend more time in private business. The single exception was a mem­
ber whose spouse was quite ill. The findings here modify the Blair-
Henry study in which greater emphasis was given to the "family" as a 
reason for retirement. 
Dissatisfaction with recent legislative experience also may be an 
important factor in voluntary retirement. Seven of the forty-three re­
spondents were explicit in this regard. Contrary to what one might ex­
pect, members who expressed this dissatisfaction were on all measures 
very active members of the legislature. All seven either were committee 
chairs or served on finance or appropriation committees. Six of seven 
were above the mean in their chamber party in: (1) the quantity of legis­
lation sponsored which passed the chamber, and (2) the percent of leg­
islation sponsored which passed the chamber. Six of the seven were ma­
jority party members. Confirmation of their dissatisfaction is noted in 
their responses to a separate item in which they were asked to rate on a 
five point scale how "rewarding" they found their last term of service. 
The following representation illustrates the difference between these 
dissatisfied members and their retiring colleagues: 
1 Very Rewarding 
Most Retirees x = 1.97 2 Usually Rewarding 
3 Rewarding only 
part of the time 
Dissatisfied x = 3.27 4 Usually not 
Retirees rewarding 
5 Not rewarding at 
all 
In sum, the members who indicated dissatisfaction with their legislative 
experience as a reason for retiring were distinct from other retirees on a 
Likert-type scale item as well. These dissatisfied respondents appeared 
to be active and potentially influential members of their chamber. In ad­
dition, none of them indicated that they had retired to run for another 
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office. Several of these members indicated that they were either frus­
trated by their experience or "burned out." A contributing factor in a 
majority of cases was also the member's need to spend more time in his 
or her business or occupation. 
In a third important group are those legislators whose career ambi­
tions lead them to vacate their seat to run for another office. Almost half 
of those who left voluntarily (21 of 43) immediately sought another 
office. In addition, members may accept other types of career positions 
in public life, such as in the state or federal bureaucracy, or the state or 
federal judiciary. Two members in our sample accepted appointments in 
federal agencies. Among those seeking elective office, several were 
house members seeking a senate seat. Others ran for Congress, and in 
some cases a local office was sought. Four of our six women respon­
dents in this survey left to run for another office. 
Of those twenty-one members who sought another office, fifteen 
offered no other reason for vacating their seat. Eight of the respondents 
wanted to move to the state senate, and others obviously wanted higher 
office to satisfy their career ambitions. Five of the six who gave more 
complex responses indicated that they needed to spend more time in 
their business or occupation (the sixth mentioned health). At least three 
of these six ran for local office (two for prosecuting attorney), and one 
ran for Congress. The member who ran for Congress gave a succinct 
explanation for his decision: 
Thus the decision was made to run for Congress and either "get in" 
full time in politics if I won, or "get out" if I lost and devote "full­
time" to my business. 
As we could have predicted from Hain's career study, those who left 
to run for another office were a younger group than those who left for 
other reasons—a mean of forty-two years of age as compared to fifty-
three. By the evidence in the official records, most of those who vacated 
their seat to run for another office did not appear well integrated into the 
formal power structure of their chamber. None of the four majority 
party senators held a committee chairmanship in 1981, and only one 
served on a committee dealing with taxation, appropriations, or bud­
get. The three house members from Indiana also did not serve on the 
"money" committees, nor did the single majority member hold a com­
mittee chairmanship. Only in the 163-member Missouri house did those 
seeking another office appear in this respect to be typical of the chamber 
as a whole. Members who are seeking another office may in fact avoid 
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heavy responsibilities in their chamber in order to devote more time to 
building a campaign. 
The progressive ambitions of members in this study may be demon­
strated more clearly by their bill sponsorship activity. They may sponsor 
a higher volume of successful bills than those who merely sought re­
election to their own seats. To make this comparison, the data (taken 
from the official legislative journals and indexes) were broken down by 
state, chamber, and party—for three reasons. First, the states have dif­
ferent rules for processing legislation. Second, members in the smaller 
senates tend to sponsor more bills (mean number of sponsorships among 
senators is 25.7 for Indiana and 15.1 for Missouri, whereas for House 
members it is 11.7 and 6.1 respectively). Finally, majority party mem­
bers tend to have greater success with their legislation. For example, the 
mean sponsorship success rate for getting bills through the chamber was 
34 percent for majority members in the two states, but only 19 percent 
for minority party members. The pattern holds for all four chambers. 
This process of sorting by state, chamber, and party status produces 
eight subgroups. 
Within each subgroup it is possible to compare the success of bills 
of those who sought reelection with the success of those who sought 
another office. Because of the small number of cases in the latter group, 
the results need to be combined in some way to gain statistical confi­
dence. We ask whether members seeking another office were above or 
below the mean of the reelection seekers in their subgroup. We find that 
in two-thirds of the cases (14 of 21) those seeking another office did 
sponsor more successful bills than the mean rate of the reelection 
seekers in their respective subgroups. This tendency will require further 
confirmation, but it is apparent that those seeking other offices were ac­
tive in sponsoring legislation and were at least as successful as those 
who continued on in their legislative chamber. 
In addition to legislators who retire because of opportunity costs, or 
dissatisfaction with the legislature, or progressive ambitions, there are 
those who have health problems or who reach what they consider to be 
normal retirement age. Seven of the forty-three respondents indicated 
that at least one of these factors was a consideration in their retirement 
from the legislature. As expected, most of these members were in an 
advanced age group. These personal reasons seem theoretically unin­
teresting, but they do constitute a part of legislative turnover. 
In a final residual group, four legislators indicated that they did not 
run again at least partly because of electoral expectations, that is, be­
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cause of adverse political circumstances in their districts. With only 
four cases, an evaluation is not appropriate, but it would seem that these 
legislators might be similar to those members who ran again but lost in 
the primary. The four members in this category apparently predicted 
they might lose and therefore did not run. Other members probably 
would not have run had they thought they would not win. 
To summarize, legislators who voluntarily vacate their seats do so 
for a variety of reasons, the most common of which are: (1) the oppor­
tunity costs associated with their private occupation and (2) the pros­
pects for career advancement in public office. Important also are oppor­
tunity costs associated with the family, dissatisfaction with legislative 
experience, health or age related considerations, and electoral expecta­
tions. The frequency of response offered in each of these categories is 
illustrated in Table 6.1. 
A degree of caution needs to be taken when interpreting the results. 
While the question posed to each respondent offered a balance of op­
tions, it is nevertheless possible that some respondents were reluctant to 
indicate the full range of their reasons. Dissatisfaction with legislative 
service, for example, may be more common among respondents than 
has been shown. In addition, those who indicated only that they sought 
another office may have had reasons for doing so that were not revealed. 
Finally, at least some of the nonrespondents may have had more per­
sonal reasons for retiring, such as those that were found in the full 
sample study of Blair and Henry. 
In conclusion, this analysis has shown that legislative turnover 
across the nation at the state level has continued to decline, but that still 
about 70 percent of the turnover in our selected states (Indiana and Mis­
souri) is due to voluntary retirement. Approximately 21 percent of those 
legislators who were up for reelection did not run for the same seat (ei­
ther in the primary or general election). Our sample suggests that about 
10 percent ran for another office and that the other 10 or 11 percent 
chose to return to private status. Only about 8 percent of those whose 
seats were up for reelection actually lost the seat at the polls. A few 
(four in our sample) vacated their seats to avoid a possible loss. 
In his study of risk-bearing and progressive ambition in Congress, 
Rohde (1979) was able to assume that returning to private status is an 
undesirable alternative except in very unusual circumstances. Histori­
cally, the return to private status has been a more viable option for state 
legislators. This study details some of the reasons and their significance. 
In recent years state legislatures have been changing from part-time to 
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Table 6.1 Summary of Reasons for Voluntarily Vacating Legislative 
Seat(N = 43)* 
Indiana Missouri Total 
Opportunity
Costs 
17(40%) 
Occupational
Family
Legislative
Dissatisfaction 
7
 3
 5
 9
 5
 2
 16(37%) 
 8(19%) 
7(16%) 
Career Ambitions (Public Office) 23 (53%) 
Elective Office 5 16 21(49%) 
Other 1 1 2 ( 5 % ) 
Health or Age 3 4 7(76%) 
Electoral 1 3 4 ( 9%) 
Expectations 
* Percentages represent proportion of respondents who gave each response. A respondent could 
give more than one response. 
full-time duty—meeting every year in longer sessions and in special 
sessions. The states are in different stages in this evolution. Future 
analysis would benefit by contrasting those that assume full-time duty 
with those that are strictly part-time. Indiana and Missouri are in the 
middle of this distribution. We would expect that the nature of voluntary 
retirement would be a reflection of those incentives that attract members 
to the legislature in the first place. 
As legislative service becomes more demanding of members' time, 
we would expect fewer legislators with lucrative private occupations to 
make a bid for a seat, unless, of course, there is a marked increase in 
legislative compensation. The increase in time demands make it more 
likely that candidates will see themselves as full-time professionals 
rather than part-time citizens. Incentives to institutionalize the commit­
tee and leadership structure become more attractive. Members may have 
aspirations for higher office, but a career in the legislature can be made 
appealing also. It is in the interest of members with long-term interests 
in public office to improve their options. 
The three major options or alternatives confronted by legislators are: 
a, Run again for the same office 
a2 Run for a "higher" office 
a3 Retire from office (returning to private status) 
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The decision of each legislator will depend on the expected utility of 
each option. Borrowing from the formalization of Rohde (1979; also see 
Riker and Ordeshook, 1973, ch. 3), the expected utility of each option 
may be stated as follows: 
E{ax) = PX{OX) U{OX) - C{ax) 
E(a2) = P2{O2) U(O2) - C{a2) 
E(a3) = U(O3) - C{a3) 
where Pt is the probability that outcome j will occur if alternative / is 
selected, U(O) is the utility to the legislators if outcome j is selected, 
C(a) is the direct utility cost of selecting alternative i, and Ov O2, and 
O3 are the outcomes corresponding to the listed alternatives. 
The above equations assume that a legislator must give up one 
office to run for another and that P = 1.0. Generally, we would expect 
that the probability of winning a higher office is substantially less than 
that of winning reelection to the same seat, thus even though the poten­
tial benefits derived from higher office are greater, they are usually more 
than offset by the low probability of winning. In the two-state study 
there were 304 seats on the line. Approximately 79 percent of the in­
cumbents chose alternative av and only about 8 percent did not succeed 
in regaining their seats. Alternatives a2 and a3 were selected with about 
equal frequency by the other incumbents. Thus when chances are four 
out of five that legislators will seek reelection, the desire to build up the 
attractiveness of continued service is likely to be widespread. Institu­
tionalization of the committee system is one way to do it. 
It is in the self-interest of members to create a committee system 
that distributes widely the benefits to be had in the form of legislation. 
In some instances this will mean nothing more than claiming credit for 
legislation to satisfy constituents who may be influential in the next 
election. In other cases, ideological differences may be at stake. In any 
case, the situation is far different than it was at the turn of the century, 
when legislators had a very limited interest in state legislative service. 
Thus in spite of the dissatisfaction that may be created by excessive 
numbers of workdays in the state capitols (as implied by the findings in 
chapter 5), 80 percent of the legislators choose nevertheless to seek re­
election to the same seat. With a 90 percent chance of success, such as 
in Indiana or Missouri, other options become less attractive. In this re­
spect the state legislative incentive system is becoming much more like 
that of Congress. As legislators see the prospect of a career, they are 
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more likely to want the institutionalization of incentives in the conduct 
of official business. Chair and committee assignments take on added im­
portance. They are likely to want visible benefits in the form of legisla­
tion, and time away from the state capitol may be valued more for shor­
ing up political support, as in the case of members of Congress (e.g., 
see Parker, 1986), than for outside business or personal activities. Even 
now many state legislators maintain offices in their districts, and such 
a phenomenon may be the next wave in state legislative elaboration of 
the office. 

Part Three 
Explorations in Efficiency 
and Reform 

7 
Risk, Efficiency, and 
Adaptation 
in Committee Decision 
Making 
Committees are created in a variety of ways. Perhaps the most interesting 
from a purely philosophical perspective is the voluntary self-selected 
committee that forms without any jurisdictional, organizational, or 
membership restrictions. In more structured situations, however, such 
as those considered in this work, committee formation usually involves 
delegations of responsibility or authority. Such actions may be divided 
into two main categories: 
1.	 Those in which one person delegates decision making to a few, or a 
few delegate to many. 
2.	 Those in which many delegate decision making to a few (or to one). 
In this book it is the latter of these two types of action that is of primary 
concern. Nevertheless, it will be helpful to consider briefly delegations 
to larger groups. 
Delegating from One to Few or Few to Many 
By definition, a committee arrives at decisions through voting or the 
counting of preferences. Thus the question of why a purely voluntary 
committee forms is really a question of why individuals choose to abide 
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by a voting rule. The latter question in turn raises a number of funda­
mental choices that pit the use of a voting rule against alternative ways 
of achieving goals. The alternatives include direct bargaining, the use or 
threat of force, delegation of responsibility to an individual or group 
that is not a committee, or simply autonomous individual action or inac­
tion. When an individual chooses to abide by a voting rule, he or she in 
essence delegates individual discretion to committee rule (i.e., from one 
to many). Motivations for participating voluntarily in committee deci­
sion making are similar to those elicited in an institutional context. 
The delegation of decision making to a larger number of partici­
pants may seem the reverse of what legislators normally do, but it is an 
important option for most committee systems. Most of the states in the 
U.S., for example, have constitutional provisions that allow the legis­
lature to use a voluntary referendum. The principal reason for individu­
als to expand participation in decisions is to reduce risk. When leg­
islators choose to place a measure on the ballot (assuming it is not 
constitutionally required), it is usually to avoid the electoral risks of a 
legislative stalemate or the consequences of taking an unpopular posi­
tion. Revenue and tax matters are frequent subjects of such procedures. 
Risk. There are several specific risk-related reasons for enlarging 
the committee decision-making setting. In settings where deliberation is 
possible, a larger group may supply either additional alternatives, or 
more complete information regarding the consequences of various alter­
natives. Even where the quality of the information pool is not expected 
to increase, the referral of decisions to larger committees may have a 
symbolic advantage and help legitimize the decisions. Even when nei­
ther of the above advantages is apparent, delegating the decisions will 
buy additional time and perhaps cause a needed delay in the settlement 
of issues. Finally, given that the decisions may carry negative conse­
quences of some magnitude, it may be appealing to shift or spread the 
risk. Legislators are noted for wanting to claim credit. They are not 
noted for wanting to take the blame. Nor are most other humans. 
In most legislative committee systems, the need to reduce risk and 
delegate decisions to larger committees is satisfied by constitutional 
requirements or official legislative procedures. The full standing com­
mittee passes judgment on legislation forwarded by its subcommittees. 
Legislative proposals surviving the standing committee must be ap­
proved by a majority of the entire chamber in order to pass. In addition, 
a second chamber often rules on the legislation approved by the first 
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chamber. Within these general guidelines, legislatures do vary some­
what in their practices. 
Most American legislatures allow committees the autonomy to sit 
on proposals indefinitely, although in a few states the committees are 
required to report out all legislation, with or without a favorable recom­
mendation. In many states the party caucus is active and will pass judg­
ment upon legislation considered by committees. In contrast, in many 
other states the party caucus seldom meets. In the parliaments of many 
nations, the standing or select committees are confined to the details of 
legislation. In the U.S., the standing committees are often the architects 
of legislation. These differences, however, should not overshadow the 
fact that risk reduction is a principal concern in any committee system. 
Adaptation. The management of risk occurs in several different 
ways. A primary organizational means of managing risk is to make all 
major decisions subject to multiple review. When review procedures be­
come standard practice, individuals in the organization will learn to take 
precautionary or anticipatory action. In a committee system such re­
views are concluded in a committee vote. Thus the best way for a mem­
ber to anticipate the action of a review committee is to poll its member­
ship. A poll is a simulated vote. 
Among seasoned observers of legislative politics, it is conventional 
wisdom that sophisticated legislators prefer to reduce the risk of defeat 
in a larger forum by first initiating polls of membership opinion. The 
party whips are best known for this function, but in American legis­
latures, where standing committees are strong, the committee chair and 
bill sponsors are often the poll takers. It is also common for lobbyists 
and newspapers to take their own polls. Obviously poll taking takes 
time and energy, and there is a limit to how much of it can be done. 
Delegating from Many to Few 
The central reason for delegating decision making to a smaller group or 
committee is to reduce the amount of time and energy it takes to arrive 
at decisions. The decision costs per member are reduced by initiating a 
division of labor and economies of scale. In the simplest of situations, 
the larger group assigns one or more tasks to a single committee that is 
composed of fewer members. The smaller committee is asked to spe­
cialize and to act according to one of the following guidelines: 
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1.	 Act with complete autonomy. 
2.	 Ask for approval from the larger group for any decision that causes 
a change in the status quo. 
3.	 Ask for approval from the larger group for all decisions. 
The first alternative represents the most complete division of labor, 
since nonmembers of the smaller committee have no further responsibil­
ity for the tasks of the smaller committee. The second alternative is a 
halfway house, requiring approval from the parent group on decisions 
that create change—but on decisions to delay or block, only members 
who are on the small committee participate. The third and last alter­
native above represents a division of labor only in the sense that the 
members of the small committee may go into greater detail than those 
not on the committee. 
Most American legislatures adopt the second guideline. The stand­
ing committees report back to the chamber only those legislative mea­
sures they approve. For the typical member the workload decreases from 
a consideration of all proposals to a consideration of proposals that are: 
1.	 Assigned to the member's standing committees 
2.	 Reported to the floor from other committees 
3.	 Not in the above but on the member's personal agenda 
To illustrate, assume a one-hundred-member chamber with one thou­
sand proposals and twenty committees. A particular member has intro­
duced ten bills and serves on three committees which together receive 
150 (3/20) bills. Forty percent of all proposals in other committees 
reach the floor. The member must consider 150 bills in his three com­
mittees, plus 340 of the 850 bills in other committees, plus a small num­
ber of personal bills (e.g., 3 or 4) not included previously. In sum, the 
member must consider only slightly less than 50 percent of the legisla­
tion. The percentage would be reduced even further if each committee 
employed subcommittees. 
The Decision versus External Cost Dilemma 
Whenever a decision is made to reduce decision costs by reducing the 
number who must approve a decision, there is risk of increasing exter­
nal costs (adverse repercussions). Buchanan and Tullock, in The Cal­
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Costs 
Fraction Required to Approve Proposal 
Fig. 7.1 Theoretical Relationship between Decision Costs and 
External Costs 
culus of Consent (1962), explore the nature of this dilemma and suggest 
that there may be some optimal level of approval that would minimize 
the sum of these costs. Buchanan and Tullock were concerned with 
broad questions of constitutional decision making; nevertheless, their 
thesis might be helpful if revised and refined to apply to legislative in­
stitutions. They distinguish between private decision costs, as illus­
trated above in our division of labor example, and interpersonal deci­
sion costs, which are decreased through economies of scale. They 
speculate that there is a direct curvilinear relationship between interper­
sonal decision costs and the number who must approve a proposal. In 
other words, in a group of fixed size, an increase in the fraction of mem­
bers required for approval will lead to increases in interpersonal deci­
sion costs at an increasing rate. Reaching agreement becomes increas­
ingly difficult as those who are less in agreement with a proposal must 
be added to form a winning coalition. 
Buchanan and Tullock would suggest, however, an inverse cur­
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vilinear relationship between external costs and the number who must 
approve. As the fraction who approve is increased, the external costs 
or adverse repercussions that will occur will decrease at a decreas­
ing rate. 
Buchanan and Tullock did not go into sufficient detail to explain 
why the above relationships are curvilinear. Greater discussion of these 
expectations will be taken up in the next chapter in relation to the spe­
cific aspects of legislative organization. Here it is sufficient to observe 
that when the two cost curves are curvilinear, one positive and one 
negative, and if in theory the costs are additive, then the curves can be 
combined to produce Figure 7.1; the figure illustrates an optimal point. 
On the graph, the point at which these two cost curves intersect would 
indicate an optimal approval level (total costs would be minimized). As 
the number who must approve is increased beyond the optimal level, for 
example, decision costs accelerate and external costs decline, but at a 
slower rate. The parabola represents the sum of decision and external 
costs at each point. 
Problems in Application 
There are a number of problems with the above thesis as it applies to 
legislatures. First of all, private decision costs—obtaining information 
about legislative proposals and making up one's mind—are a very im­
portant part of a legislative day. For example, in the survey of legis­
lators of fifty states, the private decision costs, as measured by amount 
of time spent obtaining and understanding information about bills (first 
item in Table 7.1), were equal to the total of interpersonal time costs, 
which included finding out how other members felt about the issues and 
hammering out compromises (second and third items in Table 7.1). 
A second problem in applying the Buchanan-Tullock thesis arises 
from the notion that external costs result only from decisions made. Ex­
ternal costs can result also from decisions not made. Thus while it may 
seem to make sense to have large standing committees in legislatures to 
achieve greater representation and approval before sending legislation to 
the floor, such large committees may act sluggishly and suppress de­
mands for action. These counteracting influences may be understood 
partly through the notion of risk. Legislators must weigh two types of 
risk: (1) the risk of making a change; and (2) the risk of maintaining the 
status quo. External costs can result from either choice. 
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Table 7.1 Committee Work Distributions in a Typical Legislative 
Day (in Hours) 
Q.	 Of those hours you spend on committee-subcommittee work, how would 
you estimate they are allocated among the following activities? 
All Majority Minority 
Type of Activity Members Members Members 
Obtaining information about 1.96 1.97 1.93 
proposals in order to under­
stand their content. 
Finding out how other mem­ .82 .87 .72 
bers feel about the issues 
(formal and informal 
discussions). 
Hammering out workable 1.10 1.13 1.02 
compromises with members 
of the committee(s). 
Reviewing conduct of adminis­ .50 .52 .46 
trative agencies. 
Other committee work. .24 .24 .25 
Totals 4.62 4.73 4.38 
a. Range of n = 1714-1923 
b. Range of n = 1116-1221 
c. Range of n = 598-672 
A third problem in the application of the decision cost and external 
cost theme arises from the complexity of legislative committee organi­
zation. In other words, we cannot examine simply a single standing 
committee out of context and determine, say, its optimal membership 
size. Several other factors may have a bearing upon its optimal form, 
including the size of the legislative chamber itself, and the extent to 
which the committee utilizes subcommittees. The amount of legislation 
received by a committee should have a bearing also. Optimal committee 
size makes less sense than the notion of optimal committee system (or 
systems). These optimalities are explored in chapter 8. 
A fourth problem in applying the above thesis is that most Ameri­
can legislatures labor under the condition of excess demand for action. 
The demands for time and action are likely to exceed greatly the capac­
ity of the committee system to supply well-informed responses to all 
such demands. Under this condition, legislators have two organizational 
alternatives to attempt to meet the demand. The first is to increase the 
number of legislative workdays, either by mutual agreement or constitu­
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tional amendment. The second is to improve the internal structure (com­
mittee organization, staffing, etc.) and rules for making decisions. The 
first alternative offers an increase in decision costs in exchange for addi­
tional benefits in outcomes. The results in chapter 6 would suggest that 
in practice such a solution falls far short of being Pareto-optimal. Many 
legislators would anticipate substantial increases in opportunity costs. 
Legislators who experienced more workdays tended to be less satisfied 
with the product of their efforts. 
The second alternative, improving the internal structure, offers 
lower decision costs per item of business, but it probably will not affect 
total decision costs because of excess demand for action. In other 
words, efficiency advancements must be measured not in total decision 
costs but in improved outcomes. 
Adaptation 
When the risks of taking action are too high or the costs of inefficiency 
too burdensome, we would expect individuals to initiate some type of 
adaptive behavior. As mentioned earlier, to cut down on risk, legislators 
frequently will poll the views of members prior to taking formal action 
on legislation. To reduce decision costs, legislators have a number of 
alternatives. If they receive too many committee assignments, or if the 
committees are too large to work effectively, legislators may begin to 
miss meetings on a selective basis. If legislators are unable to evaluate 
thoroughly all the legislation that they must vote up or down, they may 
choose to ignore proposals of lesser personal value. Alternatively, they 
may find shortcuts for arriving at positions such as asking the opinion of 
a trusted expert or friend, or by respecting the wishes of the committee 
chair. The costs of information might be reduced also by ignoring mi­
nority party members' views, and legislators may choose not to bargain 
over legislation except in small subcommittees. Thus, there is a variety 
of individual and informal ways that legislators can employ to better ac­
complish their goals. 
Legislatures have a formal structure and formal rules, the exact na­
ture of which may have an impact upon the ability of legislators to 
achieve their goals. Inefficiencies may be remedied by changing the for­
mal structure and rules, but if there is insufficient agreement as to what 
is necessary, legislators may very well improve their conditions by 
adapting their behavior in response to their particular circumstances. 
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Because of individual and informal adaptive behavior, formal organiza­
tional differences in legislatures will not have the impact that might be 
expected. Nevertheless, if conditions continue to worsen, as when the 
number of committees and committee assignments continues to expand 
in response to leadership incentives to hand out patronage, the members 
may institute a major reorganization of operating rules. The following 
chapters include specific consideration of formal and informal adaptive 
behavior. 
8 
Committee System 
Optimalities: Size Preferences 
and Member Adaptation 
In the previous chapter the "costs of decision making" were classified 
into two types: (1) Decision Costs, and (2) External Costs. Decision 
costs are incurred as a positive curvilinear function of the fraction of 
membership required for approval, whereas external costs, following 
Buchanan and Tullock, are a negative curvilinear function of that frac­
tion. Given these assumptions, it makes sense to ask how they might be 
applied to a legislative institution. In the last chapter a number of con­
ceptual problems with this approach were discussed. In this chapter an 
empirical investigation will offer more specific modifications. In par­
ticular, how can decision costs and external costs be evaluated in rela­
tion to committees, committee size, and the structure of the committee 
system? 
The analysis to follow demonstrates that in a legislative setting it 
makes more sense to develop the notion of "optimal committee system" 
rather than optimal committee size. Evidence is provided also to suggest 
that legislators do adapt in predictable ways to "inefficiencies" in com­
mittee organization, but that it is not possible in all circumstances for 
them to compensate. 
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A Theoretical Model for a Single Committee 
Earlier theoretical work has established the significance of "decision 
rules" for evaluating costs and benefits of decision making (Rae, 1969). 
Legislative committees, however, almost universally employ majority 
rule, not two-thirds, three-fourths, and so forth. The number who must 
approve a proposal is therefore a direct function of committee size. Thus 
we may hypothesize that an increase in committee size will lead to: 
1. a rate increase in decision costs 
2. a rate decrease in external costs 
More formally, these relationships may be expressed as: 
D=f{W} 8.1 
E =f{N~k} 8.2 
where D refers to Decision Costs, E to External Costs, TV to the number 
of members on the committee, and where g > 1 and —k < — 1 to sig­
nify the expectation that the relationships are curvilinear. 
The first equation suggests that, other things being equal (such as 
the voting rule, and the right of members to speak and bargain), de­
cision costs will increase at a faster rate than membership size. The ac­
celerating factor in this relationship is found in the complexities of bar­
gaining. The number of bargaining combinations and corresponding 
coalition possibilities expands very rapidly—as a factorial of the num­
ber of committee members. 
The second equation above suggests that as committee size in­
creases, external costs decrease at an even faster rate. A committee ma­
jority becomes very quickly a more representative sample of its parent 
majority as the size of the committee is increased—much in the way 
random samples work. The larger the committee, the less it can be ori­
ented toward special interests, and hence the less it suffers from the re­
percussions of special interest decisions. 
The goal of the individual legislator is to minimize D + E. If we 
assume that the above is a plausible portrayal of the effects of committee 
size, it may be shown, using standard minimizing procedures, that for 
each legislator there is an optimal committee size. Letting C = D 4- E, 
we may sum the two cost equations such that: 
C =f{Ns + N~k} 8.3 
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Taking the first derivative to minimize total costs with respect to com­
mittee size (N), we find 
dCldN = + = 0 
which reduces to: 
#<«+*> = k/g 
= g<i/g+*xin<*/g)) wher  e N is op t imal . 8.4 
These equations simply confirm the existence of an optimal committee 
size as a result of summing the cost equations. As pointed out by 
Buchanan and Tullock (1962), total costs will take on a parabolic shape 
(Figure 8.1), the lowest point of which is optimal. 
How plausible is this model? It does not suggest that the optimal 
committee size is the same for all members, nor that individuals will 
have the same tolerances for decision costs or external costs. Many 
Costs 
Committee Size 
Fig. 8.1 Decision/External Cost Functions for Varying Committee 
Sizes under Constant Decision Rule 
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other factors, such as the use of subcommittees, the role of the chair, 
and the motivations of members serving in the legislative body, would 
need to be taken into account. 
Also, in chapter 7 decision costs were divided into "private" deci­
sion costs and "interpersonal" decision costs. Private decision costs are 
a direct function of the number of proposals. Interpersonal decision 
costs are probably a function of both the number of proposals and the 
number of members. Equations 8.1 and 8.3 are thus incomplete unless 
it is assumed that the number of proposals is a constant. Several of these 
modifications will be taken up later. The present task is to make a 
simple test of the model. 
An Empirical Test 
The direct measurement of decision costs and external costs is a com­
plex and messy business, but there is a different way to get at the prob­
lem and thereby indirectly test the illustrated model. In a nationwide 
sample of state legislators, the following question was posed: 
From your experience in committee work, what would you regard as 
the ideal committee size (# of members) for the following type of 
committee? 
a typical standing committee of your chamber 
This item was first administered to a sample of 511 state legislators after 
the 1979 legislative sessions in each state. The results are reported by 
the author in a 1982 article. This analysis utilizes the later and more 
complete returns of a 1981 survey of two thousand state legislators. 
We might surmise that there would be an equilibrium factor at work 
in the responses to the above question. When a member feels that the 
standing committees are larger than optimal size, he or she may indicate 
a preference for smaller committees; likewise, if the committees seem 
too small, a preference for larger committees may be expressed. We 
should not expect legislators to know the "optimal size" committee, but 
we would expect them to provide informed judgment about whether or 
not their experiences suggest that their committees have too many or too 
few members. 
In order to make the best use of the judgments provided by legis­
lators, two measures of actual committee size have been developed: 
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1.	 Average Committee Size 041). Calculated from the official com­
mittee listings of each state. "Housekeeping" committees not 
included. 
2.	 Average Named-Committee Size (A2). Legislators were asked to 
name two committees on which they served. The responses were 
verified in the records, and the sizes recorded and averaged. Cases 
were omitted in this analysis if only one committee was named. 
The first measure is more likely to tap the entire standing committee 
experience of legislators in each chamber, whereas the second measure 
focuses upon the immediate past experience. An ample proportion of 
legislators served on only two standing committees. 
Letting / = Ideal Committee Size for each respondent, and A1 and 
A2 the respective mean values of "actual" committee size, we are able 
to observe that the "ideal" is highly related to experience, where 
r\M) = .64 (N = 1958) 
r\A2) = .41 (N = 1922) 
Legislators are likely to suggest an incremental change, if any, and only 
rarely a fundamental alteration (at least in a survey instrument of the 
kind used here). Thus instead of treating the "ideal" responses as abso­
lutes, we may treat them as expressions of preference to move off the 
status quo, such that: 
Q\ = l-A\ 
Q2 = I-A2 
where: 
1.	 A positive Q value means a preference for larger committees. 
2.	 A Q value of O means a preference for committees of the same size. 
3.	 A negative Q value means a preference for smaller committees. 
The Q differences allow an evaluation of the minimization model. 
If the model is to be retained, we should find that the relationship be­
tween Q and A is consistent with the parabolic relationship illustrated in 
Figure 8.1. If in fact members of committees do seek to minimize the 
sum of decision costs and external costs, and if in fact the costs are ex­
ponential functions of committee size, one direct and the other inverse, 
we should find that the responses exhibit a weighing of these costs. In 
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Table 8.1 Differences between Preferred and Actual Committee 
Size (I-Al) 
Actual 1981 Mean Values Mean Values 1979 
Size N of Q (1981) of Q (1979) N 
5-6.99 126 + .26 + .22 49 
7-8.99 218 - .04 + .28 69 
9-10.99 331 - .30 - .52 60 
11-12.99 340 - .76 - .82 56 
13-14.99 181 -1.32 -1.25 86 
15-16.99 196 -1.64 -2.33 40 
17-18.99 219 -1.98 -1.81 67 
19-20.99 168 -2.74 -3.82 33 
2 1  - 179 -3.14 -4.11 32 
Table 8.2 Differences between Preferred and Actual Committee 
Size (I-A2)* 
Actual 1981 Mean Values Mean Values 1979 
Size N of Q (1981) of Q (1979) N 
5-6.99 82 + .76 + .62 29 
7-8.99 144 + .18 + .56 50 
9-10.99 226 - .50 -.41 37 
11-12.99 206 -1.00 -1.32 59 
13-14.99 207 -1.94 -1.85 52 
15-16.99 241 -2.58 -2.30 64 
17-18.99 136 -2.81 -3.53 38 
19-20.99 151 -2.99 -3.23 30 
21-22.99 71 -5.62 -6.08 20 
23-24.99 44 -6.84 -9.14 14 
25-26.99 70 -7.86 -7.19 8 
27-28.99 32 -10.08 -9.50 6 
29-30.99 14 -10.21 -11.67 6 
31-32.99 18 -14.33 -11.87 4 
3 3  - 25 -25.78 -24.50 7 
*The figures in this table do not contain responses from members who named only one commit­
tee on which they served. 
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Table 8.3	 Subcommittee Use and the Relationship between Actual 
and Preferred Committee Size 
Extent of Subcommittee Use Differences 
Committee High Low 1981 1979 Size High- High­
(A2) Q2 N Q2 N Low Low 
5-6.99 + .91 36 + .64 46 .27 1.42 
7-8.99 + .49 57 -.02 87 .51 .56 
9-10.99 -.37 141 -.69 85 .32 .67 
11-12.99 -.85 151 -1.41 55 .56 .09 
13-14.99 -1.84 112 -2.08 95 .24 .46 
15-16.99 -2.29 169 -3.28 72 .99 .94 
17-18.99 -2.82 114 -2.75 22 -.07 2.33 
19-20.99 -3.17 125 -2.13 26 -1.04 7.00 
21-22.99 -5.83 57 -4.79 14 -1.04 1.63 
23-24.99 -6.32 36 -9.19 8 2.87 2.17 
25-26.99 -7.60 66 -12.25 4 4.65 8.93 
27-28.99 -10.08 32 0 
29-30.99 -10.21 14 0 
31-32.99 -14.33 18 0 10.17 
3 3  - -25.78 25 0 6.25 
other words, the responses must illustrate a tendency to move to an op­
timum (or equilibrium). 
To illustrate, the average committee size measures (A\ and A2) 
may be classified into intervals of 5 to 6.99, 7 to 8.99, 9 to 10.99 . . . , 
to cover the entire range for ninety-nine chambers. In each category of 
committee size, the differences in preference (Q values) can be aver­
aged, yielding the results illustrated in Tables 8.1 and 8.2. As may be 
observed, members of standing committees with small memberships do 
tend to prefer somewhat larger committees (e.g., Q\ = +.26, Q2 = 
+ .76) than they experience. Members from committees with larger 
memberships tend to prefer smaller committees. The responses are con­
sistent with the theoretical model. In the more extended classification in 
Table 8.2, it is more apparent that as committee size increases beyond a 
membership of nine, legislators prefer even greater percentage reduc­
tions in committee size. The relationship is curvilinear as mapped in 
Figure 8.1. 
Do the above results mean that for the "typical" legislator the op­
113 Committee System Optimalities 
timal standing committee size is between seven and nine? Not neces­
sarily. It is possible that the overall result reflects the averaging of differ­
ent situation-specific optima. 
The Subcommittee Effect 
As one possible modification, we may hypothesize that the use of sub­
committees will tend to reduce total costs, primarily by reducing deci­
sion costs. A further division of labor into subcommittees could reduce 
the number of proposals members would consider and might reduce the 
number of active participants in the bargaining process over particular 
legislative measures. If this is the case, we should find that when sub­
committees are employed, legislators will be satisfied with somewhat 
larger standing committees. If they are more satisfied, the differences 
should surface in a comparison of legislators working under high and 
low subcommittee use. The 1981 fifty-state survey allows us to make 
Table 8.4	 Large and Smalli Chamber and the Relationship between 
Actual and Preferred Committee Size (1981) 
Size of Legislative Chamber 
Committee	 Differences 
Size 80+	 <80 (Large­
(A2) (Q2) N (Q2) N Small) 
5-6.99 0 + .76 82 
7-8.99 + 3.12 12 -.09 132 3.21 
9-10.99 + .14 33 -.61 193 .75 
11-12.99 -.03 77 -1.57 129 1.54 
13-14.99 -1.22 78 -2.39 129 1.17 
15-16.99 -2.26 102 -2.82 139 .56 
17-18.99 -2.87 103 -2.61 33 -.26 
19-20.99 -2.47 131 -6.40 20 3.93 
21-22.99 -5.56 64 -6.21 7 .77 
23-24.99 -6.60 43 -17.00 1 10.40 
25-26.99 -6.37 59 -15.86 11 9.49 
27-28.99 -9.16 29 -19.00 3 9.84 
29-30.99 -10.25 12 -9.95 2 -.35 
31-32.99 -14.47 17 -12.00 1 -2.47 
3 3  - -25.78 25 0 
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this distinction. Those classified in the "high" group indicated that sub­
committees were a part of their official chamber rules and/or used on a 
regular basis by many committees. Approximately two-thirds of the re­
spondents were in this high use group. The remaining respondents, 
those in the "lower" use group, indicated that subcommittees were not 
used very often or that they were not used at all. 
An examination of Table 8.3 reveals that for most size categories of 
standing committee (and in all categories where N > 30), legislators 
experiencing high subcommittee use prefer larger committees (see 
"high-low" column). The 1981 data are consistent with the 1979 data in 
this respect. In addition, the optimal committee size, as suggested by 
the change in signs from + to —, appears to be approximately nine for 
the high use group and closer to seven for the low use group. Finally, it 
should be noted that there are very few cases in the sample where those 
serving on committees of seventeen or more also report low subcommit­
tee use. Legislators almost always resort to subcommittees when the 
committees get too large or too busy. 
The Chamber Size Effect 
As a second modification, we may hypothesize that larger chambers 
lead to the creation of larger standing committees, perhaps to reduce 
external costs of such committees. If this is the case, we should find that 
legislators from larger chambers will actually prefer larger committees 
than will those legislators from smaller chambers. To make this test in 
an illustrative manner, the respondents from the 1981 survey may be 
divided into those who are from: 
1.	 Chambers where membership is less than 80. Includes all state sen­
ates and 12 state houses. N = 882. 
2.	 Chambers where membership is 80 or greater. Includes 37 state 
houses. N = 785. 
Using the differences between actual and preferred committee sizes as 
before, it may be seen in Table 8.4 (last column) that in larger chambers 
legislators do in fact find larger committees more acceptable. Also, in 
small chambers large committees are not used very often. Finally, the 
optimality estimate in large chambers is about eleven, whereas it is 
closer to seven in smaller chambers. 
The combined effects of chamber size and subcommittee use is il­
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Table 8.5	 Chamber Size, 'subcommittee Use, and the KRelationship 
between Actual and Preferred Committee Size (1981) 
Large Chambers Small Chambers

Committee Subcommittee Use Subcommittee Use

lviemDersnip

Size (A2) High Low High Low 
5-6.99 + .92(36) + .64(46) 
7-8.99 +4.92(6) + 1.33(6) -.03(51) -.13(81) 
9-10.99 + .48(26) -1.14(7) -.57(115) -.65(78) 
11-12.99 + .12(63) -.71(14) -1.55(88) -1.65(41) 
13-14.99 -1.46(54) -.69(24) -2.19(58) -2.55(71) 
15-16.99 -2.18(76) -2.50(26) -2.38(93) -3.73(46) 
17-18.99 -2.89(83) -2.78(20) -2.61(31) -2.50(2) 
19-20.99 -2.57(106) -2.06(25) -6.52(19) -4.00(1) 
21-22.99 -5.86(51) -4.38(13) -5.58(6) -10.00(1) 
23-24.99 -6.01(35) -9.19(8) -17.00(1) 
25-26.99 -6.16(56) -10.33(3) -15.65(10) -18.00(1) 
27-28.99 -9.16(29) -19.00(3) 
29-30.99 -10.25(12) -9.95(2) 
31-32.99 -14.47(17) 
3 3  - -25.78(25) 
Number of cases enclosed in parentheses. 
lustrated in Table 8.5. In large chambers that experience high subcom­
mittee use the optimal committee size estimate moves upward to be­
tween twelve and thirteen—as opposed to approximately nine where 
there is low subcommittee use. In small chambers (80 or less), however, 
the use of subcommittees seems to make very little difference in the re­
sponse patterns. At this point it pays to note that subcommittees may not 
be used in state legislatures in the manner to which we are accustomed 
when observing the U.S. Congress. In the states, subcommittees fre­
quently have very little autonomy, and the full committee very often 
conducts full hearings and duplicates the work of the subcommittees. 
The subcommittee's role may be little more than one of taking respon­
sibility for the discussion when the full committee meets to consider 
the legislation seriously. These circumstances would seem to be more 
prevalent in smaller chambers where members tend to have many more 
committee assignments and where subcommittees act more informally. 
The crux of the above analysis is to suggest that while the notion of 
optimal committee size has some merit, it makes more sense to pursue 
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the notions of optimal committee systems or optimal decision-making 
conditions. Legislator preferences will vary with legislative structure. 
Structural and Behavioral Adaptation 
If we can assume that legislators have in mind the purpose of minimiz­
ing total costs (decision plus external), then it can be expected that they 
will adjust to possible "inefficiencies" in the committee system. One 
obvious way to make this adjustment is to do it formally by altering the 
organizational structure. The previous analysis of optimalities brought 
together three structural features: (1) chamber size; (2) committee size; 
and (3) subcommittee use. If we examine the ninety-nine state chambers 
we find that chamber size does in fact influence average committee size, 
and that average committee size in turn influences the degree of sub­
committee use, such that: 
[CHAMBER SIZE] 
J.65 
[AVERAGE COMMITTEE SIZE] 
{.43 
[SUBCOMMITTEE USE] 
where the relationship between chamber size and subcommittee use is 
spurious (Francis and Riddlesperger, 1982). 
In earlier chapters, we saw that legislative leaders and followers 
alike prefer standing committees in order to process the agenda more 
efficiently than would be possible in full forum. In the language of this 
chapter, the use of committees has the property of reducing decision 
costs per item of business and of reducing the status quo external costs 
that could result from inaction. By way of refinement, we learn here that 
legislators in chambers with large memberships create larger standing 
committees. This creation of larger committees occurs in part no doubt 
simply because there are more members to place on committees, but 
perhaps also in part because there is need to reduce the external costs of 
those committee members and to minimize problems on the floor. A 
larger standing committee is needed in a larger chamber in order to re­
duce risk of defeat by maintaining sufficient representation of the full 
membership. 
Just as a large chamber needs committees to process the agenda 
efficiently, a large standing committee may need subcommittees. Legis­
lators adapt to the situation at hand by altering the structure, often on an 
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ad hoc basis, but frequently by formal rule or policy. Whether any par­
ticular standing committee actually utilizes subcommittees may depend 
in part on how many proposals it receives. A large committee with 
nothing to do has little need for subcommittees. 
Those problems not accommodated by changes in the formal struc­
ture may be resolved nevertheless by further adaptation in individual be­
havior. One obvious way to adjust to committees that are too large is 
selectively to miss their meetings. If the tactic of missing meetings is 
widely practiced, then those meetings will be conducted with fewer 
members, and the problem of excessive decision costs is reduced. Such 
a practice is most likely to occur when the leadership has given mem­
bers too many committee assignments. In other words, the committees 
are either too large, too numerous, or both. 
Committee attendance is a phenomenon difficult to measure on a 
broad scale. Accurate records usually are not kept and members drop in 
and out of meetings as the situation requires. In the nationwide survey 
of American states, legislators were asked a series of questions about 
two committees on which they served. In addition to many other items 
they were asked: 
How many members were typically present at a committee meet­
ing? A B 
where A and B referred back to the two committees the legislators 
named. These answers then were matched with the actual memberships 
determined by checking the official records. 
The first column in Table 8.6 illustrates that as committee size in­
creases, estimates of attendance decrease, from approximately 100 per­
cent attendance in the smallest committees to approximately 70 percent 
attendance in committees of twenty-three members or more. Attendance 
rates appear to fluctuate around 70 percent once the standing commit­
tees reach a particular size. The decline in attendance appears to be a 
function of committee size. A series of regression experiments were im­
plemented to include other variables, including majority party percent, 
number of committee assignments, subcommittee use, and estimated 
frequency of meetings. None of these experiments diminished the sig­
nificance of committee size, and none of the additional variables (as 
measured in this analysis) were statistically discernable in relation to 
committee attendance. 
That committee attendance appears to level off somewhere between 
65 and 70 percent is not surprising. A quorum is usually 50% + 1, and 
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Table 8.6 Committee Attendance: Relationship to Actual Committee 
Size and Preferred Committee Size 
Committee Average Average Difference 
Size Attendance (Ideal-Actual 
(A2) (Estimate) Attendance) 
5-6.99 100% (77) 1.65 (119) 
7-8.99 89 (138) .97 (135) 
9-10.99 85 (216) .92 (208) 
11-12.99 84 (190) .95 (188) 
13-14.99 79 (208) 1.02 (196) 
15-16.99 78 (235) .88 (230) 
17-18.99 76 (129) 1.50 (126) 
19-20.99 80 (141) .94 (136) 
21-22.99 80 (70) -1.08 (67) 
23-24.99 71 (46) .24 (43) 
25-26.99 63 (66) 1.39 (64) 
27-28.99 71 (32) -1.90 (30) 
29-30.99 72 (12) -2.20 (12) 
31-32.99 67 (18) -3.92 (18) 
3 3 - 69 (26) -14.20 (23) 
Number of cases enclosed in parentheses. 
sometimes more, and in about one-third of the cases majority support 
of the full committee membership is required to pass a measure. We 
might surmise that committee chairs will round up ample majorities if 
necessary. 
Actual attendance may be considered a behavioral adjustment to 
perceived or actual inefficiencies in the committee structure. Attendance 
in standing committees corresponds rather closely to legislators' percep­
tions of "ideal" committee size, as illustrated in Table 8.6. As commit­
tee size increases, attendance drops off to more or less coincide with 
expressed preferences. Only when the committee sizes are larger than 
thirty or so do legislators not adjust to preferences. 
The above results would seem to suggest that legislators will find 
ways to adapt to deficiencies in organization, either by making struc­
tural changes or by autonomous individual behavior. It is no surprise 
perhaps that humans are able to correct structural defects, nor is it really 
that surprising that they are able to adjust individual behavior to make 
further corrections. Is this ability to adjust then so ingenious that real 
legislative bodies all hover near optimal arrangements! In the next sec­
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tion we can take up an example of how some legislators simply endure 
suboptimal conditions. 
Chamber Size and Joint Committees 
An examination of ninety-nine legislative chambers reveals that the 
membership size of chambers influences both the average committee size 
and the number of committees created. This dual impact may be modeled 
such that: 
[CHAMBER SIZE]

.37 .65

[NUMBER OF COMMITTEES] [AVERAGE COMMITTEE SIZE]

where the relationship between the number of committees and average 
committee size is spurious (r = .20). In other words, members or lead­
ers in larger chambers, in order to achieve their goals, appoint more 
committees and larger committees. We may infer that the features of an 
"optimal" committee system are dependent upon chamber size. 
If the size of the chamber is in fact an important factor in selecting 
the number and size of committees, then the puzzle will be especially 
perplexing for joint committee systems. We would expect that in com­
plete joint committee systems, where there is also a major imbalance in 
the size of the house and senate chambers, the members of at least one 
chamber will be unhappy with the committee system. The committee 
systems of American state legislatures may be classified into four major 
groups (based on 1981 data): 
Traditional. The chamber committee systems operate separately 
and differences are resolved in conference or informally. Some of these 
states do allocate minor functions to joint committees (e.g., Arizona, 
California, Kansas, Mississippi, New Jersey, West Virginia). All states 
not listed below are in this category. 
Joint Committee. All or almost all committee functions are per­
formed by joint committees. Includes Connecticut, Maine, and Massa­
chusetts, although the latter state has separate Ways and Means, Rules, 
and Ethics committees. 
Joint Finance. "Money bills" are processed by joint committees 
and/or subcommittees, while "non-money" bills and/or authorization 
are processed separately in each chamber. Includes Arkansas, Colo­
rado, Delaware, South Dakota, Utah, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. 
Mixed Use. Important functions are handled both in separate cham­
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Table 8.7 Criticisms of Committee Systems by Senators in 
Legislatures with Joint Committees and in Other 
Legislatures (in Percentages) 
Other 
Type of Criticism Conn Maine Mass Senates 
Most members receive too many 77 27 42 19 
committee assignments. 
Many committees are too large 30 13 14 7 
to work effectively. 
For many members the schedule 85 67 71 49 
of meetings (committee-
subcommittee) creates 
attendance problems. 
ber committees and in joint committees, depending on subject matter. 
Appropriations and finance are processed separately. Includes Maryland 
and Rhode Island. 
The three joint committee systems are in Connecticut, Maine and 
Massachusetts; and in each case there is a great difference in the size of 
the two chambers. In Connecticut there were 151 House members to 35 
Senate members, in Maine 151 to 33, and in Massachusetts 160 to 40. 
Each has a 4 - t o - 1 to 5 - t o - 1 ratio of house to senate members. Legis­
lators from all chambers were asked to select items that they thought 
characterized their committee system. Three of these items identified 
problems of "procedural efficiency." We can compare the responses of 
senators from the three "joint" committee states with the senate aver­
ages from all other states in Table 8.7. 
As may be seen, a much higher percentage of senators from the 
three "joint" committee systems register complaints. Complaints are 
more frequent regarding: (1) the number of committee assignments; 
(2) the size of committees; and (3) the scheduling of committee meet­
ings. In the house chambers of these states, the members were also quite 
aware of the scheduling and attendance problems, with the complaint 
percentages ranging between 67 and 91, compared to 41 percent for all 
other house chambers. In other states using joint committees the prob­
lem is less noticeable, partly because much of the business is handled in 
the separate chambers, and partly due to the greater balance in house 
and senate membership numbers. 
The above example illustrates that structural problems relating to 
legislative committees are not always remedied by adaptive behavior in 
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session decision making. Differences in chamber size call for differ­
ences in standing committee size and numbers of committees. But joint 
committees mean that each member of the legislature, senate or house, 
will serve on committees of the same size, and that together they will 
service the same number of committees. The negative responses of leg­
islators in reaction to this dilemma confirms the importance of chamber 
size in developing the notion of optimal committee system. 
Representation and the 
Reduction of Complexity 
in Lawmaking 
Any legislature that allows all members to offer formal proposals, un­
limited in number or in content, may be called an open-input system. 
Requirements that proposals must be filed by a certain date during the 
session, or even that they be prefiled, may reduce the actual number 
of proposals, but nevertheless all members have fair warning and are 
free to submit as much legislation as they wish. Under such a system 
legislators are free to sponsor legislation emanating from a variety of 
sources—nationwide or statewide interest groups, government agen­
cies, constituency interest groups, private individuals, or model legisla­
tion initiated in other political systems. The same legislators, perhaps 
with the help of legislative staff, may initiate a variety of legislative 
measures of personal interest as well. 
It can be argued that "open-input" is a necessary if not sufficient 
requirement for adequate representation. When all elected members of 
the legislative body can influence to some extent the content of the 
agenda, the suppression of diverse demands are minimized. The con­
cept of representation goes well beyond what is directly relevant to this 
point (e.g., see Pitkin, 1967;Eulau, 1978;Wahlke, 1978; Jewell, 1982); 
it is sufficient to note that rules affecting the agenda are crucial. Under 
an open-input system, constituents have the opportunity to organize and 
express their demands in the form of legislative proposals-they need 
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only a sponsor. And legislators can decide whether such proposals allow 
them to better represent their constituency. 
Because American legislatures, with rare exception, are open-input 
systems,1 they are faced with an extraordinary level of demand for ac­
tion (Rosenthal and Forth, 1978; Francis, 1985b). Each chamber initi­
ates hundreds if not thousands of proposals each legislative session. The 
great volume of demand can have a number of ramifications. At one 
extreme, most of the legislation may never come up for consideration. 
At the other extreme, most of the legislation may be passed through the 
system with very little quality control. At either extreme there are risks 
of external costs. The data for American state legislatures in 1981 sug­
gest that both extremes do exist. For bills in the chamber of origin, the 
chamber passage rate ranges from less than 10 percent to more than 80 
percent. Reformers seem to be primarily concerned, however, with 
quality control and the need for committee screening to hold down the 
flow of bills (e.g., Rosenthal, 1974). This should not cause us to lose 
sight of the fact that badly needed legislation can get buried, and often 
does, in the briefcases of committee chiefs. 
How is it possible to have both quality control and the expeditious 
handling of legislation? The answer to this question may be better 
understood if we consider the decision-making environment of the typi­
cal legislator. Such a legislator will serve on a number of legislative 
committees and will be confronted by dozens of bills each week, many 
of which require that he further interact with colleagues in order to ob­
tain their views and to bargain over the outcomes. Faced with excessive 
amounts of legislation, the legislator will be forced to simplify the way 
he or she makes decisions. For example, if there are too many bills, the 
legislator may not read those that appear to be less important, may not 
attempt to learn about the views of other legislators, or may abandon 
attempts to bargain. The adverse consequences become apparent if such 
conditions are extreme. Either most bills are dead at the outset, or most 
legislative measures are approved in a careless manner. The committee 
systems are designed to come to the rescue. 
An open-input system with procedurally efficient methods of deal­
ing seriously with legislation is likely to be judged more representative 
1. A "closed-input" system would either place a specific limit on the number of pro­
posals a member may introduce, or would specify who in the chamber is not eligible to 
sponsor proposals. From time to time some state legislatures have set such limits, but the 
practice is uncommon. Limits on amendments offer another way of reducing at least ad 
hoc proposals. 
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than a system attached merely to notions of full consensus. The external 
costs resulting from the lack of full participation or unanimity may be 
small compared to those resulting from inability to review a substantial 
agenda. When standing committees or subcommittees are given ample 
autonomy, more legislation can be given serious consideration. 
Increasing Representation by Reducing 
Complexity 
If the conditions under which decisions are made are too complex to 
allow legislators to evaluate information and estimate consequences, 
how can legislators cope with the problem? In a legislative body it is 
helpful to distinguish between two types of complexity. The first is in­
troduced by the sheer volume of substantive material put forth as formal 
proposals. The second type is the result of the collective nature of 
choice in such an institution. 
Volume of Legislation 
The volume of material put forth as legislative proposals affects the 
amount of time and energy necessary to understand and process the ma­
terial, and it has an impact on what may be called "decision costs." 
Decision costs are incurred by learning about the substance of legis­
lative proposals and the affected environment, and by making up one's 
mind about their worth. But excessive volume can also create risk and, 
thereby, external costs. Greater risk is assumed whenever proposal con­
tent is ignored or considered carelessly. 
What are the coping strategies for dealing with volume in a legis­
lative organization? The most notable are: 
1. Devote attention to legislation involving substantial net benefits 
and/or whose outcome is in doubt. The legislator makes guesses about 
which alternatives have the greatest B — C values or whose probability 
of passage is near 0.5 (relative to other alternatives). One of several pos­
sible indexes, for example, would be p{\ — p)(B — C), where p = 
probability that the legislation will be approved, B = benefits, and C = 
costs. We need not wonder why the lion's share of legislative attention is 
given to a small number of controversial issues. While we would expect 
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legislators in any case to give more attention to such issues, a crowded 
agenda means that a greater proportion of proposals are never consid­
ered. The legislator may not have time to assess the benefits of most 
legislation, and thus whatever is at the front end of the agenda has the 
best chance of surviving. This coping strategy is not a solution to the 
problem but is really an elaboration of why the problem exists. 
2. Increase the length of the legislative session. Many American 
states have moved in this direction, but Congress has almost reached its 
limit. Lengthening the legislative session creates opportunity costs for 
members with private occupations. A longer session also usually means 
that additional legislation will be introduced, perhaps at the same rate as 
in a shorter session. 
3. Increase staffing. Staff members can aid in the search for and 
consolidation of policy-related information, or they can free legislators 
from other duties (e.g., constituency service) to allow legislators to de­
vote more time to legislation. Both Congress and the state legislatures 
have greatly increased staff support over the last twenty years. 
4. Follow the lead of the chief executive. Legislators may adopt a 
simple decision-making rule such as: "Vote the governor's position on a 
bill; if the governor has taken no position, vote against it." Such a rule 
could be expanded or altered to take into account chamber party leader 
positions. The rationale for adopting such a rule could be based on the 
confidence members have in the superior resources such leaders retain 
for evaluating legislation. The "followers" may also anticipate future 
side payments in return for their support. 
5. Use autonomous or semiautonomous standing committees and I 
or subcommittees. Most American legislatures employ semiautonomous 
committees—committees that can kill legislation (with exceptions), but 
that must send all approved measures to the next highest level for con­
sideration. A legislator can ignore non-personal agenda items held back 
in those committees of which he is not a member. Such items may con­
stitute two-thirds of the total agenda. For example, if a legislator serves 
on two of twenty committees in a one-hundred-member chamber, he may 
review only 10 percent of the legislation in committee. If the other com­
mittees report out only 25 percent of their proposals, the legislator needs 
to review or read only 32.5 percent of the proposals (.25(.9) + .10), 
plus the few proposals he sponsored that did not make it out of other 
committees. Of course he may not need to review many proposals as­
signed to his own committees if subcommittees are employed. 
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All of the above strategies may have the effect of reducing the com­
plexity of the decision-making environment. This does not mean that 
all such strategies are necessarily desirable. Legislators can make poor 
guesses about the value of legislation. They may find that longer legis­
lative sessions create offsetting costs. Increased staffing sometimes cre­
ates more problems than it solves. To rely on the positions of the chief 
executive is to run the risk of alienating the home district. And the use 
of a committee-subcommittee system can make members vulnerable to 
the influence of pressure groups. Nevertheless, the problem does not go 
away by itself. Legislators need ways to simplify their options and to 
manage an agenda. 
Collective Choice 
The second source of complexity in legislatures is found in the use of 
majority voting to determine decision outcomes. This counting rule for 
tallying preferences is practiced normally on all occasions—floor deci­
sions, standing committee decisions, and subcommittee decisions. In 
the U.S., only minor variations exist, for example, where a majority of 
those present is distinguished from an absolute majority, or where larger 
majorities are needed for certain types of action such as a veto override 
or constitutional amendment. 
Majority voting, in conjunction with substantial quantities of legis­
lation, introduces interpersonal complexities. Interpersonal complexi­
ties are of two kinds. The first is encountered in attempts to understand 
the preferences of other participants. The second is encountered in the 
process of bargaining and compromise. To understand the significance 
of these phenomena, it is necessary to refer to individual preference 
matrices. Making the normal assumption that individuals have tran­
sitive preference orderings, we may let R(k, A) define an ordered ma­
trix, where an individual has preferences of Pass or Defeat over M is­
sues, A(l), . . . , A(M), and where there are 2M possible outcomes, 
k(l), . . . , k(2M). To illustrate we take four proposals and elaborate all 
possible preference patterns, each of which is a possible outcome: 
Proposals According to Saliency 
12 3 4 
P P P P Most preferred outcome 
Case I P P P D 
P P D P 
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P P D D

P D P P

P D P D

Preference Order of P D D P

Possible Outcomes, P D D D

D P P P

2M = 16 D P P D 
D P D P 
D P D D 
D D P P 
D D P D 
D D D P 
D D D D Least preferred outcome 
How complex is this preference matrix?2 
At first glance it is tempting to define complexity by the size of the 
matrix, M(2M), which gives the number of cells in the matrix. The 
problem with this formulation, however, is that some 4 x 16 matrices 
are more complex than others. The above illustration, for example, can 
be produced uniquely by the person's preference for Pass or Defeat on 
each proposal, plus the fact that the member 
1.	 prefers to win on proposal A(\) more than winning on the other 
three proposals taken together; 
2.	 prefers to win on proposal A(2) more than winning on proposals 
A(3) and A(4) taken together; 
3.	 prefers to win on proposal A(3) more than winning on proposal A (4). 
In other words, seven preference relations, one for Pass or Defeat on 
each of the four proposals and one for each of the above three statements 
linking the saliency of the proposals, are enough to produce the complete 
matrix. The simplicity of the array is explained by the fact that the prefer­
erences are "separable." The outcome on one proposal has no effect 
upon the legislator's preferences on the other proposals. He prefers each 
2. The assumption here of strict preference orderings, apparent in these illustrations, 
was adopted only after considering whether "indifferences" would substantially affect the 
analysis. There is first the question of whether a person is really very often indifferent 
between two alternatives when one of the alternatives must be selected, especially in a 
legislative setting. Second, the use of indifference relationships substantially complicates 
the model without altering the overall results. In other words, I have selected the simplest 
model that illustrates the basic features of complexity in a committee decision-making 
game. This does not preclude experimentation and refinement with weak preference 
orderings. 
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to pass regardless of the fate of the others, even though he prefers to win 
on some proposals more than others. In a situation of this kind, the leg­
islator would have little difficulty in establishing his priorities. Further­
more, it would not be difficult for a colleague to understand the prefer­
ences of this legislator. 
Another example of separable preferences occurs when a legislator 
prefers to win on all four issues, but short of that on any three issues, 
and short of that on any two issues, and so on. Again a unique configura­
tion would be produced from a small number of preference statements. 
The preference setting can become much more complex, however, if the 
preferences are "inseparable," where the outcome preference on one 
proposal depends upon the outcome of another proposal. To illustrate 
this property of inseparability, a four-issue case will suffice: 
Proposals 
1  2 3 4 
D D D D 
P P P P 
Case II D P P P 
P D D D 
D D D P 
P P D D 
P P P D 
Preference Order of D P P D 
Possible Outcomes, D P D D 
D D P P 
2M = 16 P P D P 
P D P P 
D P D P 
P D P D 
P D D P 
D D P D 
In this case the legislator prefers most that all proposals are defeated 
(DDDD), but secondarily that all proposals pass (e.g., a subsidy for one 
group warrants a subsidy for three other groups, even though it would 
be better if none had a subsidy). Such contingencies make it impossible 
to deduce the order of preferred outcomes from the saliency of the pro­
posals. While the above example was made fairly simple in order that it 
could be explained, inseparable preferences can describe patterns that 
appear to be nearly random. In such a situation, we have no basis for 
knowing the order of the outcome preference sets. 
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In order to understand the complexity of a situation involving the 
fate of several proposals, it is necessary to consider the structure of pref­
erences. Legislators need to learn about each others' preference struc­
tures in order to bargain efficiently. In sum, there are at least three fac­
tors that affect the complexity of the game: 
1. The number of proposals.3 
2. The number of decision makers. 
3. The structure of preferences. 
Is there some way to minimize complexity? If so, legislators may be 
able to make decisions that will minimize decision costs per proposal 
and also the risks of external costs. 
Minimum and Maximum Preference Complexity 
One of the difficulties in evaluating decision-making complexity is that 
there is no known feasible way to measure or scale the structural com­
plexity of preferences (as expressed in the preference matrix) in a prac­
tical setting. One alternative is to define the extremes mathematically. 
We can begin by defining preference complexity as 
the minimal number of preference inequalities necessary to produce 
complete information on outcome preferences over M issues. 
For convenience of expression, we can let the sign " >  " substitute for 
the phrase "is preferred to," and the use of which represents a prefer­
ence inequality. 
Minimum Preference Complexity is found when the preference 
structure is in its simplest form, when the complete matrix of outcome 
preferences can be produced from the fewest possible preference state­
ments. For a single individual this quantity may be defined as 
Cmin = 2M - 1 9.1 
where Cmin is the minimum number of preference inequalities neces­
sary to produce the entire preference matrix, and M = the number of 
3. It is clear that some proposals are more complex than others because they may in­
clude more sub-issues. Such a modification would need to be made in particular applica­
tions. The "budget bill" is a typical example. 
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proposals to be voted upon. For a proof that this is the minimum see 
Appendix I. For an entire group of legislators the minimum preference 
complexity is thus: 
Cmin = N(2M - 1) 9.2 
Maximum Preference Complexity, as indicated earlier, occurs when 
the preference outcomes are ordered randomly. In such a case, only the 
last preference outcome would be deducible, and thus the number of 
preference statements necessary can be enumerated as follows: 
k{\) > k{2) > k(3) > . . . > k(2M) 
Thus we may state that for a single individual: 
Cmax = 2M - 1 9.3 
and for a group the maximum is specified as 
Cmax = N(2M - 1) 9.4 
The range of complexity between Cmin and Cmax will depend 
upon the values of M and N, the number of proposals and the number of 
decision makers. For example, Table 9.1 illustrates the calculations of 
Cmin and Cmax values for a variety of conditions. The degree of com­
plexity can vary widely when three or more proposals are considered. 
Table 9.1 Illustrative Cmin and Cmax Values for Increasing 
Numbers of Members and Proposals 
Number of Proposals (M) 
N 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Cmin 3 3 9 15 21 27 33 
Cmax 3 3 9 21 45 93 189 
Cmin 4 4 12 20 28 36 44 
Cmax 4 4 12 28 60 124 252 
Cmin 5 5 15 25 35 45 55 
Cmax 5 5 15 35 75 155 315 
Cmin 6 6 18 30 42 54 66 
Cmax 6 6 18 42 90 186 378 
Cmin 7 7 21 35 49 63 77 
Cmax 7 7 21 49 105 217 441 
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Using the Committee System 
to Minimize Complexity 
The above formulations offer a completely explicit way of representing 
preference complexity. It is apparent that such complexity may be re­
duced by assigning proposals to different and at least semiautonomous 
standing committees. In most situations each decision maker would en­
counter fewer participants and fewer proposals. In addition, it makes 
sense to assign unrelated proposals to different committees and any set 
of related proposals to the same committee. In this way the assignments 
will be more likely to coincide with separable subsets of inseparable 
preferences. Is there any way to know, however, just how many com­
mittees are desirable? In the long term such a question requires a great 
deal of empirical work, but headway can be made through the use of 
logical methods as well. 
An Example. To illustrate we can let S — the number of commit­
tees, N = the number of members, and M = the number of proposals, 
and assume that: 
1. Each committee is assigned the same number of members. 
2. Each committee is assigned the same number of proposals. 
3. Each member receives one committee assignment. 
4. Each committee reports out exactly one bill for floor vote. 
We might label this example the "equal work-single assignment" case. 
Clearly, I have made the above assumptions to produce a nontedious re­
sult. More general equations than those below are in Appendix 9.2 of 
this chapter. Overall conclusions derived here would not be affected by 
specifying the assumptions differently. 
From equations 9.2 and 9.4, the preference complexity of floor 
consideration has a minimum and maximum of: 
Cmin = N(2S - 1) Cmax = N(2S - 1) 
where Assumption #4 allows the substitution of S for M. 
Since each standing committee has the same number of members, 
N/S, and the same number of proposals, MIS, the total preference com­
plexity for all committees at minimum and maximum levels may be 
written as follows (substituting in equations 9.2 and 9.4): 
Cmin = S(N/S)(2M/S - 1) Cmax = S(NIS)((2MIS) - 1) 
N(2M/S - 1) = N((2MIS) - 1) 
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The above alternatives make it possible to consider combinations of 
committee and floor conditions, minimum complexity on the floor and 
in committees, maximum complexity in both, and minimum complexity 
in one and maximum in the other. 
From the above equations we are able to utilize standard minimiz­
ing procedures to solve for complexity. In the first case, it is assumed 
that minimum complexity conditions apply to both floor and committee 
proceedings, where 
Cmin = N(2S - 1) + N(2M/S - 1) 
and minimizing Cmin with respect to S (minimizing complexity with 
respect to the number of committees) we take the partial derivative, 
where dCminldS = 0 and 
N(2 - 2M/S2) = 0 
N2 - N2M/S2 = 0 
N2 = N2M/S2 
1 = MIS2 
S2 = M 
S = VS7 where the second derivative, 
d2Cmin/dS2 = N(4MS/S4) 
Applying the same procedures when maximum complexity exists on 
both the floor and in committees, we obtain: 
Cmax = N(2S - 1) + N(2MIS - 1) 
N(2S + 2M/S - 2) 
dCmax/dS = N(2s(\n 2) + 2M/5(ln 2)(-MIS2)) = 0 
25(ln 2) = (2M/5(ln 2)M)IS2 
2s = (2M/S(M))/S2 
(S2)2S = M2MIS (Note that for S2 to equal 
S2 = M M,2S must equal 2MIS) 
S = V M 
The result is the same as for Cmin. Complexity is at a minimum when 
the number of committees equals the square root of the number of pro­
posals. Conversely, if the number of committees is a given, preference 
complexity conditions are minimized if the expected number of pro­
posals is that number squared. 
A special result like the above is a function of the assumptions, thus 
we might expect a different solution when minimum complexity condi­
tions exist on the floor but maximum complexity conditions exist in 
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committees. Referring to these mixed conditions as Cmix and using the 
same procedure, we obtain: 
Cmix = N(2S - 1) + N(2M/S - 1) 
N(2S + 2M/S - 2) 
dCmixIdS = N[2 + (2"'s(ln 2))(-M/S2)] = 0 
which reduces to 
2S2 = .69M2M/S 
S = (347M2M/S)m 
To illustrate the results in Equations 9.5 and 9.6, we can take as a 
given the number of committees established by a legislative chamber, 
and then ask for the number of proposals the system is designed to pro­
cess in a single "production cycle." That is, assuming that preference 
complexity is to be minimized, and excluding at this point the use of 
subcommittees, what advice can be obtained? Taking three examples: 
# of Committees Eq 9.5 Eq 9.6

5 = 10 M = 100 M = 32

S = 20 M = 400 M = 78

S = 30 M = 900 M = 130

As may be observed, when preference complexity structure is the same 
at the chamber and committee levels, the number of committees relative 
to the number of proposals is small. But if it is assumed that proposals 
reaching the floor stimulate separable preferences, while those in each 
committee stimulate inseparable and highly complex preferences, then a 
relatively large number of committees is desirable. The average number 
of proposals per committee under Equation 9.6 ranges only from 3.2 to 
4.3, or approximately 3 to 5 proposals per committee. 
To take another example, suppose that a production cycle were 
defined by a "call of the roll," where each member is allowed to intro­
duce one proposal. In a fifty-member group, homogeneous separability 
conditions would suggest that seven committees would be optimum, 
whereas for Cmix, fourteen committees would be optimum. These num­
bers do reflect the very strict constraints set forth earlier. What is impor­
tant to note, however, is that an organizational decision to separate pro­
posals into separable subsets of inseparable issues, if in fact this can be 
done, makes a major difference in what is structurally optimal. 
To fully illustrate preference complexity under varying conditions, 
we can utilize the above minimizing solutions to estimate preference 
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complexity values, first assuming there were no committees, and then 
assuming chamber review of only committee approved legislation. To 
illustrate: 
Let M = 50, N = 50 
FULL CHAMBER CONSIDERATION ONLY 
A.	 Separable Preferences (Using Cmin) 
N(2M - 1) = 50(2(50) - 1) = 4950 
B.	 Inseparable Preferences (Using Cmax) 
N{2M - 1) = 50(250 - 1)

= 5.6295 16 (scientific notation)

COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION AND CHAMBER REVIEW 
OF APPROVED BILLS 
C.	 Separable Preferences at Both Levels (Using Cmin) 
N(2S	 - 1) + N(2M/S - 1) = 50(2(7) - 1) + 50(2(50/7) - 1) 
= 1314 
D. Inseparable Preferences at Both Levels (Using Cmax) 
N(2S - 1) + N(2MIS - 1) = 50(27 - 1) + 50(27-14 - 1) = 13,366 
E. Separable on Floor, Inseparable in Committee (Using Cmix) 
N(2S - 1) + N(2M/S - 1) = 50(2(14) - 1) + 50(2357 - 1) = 1,894 
These abstract solutions illustrate that the impact of committee use is 
especially dramatic when preferences are inseparable, and when such 
conditions can be delegated to committees rather than confronted on the 
floor of the chamber (as in case E). 
The above example demonstrates in a precise way the major reduc­
tions in complexity that can be achieved by paying attention to the dis­
tinction between separable and inseparable preferences. A fair question 
here is whether legislators have any knowledge of such distinctions until 
after the fact. That is, can legislative leaders foretell which kinds of pro­
posals are likely to be highly related to each other (thus stimulating in­
separable preferences), and thereby construct committee subject-matter 
areas and assign proposals accordingly? It seems to me that this is ex­
actly what legislators do, but with varying skill and foresight. In fact, 
we might argue that when related proposals are assigned to different 
committees very often, it is a signal that reorganization may be desir­
able in order to bring such proposals to a common forum within a single 
committee. 
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Subcommittees 
For the American states most observers would probably agree that due 
to the increased volume of legislation, the use of subcommittees has in­
creased substantially over the last twenty years. In most states, however, 
their use remains much less formal than in the U.S. Congress. Almost 
one-third of survey respondents indicated that the use of subcommittees 
was not very common in their experience, and only 17 percent indicated 
that subcommittees were required by their chamber rules. Most illustra­
tive of the status of subcommittee use were the responses to the follow­
ing inquiry: 
Some state legislatures now use subcommittees frequently. What is the status of 
this practice in your chamber? (Please check) 
Subcommittees are an official part of my chamber rules and at 344 
least some committees are required to use them. 
Subcommittees are used on a regular basis in many committees, 1028 
but it is really up to the chairman of the committee to decide in 
each session whether they will be used. 
Subcommittees are not very common but they tend to be used in 543 
an informal manner in some committees. 
To my knowledge subcommittees have not been used. 95 
N = 2010 
Subcommittees are used more frequently in the larger lower cham­
bers. For example, in only ten of forty-nine lower chambers did respon­
dents indicate that subcommittees were not very common or not used. 
In the senate chambers, nearly half (23) were described as having little 
subcommittee use. In sum, the responses suggest that about one-third of 
the chambers exhibit low subcommittee use. Two states had unusual 
practices. In Iowa a subcommittee was appointed for each bill that was 
assigned to a committee. As a consequence, each member served on a 
very large number of subcommittees. In the Utah legislature, the mem­
bers all serve on appropriations "subcommittees," but since the full 
committee includes the entire membership, the subcommittees are 
really in fact no different from committees. 
Legislators were asked two other questions about subcommittees. 
They were asked to specify on how many they served and to indicate 
whether "important committees relied upon subcommittee reports." 
The correlations between "subcommittee use," reliance upon subcom­
mittee reports, and the mean number of subcommittee assignments 
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range between 0.59 and 0.65 (n = 99), suggesting that the questions tap 
into different aspects of the same phenomenon. 
Scholars have long noted, especially with regard to Congress, that 
larger chambers have been more formal and rigid in their rules. Since 
there are more members to introduce bills and amendments and since 
the bargaining complexity is geometrically increased, the members in 
larger chambers are frequently forced to set more severe limits on de­
bate and floor action. The creation of a committee system also takes on 
greater dimensions in large chambers. In Figure 9.1, we can see that 
members or leaders in larger chambers appoint more committees (r = 
.37 and larger committees (r = .65). Larger committees are more likely 
to utilize subcommittees (r = .43) and to utilize subcommittee reports 
(r = .44). 
The point to be taken from the analysis is that subcommittees fol­
low naturally in an attempt to process the agenda efficiently. Just as a 
large chamber needs committees, a large committee needs subcommit­
tees. In large chambers the leaders have more members to place on com­
mittees and thus must decide whether to accommodate them through 
size or number. To the extent that they choose the former, subcommit­
tees will follow. Whether any particular committee actually uses sub­
committees will depend in part on how many proposals it receives. The 
decisions about how many committees to have and of what size can have 
a major impact on the ability of members to cope with the demands 
made on them. 
An effective committee system makes it unnecessary for a legislator 
to learn about proposals and consequences if the proposals are not on his 
personal agenda and if the proposals die in committees of which he is 
not a member. Subcommittees, if they are given similar powers, econo­
mize in the same manner. The use of standing committees and subcom­
mittees makes it less complex to bargain and easier to learn about the 
preferences of other voting members. 
Traces of these effects are not so easy to discover, since every 
chamber employs committees and the amount of legislation they receive 
varies widely. Nevertheless, we are able to examine the reported time 
legislators spend in various types of committee activity, allowing "time" 
to serve as our proxy for costs. Table 9.2 illustrates that the time-costs 
of seeking information about the positions of other members (taken as a 
percentage of total time-costs) increases with committee size (r = .22), 
even though, as shown earlier, increased committee size often leads to 
increased subcommittee use. Where subcommittee use is a conse­
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Y 
.62 Frequency of Reliance upon 
Subcommittee Use Subcommittee Reports 
Spurious Relationships: rx,X2 = .20; ryiX3 = .28; ry2y3 = .30 
Fig. 9.1 Relationship between Chamber Size and Four Committee 
System Characteristics 
quence, as demonstrated by the three separate measures in Table 9.2, 
legislators appear to shift their activities somewhat, from acquiring in­
formation about proposals to bargaining over them. We might speculate 
that the use of subcommittees in and of itself probably means a busy 
agenda—that is, there are too many proposals or the subject matter is 
too complex for the committee as a whole to handle. Subcommittees not 
only reduce the number of proposals each member must consider, but 
they allow each member the opportunity to bargain with some realistic 
chance of locating equilibrium choices (e.g., see Shepsle, 1979). 
How does the above discussion fit into the previous mathematical 
analysis of complexity reduction? First, it does appear that the use of 
subcommittees brings into play the kind of interpersonal behavior that 
we expect when inseparable issues need to be resolved. Second, it can 
be seen, theoretically, that subcommittees are to a standing committee 
what standing committees are to the entire legislature. Presumably, pro­
posals that stimulate inseparable preferences should be assigned to a 
subcommittee—separable from other subsets of inseparable prefer­
ences, since those proposals respectively are assigned to other subcom­
mittees. In an extraordinarily efficient system the proposals are parceled 
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Table 9.2 Relationship between Committee Characteristics and 
Time-Costs (correlation matrix, N = 99) 
Proposal Member 
Information Information Bargaining 
Time-Costs Time-Costs Time-Costs 
Characteristic (% of Total) (% of Total) (% of Total) 
Average Committee Size .22 
Subcommittee Use - . 19 .25 
Number of Subcommit- - . 29 .31 
tee Assignments 
Subcommittee Reports in —.29 .25 
Important Committees 
Only r values where p < .05 are reported in order to illustrate a pattern. These correlations do 
not take into account variance within chambers, which cannot be separated from reporting error. 
out such that (See Appendix 9.2 of this chapter for representative 
equation): 
1.	 The entire legislature receives proposals that elicit separable 
preferences. 
2.	 The committee receives proposals that elicit separable preferences. 
3.	 The subcommittee receives proposals that elicit inseparable 
preferences. 
It is certainly true that no known legislature is so efficient, and no 
less true that legislators in any setting can complicate matters by offer­
ing amendments or by engaging in logrolling. These truths in no way 
contradict the argument. Instead they ask for additional analyses that go 
beyond the scope of this project. We can simply point out here that to 
minimize complexity, the above conditions may be necessary if not 
sufficient.4 
Conclusion 
Concern for representation in American legislatures arises when legis­
lative decisions are delegated to standing committees and their subcom­
4. In preliminary formal analysis of complexity minimization, for example, it has 
been found that a committee-subcommittee system does not necessarily outperform a 
simple standing committee system. The central determinant is the number of legislative 
proposals. 
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mittees. Such delegations mean that fewer elected legislators are likely 
to have a vote on the outcome of many if not most proposals. The argu­
ment is made here that a more serious problem can result from the 
inability of the legislature to offer serious deliberation over an ample 
proportion of legislative proposals. The standing committee and sub­
committee system allows a division of labor that enhances the process­
ing of the agenda. 
In constructing a standing committee-subcommittee system, proce­
dural efficiency is important to the extent that a larger proportion of leg­
islative measures receive formal consideration and resolution. Central 
to the efficiency of the system is the degree to which the organizational 
structure accommodates the structure of human preferences. The com­
plexity of the decision-making environment is a significant determinant 
of the quality of legislative deliberation. The crowded agendas of legis­
latures make it necessary to seek ways to reduce the complexity of deci­
sion making. This is accomplished by applying fewer members to fewer 
issues, and by taking into account the distinction between separable and 
inseparable preferences. The restricted complexity minimization model, 
in its alternative forms, illustrates that it is possible to estimate optimal 
organizational structures by taking into account the complexity of hu­
man preferences. 
Relatively little is known about the use of subcommittees in the fifty 
U.S. state legislatures. Subcommittees have not been standardized or 
well documented in official records. Evidence in this study does sug­
gest, however, that their use has had an impact upon allocations of time 
to bargaining and negotiation. In other words, such activities can be con­
ducted most profitably in settings not disadvantaged by overwhelming 
complexity. Subcommittees are more likely to offer situations wherein 
inseparable preferences can be negotiated and resolved. 
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Appendix 9.1 
For an informal proof to show that 2M — 1 is the minimum number of 
preference inequalities necessary to produce the entire preference ma­
trix, the following steps may be taken: 
1. When the preferences on proposals are separable, a member 
prefers passage (P > D) or defeat (D > P) on each proposal regardless 
of the outcome of other proposals, such that 
A(2), . . . , A(M) 
P or D, P or D, . . . , P or D 
Thus the number of Pass/Defeat preferences equals M. 
2. Assuming strict transitivity, a member ranks the proposals ac­
cording to their saliency, such that 
A(\) > A(2) > A(3) > . . . > A{M) 
Thus there are M — 1 necessary preference statements related to saliency. 
3. The same number of preference statements are needed to produce 
A(l) > [A(2) and A(3) . .  . and A(M)], A(2) > [A(2) . . . 
andA(M)], A(3) > . . . > A(M). 
which may be reduced to 
A(\) > [A(2) > [A(3) > . . . > A(M)] . . . ] 
For example, the above formulation solves for the preference matrix in 
CASE I illustrated earlier. For notational convenience, let the proposals 
be designated as A, B, C, and D, where 
A> B>C> D

and A > (B > (C> D))

4. When the number of preference statements due to saliency is 
added to the number of Pass/Defeat preferences, the preference com­
plexity for one member is 
M + (M - 1) = 2M - 1 
5. When there are N members, each having separable preferences 
of minimum complexity, 
Cmin = N(2M - 1) 
 141 Representation and the Reduction of Complexity
Appendix 9.2 
The assumptions made for the example in the text allow the efficient 
calculation of partial derivatives according to standard minimization 
procedures. That is, it was possible to minimize "preference complex­
ity," as explicitly defined, with respect to particular variables such as 
the number of committees. If these simplifying assumptions are not 
made for the purpose of examining the relationship between the number 
of committees and the number of bills when complexity is minimized, it 
will be necessary to work with the calculation formulas presented below. 
I.	 FULL MEMBERSHIP CONSIDERATION ONLY 
Separable Preferences N(2M - 1) 
Inseparable Preferences N(2M — 1) 
II.	 ASSIGNMENT TO COMMITTEES, FULL

MEMBERSHIP REVIEW OF COMMITTEE

APPROVED BILLS ONLY

Separable Preferences N(2P — 1)

Inseparable Preferences N(2P — 1) 
in Committee Only s 
+ £/!,-(2"'- 1) 
III.	 ASSIGNMENT TO SUBCOMMITTEES, 
COMMITTEE REVIEW OF SUBCOMMITTEE 
APPROVED BILLS ONLY, FULL MEMBERSHIP 
REVIEW OF COMMITTEE APPROVED BILLS 
ONLY 
Separable Preferences N(2P — 1) 
Inseparable Preferences N(2P - 1)

in Subcommittee Only
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KEY: N = Number of Members, M — Number of 
Proposals 
P = Number of Proposals reported out of 
Committees 
n, = Number of members in Committee i 
mi = Number of proposals in Committee i 
Pi = Number of proposals reported out of 
subcommittees in a committee / 
n\ — Number of members in Subcommittee / 
ml — Number of proposals in Subcommittee i 
s = Number of committees in Chamber 
b = Number of subcommittees in Committee / 
10

The Complex Committee 
Game 
Within the context of constitutional sanctions in the United States, the 
standing committees of the various legislatures have evolved along simi­
lar patterns. As the volume of demand for action in the form of legis­
lative proposals has increased, responsibility for processing legislation 
has devolved upon the committees and their subcommittees. The elected 
party leaders and the chief executive no doubt have a major influence 
over what items are placed at the top of the agenda, but, with rare ex­
ception, such items must undergo the scrutiny of the committees. To 
counterbalance the weight of the leadership, committee chairs and rank-
and-file legislators have agendas of their own. In addition, the sources 
of demand for change are widespread, found among countless national, 
state, and local interest group leaders as well as among the legislators 
themselves. 
Evidence amassed for both Congress (Westefield, 1974; Shepsle, 
1978; Ray and Smith, 1984) and the states would suggest that, typically, 
in order to meet in part this extraordinary demand, the legislative 
leadership begins the legislative session by practicing accommodation 
in making committee assignments, including enlarging committees for 
which there is a surplus of requests for membership. Committee chair­
manships are also a potential source of contention. Such positions are in 
scarce supply in Congress, but the problem is solved there by having a 
multitude of subcommittee chairmanships. In the states, where seniority 
is much less a factor, legislative leaders are more likely to use political 
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preferences and leverage in making chair appointments. State legislative 
party leaders frequently have more freedom, however, to create new 
committees to accommodate members' ambitions. 
The historical pattern over thirty years (1950-1984) has shown a 
decline in the number of committees in almost all legislative chambers 
in the states. The trend lines vary considerably, usually illustrating sev­
eral increases and decreases in the number of committees, and some­
times characterized by a single major reduction. Reorganizations into 
fewer but larger committees in state legislative chambers has no doubt 
helped spawn the use of subcommittees. And likewise, the prospect of 
subcommittee use may offer sufficient reason to reduce the number of 
standing committees. 
Why are legislative leaders so accommodating in the committee as­
signment process? A common observation is that they are simply in a 
weak position, for example, relative to the party leaders in parliamen­
tary bodies. The reelection of a legislator in the U.S. depends much less 
on support of the party leadership than in most countries with parlia­
mentary systems. A second reason, of equal or greater significance, is 
that legislators are not playing a zero-sum game. The leaders, for ex­
ample, can have their way on a number of important legislative matters, 
yet not find it necessary to prevent other members from deriving bene­
fits also. Such cooperation can be encouraged by doling out as many 
favors as possible in the committee assignment process. 
Leadership accommodation solutions to these committee preference 
"puzzles" do not necessarily bring about solutions to policy prefer­
ence puzzles; however, distributive policies, as defined in Lowi (1964), 
allow members to "pork barrel" for their districts in omnibus legis­
lation (Ferejohn, 1974). Leaders and followers alike incorporate their 
district projects into major budget or appropriation approvals. Such 
projects are believed to bring in support in future elections. In this re­
gard, several scholars have noted the norm of "universalism" (Polsby, 
1968; May hew, 1974; Weingast, 1979) with respect to Congress. Uni­
versalism refers in this context to the unopposed inclusion of legislators' 
projects in an omnibus bill produced by a committee. Weingast is able 
to show logically why such an approach (called the Universal Legis­
lative Game) makes sense, for example, when compared to situations in 
which minimal winning coalitions are sought (called the Distributive 
Legislative Game). 
Most governors in the U.S. have the item veto. This is an extraordi­
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nary tool in the hands of a single actor and can severely restrict a legis­
lator's success in obtaining projects for the district. An uncooperative 
governor may be able to wreck the "universal legislative game" by se­
lectively vetoing the projects of legislators. The President of the United 
States does not have the item veto and will have great difficulty undoing 
an omnibus package. President Carter learned this lesson the hard way 
at the beginning of his term when he opposed public works legislation to 
build dams. Many of the projects were at best marginal on a benefit-cost 
basis. Carter had to veto either everyone's dam or no dam at all. 
So how can most state legislators respond to their dilemma? Not 
only are governors blessed with the item veto, but also the states have 
severe budget-balancing restrictions. Deficit financing is not open-
ended. Estimated revenues act as a cap on appropriations, and in many 
states the governor has the power to withhold funds from expenditure 
categories if the legislature was too optimistic. The legislators have no 
choice but to "take it one step at a t ime." 
To the individual legislator with an agenda, the first major hurdle is 
the standing committee or its subcommittee. The legislator increases the 
chances of bill sponsorship success if: 
1.	 He or she is a member of the committees (or subcommittees) to 
which personal agenda items are assigned, and 
2.	 personal agenda items in fact do come up for committee-
subcommittee consideration. 
Organizational efficiency is an important matter, especially to those 
members without the access or influence to have their items positioned 
early in the committee agendas. 
The second major hurdle occurs on the floor of the chamber (or 
possibly in the party caucus). If there is "reciprocity" among commit­
tees, action on the floor (or in caucus) is less likely to be conflictual and 
may appear to be little more than a routine processing of committee de­
cisions. Floor or caucus decision making is further simplified if issues 
involving inseparable preferences have been taken up and settled at the 
standing committee or subcommittee level. Legislation surviving the 
standing committees and floor action may be subjected to conference 
committee action and gubernatorial action as well. Table 4.1 illustrates 
that the second chamber usually approves bills, with or without amend­
ment, sent over by the first chamber (Median > 70%). 
In sum, to maximize benefits, it is in the individual interest of most 
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legislators to maximize chances for approval of their personal agendas. 
The greater the success in standing committees and the chamber of ori­
gin, the greater the success in the enactment of legislation (chapter 2). It 
is in the interest of legislators to act out a game scenario that produces 
high success at early stages in the process. 
Scenario for Success 
An important part of the game is spawned by leadership accommoda­
tion in committee assignments. As depicted in Figure 10.1, accom­
modation allows members to sort themselves out according to "saliency 
of preference." In other words, members will ask to serve on commit­
tees dealing with issues most important to them, the same committees 
LEADERSHIP ACCOMMODATION

OF COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENTS

MEMBERSHIP SORTING BY

SALIENCY OF PREFERENCE

RECIPROCITY SPONSORSHIP 
AMONG COMMITTEES SUCCESS IN COMMITTEES 
SPONSORSHIP SUCCESS

IN CHAMBER

Fig. 10.1 Scenario for Sponsorship Success 
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through which they are likely to sponsor legislation. Because they serve 
on the committee they will have greater success in gaining committee 
approval. Committee approval makes it more likely that legislators will 
want reciprocity among committees, especially if they are on the com­
mittees dealing with issues most important to them. Reciprocity and 
committee approval will increase sponsorship success at the cham­
ber level. 
This scenario for sponsorship success may be seen as a conditional 
behavioral solution to the legislative policy making game. The same 
fundamental process could apply to a committee and its subcommittees 
(In Figure 10.1 simply insert "subcommittee" for committee and "com­
mittee" for chamber). A number of other factors, however, can decrease 
the effectiveness with which the game can be played. 
Counterbalancing Inefficiencies 
Committee assignment accommodation also leads to differentiation in 
committee size. To the extent that this leads to enlarging the more popu­
lar committees without reducing the size of other committees, legis­
lators will receive an increased number of committee assignments. At 
the same time, when the leadership wishes to accommodate requests for 
committee chairmanships, one way to do it is to increase the number 
of committees. Again, such a change will tend to lead to an increased 
number of committee assignments. 
An increase in the number of committee assignments may have 
little impact if the committees do not meet or consider legislation, but in 
the national survey of state legislators, complaint levels (by chamber) 
regarding "too many committee assignments" do correlate with the 
mean number of committee assignments (r = .60, N = 99). In order to 
illustrate this relationship, a scatterplot was examined and it was deter­
mined that a 20 percent complaint level in a chamber seemed to be a 
threshold. Using this criterion, data in Table 10.1 reveal that there is 
little difference in the complaint rate when three or fewer committee as­
signments per person are made. The proportion of chambers reaching 
the 20 percent complaint threshold, however, accelerates as the number 
of committee assignments increases. 
Further examination of legislator responses reveals in fact that there 
are three different kinds of complaints that covary across the ninety-nine 
state legislative chambers: 
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1. Too many committee assignments (ASSIGN) 
2. Scheduling and attendance problems (SCHED) 
3. Committees dominated by the chairs (CHAIRDOM) 
where (r values): 
ASSIGN 
While data conditions do not warrant a formal path analysis of the 
above relationships, the results suggest that the number of committee 
assignments may be a key underlying factor in producing lower passage 
rates—mainly because too many assignments lead to scheduling prob­
lems and chair domination of committees. Leadership accommodation 
of preferences produces also a counter-scenario, as illustrated in Fig­
ure 10.2. Too much accommodation can lead to too many committee 
assignments, which then in turn can lead to scheduling problems and 
chair domination of committees. These latter two factors appear to have 
an adverse effect upon the bill passage rate, as shown in chapter 4 
(Table 4.5). 
Equilibrium 
The above analysis implies that accommodation of committee assign­
ment and chairmanship preferences can be carried too far. Increased ac­
commodation will increase sponsorship success unless it leads also to 
Table 10.1 Relationship between Mean Number of Committee 
Assignments and "Too Many Committee Assignments" 
Complaint 
Mean Number of Committee Assignments 
2 or less 2+ to 3 3+ to 4 4+ to 5 5+ or more 
Above 20% 2 (10%) 4 (12%) 8 (31%) 7 (54%) 6 (100%) 
Complain 
20% or Less 19 (90%) 29 (88%) 18 (69%) 6 (46%)

Complain

21 33 26 13 
 0 
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Fig. 10.2 Counter-Scenario to Sponsorship Success 
too many committee assignments. The search for the optimal set of ac­
commodation moves can be seen as an equilibrium process. The system 
reaches marginal equilibrium when any change in accommodation 
(more or less) leads to a decrease in sponsorship success. A number of 
factors affect the equilibrium, including the amount of legislation of­
fered (which has increased dramatically in the last thirty years), the in­
flux of new members every two years, and changes in preferences of 
returning members. 
Changes in the environment and the distribution of legislation to 
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various subject areas also encourages the creation of additional commit­
tees or changes in the committee structure. For example, from the early 
1960s to the 1970s a large number of states created committees on en­
ergy and environment. These new committees may or may not subsume 
the subjects of older committees. In the 1980 Texas house, for instance, 
there were committees on energy resources, environmental affairs, and 
natural resources as well as committees on agriculture and livestock, 
and transportation. In the California senate there were standing commit­
tees on agriculture and water resources, energy and public utilities, and 
natural resources and wildlife, while in the house there were committees 
on resource, land use and energy with a standing subcommittee on en­
ergy, a committee on transportation with a standing subcommittee on 
air quality, a standing ways and means subcommittee on resources and 
transportation, and a committee on water, parks and wildlife. 
In spite of apparent difficulties in sorting out the issues, especially 
in new areas of concentration, legislators are able to find ways of dele­
gating issue responsibility to reduce decision-making complexity. A 
more detailed examination of bill assignments, as was undertaken for 
Indiana (chapter 2), will show normally that highly related legislation 
will go to the same committee. 
It is clear from the above analysis that the chamber leadership ap­
proach to committee and chair appointments is the key to the way in 
which the committee game of legislating is played out. The leadership, 
intentionally or unintentionally, can "over-accommodate." From the 
equation: 
# of Committee = (# of Committees)(Mean Size of 
Assignments Committees) 
the impact of accommodation is clear. Intentional and excessive in­
creases in the number of committee assignments could be seen as play­
ing into the hands of the committee chairs and chamber leadership. 
Thus the equilibrium state described above may not be appealing to par­
ticular leadership coalitions. 
Externalities 
The incentive for efficient processing of legislation is strengthened by 
the external or "whole life" circumstances that most legislators face. In 
earlier chapters (5 and 6) we saw how opportunity costs can influence 
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legislator preferences for shorter legislative sessions. Legislators with 
substantial opportunity costs, owing to private occupation or family 
needs, are likely to see diminishing marginal returns with each addi­
tional day of legislative work required. Legislators who are "profes­
sionals," however, prefer to be full-time legislators and may very well 
support longer sessions for additional pay at the same rate. While these 
concerns are important, they are intermediate to long-term in nature. In 
the short-term (i.e., one legislative session or term), the self-interests of 
legislators may not be so disparate. Salaries for the session normally are 
fixed or limited and very few legislators are likely to benefit by per diem 
allowances over and above the minimum amount of time it takes to pro­
cess the agenda. Thus as a whole, legislators are likely to benefit more 
in the short run by a system that processes legislation quickly and with­
out the call for special sessions and overtime. 
To the legislator the value of the legislative game is a function of 
the costs of playing the game and the net benefits derived from it. As we 
saw in chapter 5, the number of workdays required in the capital, and 
the success rate on legislation, are significant indicators of these costs 
and benefits, respectively. It is in the achievement of benefits that legis­
lators have developed a number of interesting ways to proceed. The pre­
vious chapters have given evidence of both formal and informal adapta­
tion in the behavior patterns of legislators. 
Taking a longer view of state legislative histories, it would ap­
pear that five basic trends have occurred over approximately the last 
thirty years: 
1. An increase in the amount of legislation. 
2. An increase in the length or frequency of legislative sessions. 
3. An increase in the amount of staffing. 
4. A decrease in the number of standing committees. 
5. An increase in the use of subcommittees. 
These trends characterize an overwhelming proportion of states. At 
least three plausible explanations for these changes (mainly trends 2-5) 
can be put forward: 
1. The need to exercise control over the executive. 
2. An emulation of Congress and its attributes. 
3. The need to process increasing amounts of legislation. 
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It seems reasonable to speculate that many of these changes have come 
about in response to growth in the executive and the need to coordinate 
legislative policy and control with executive activities. As the executive 
expands, it devotes increasing human resources to the formulation of 
policies requiring legislative approval. If the legislature is to legislate it 
must maintain control by devoting increasing amounts of time to the 
job, by hiring staff specialists, and by coordinating its organizational 
structure with the executive department's organization. No doubt many 
state legislatures received impetus from the reform movement of the 
1960s, highlighted by the efforts of the Citizens Conference on State 
Legislatures in The Sometimes Governments (1971). It so happens that a 
great many of the suggestions of the Conference are taken directly from 
Congressional practices. And one cannot help noticing the similarity of 
these trends to the evolution of Congress. 
Even though it is possible to attribute the legislative changes to in­
ducements relating to legislative control of the executive, and to the 
cloning of Congressional procedure, it is nevertheless the case that 
the above trends are all consistent with the need to increase the ability 
of the legislative chamber to process greater amounts of legislation. 
Thus one may argue that individual legislator demands are a strong con­
tributing factor to the internal dynamics that result in the above trends. 
Appendix:

Survey Information

Several surveys were administered to obtain the information necessary for this 
work. All of the surveys were based upon the 1981 sessions. A copy of the main 
survey, the four page questionnaire sent to legislators in every state chamber, is 
included at the end of this appendix. 
The Fifty-State Legislator Survey 
The responses represent a return of 43 percent. Questionnaires were sent to 
sixty-six members of every house and thirty-three members of every senate (ex­
cept when fewer members served in such chambers). Within each chamber the 
members were randomly selected. The original mailouts were made upon the 
close of legislative sessions, which meant that they were staggered according to 
length of session. Nonrespondents were sent two followup questionnaires. The 
primary purpose of the study was to conduct an analysis at the chamber level, 
and to that end our minimum number of responses for any chamber is seven. 
The mean exceeds twenty-one. The respondents make up 27 percent of all state 
legislators. 
In total figures, house respondents represent 69 percent of the returns, 
compared to 74 percent of all legislators (Nebraska excluded). The Democrat-
Republican ratio among respondents is 53-47. Majority party respondents 
make up about 25 percent of all majority party members. 
The Legislative Workday and Bill Passage Surveys 
Two non-opinion surveys were necessary to obtain vital information about each 
legislative chamber. In the first case, legislative service personnel were sent a 
questionnaire containing a monthly breakdown asking them to indicate the days 
of each week the legislators actually met within each month. While human error 
cannot be avoided entirely, the responses were detailed and of high quality, in­
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dicating the respondent had consulted official records. An expensive alternative 
method would require consulting each legislative journal and counting the days 
of official business recorded. 
The second survey required determining the number of bills introduced and 
passed in the first and second chambers of each legislature. In many states we 
were sent official documents from which the information could be extracted 
(with varying degrees of difficulty). In other states, qualified personnel filled out 
a form we had sent along with the request. Our sources were often state li­
brarians or the immediate professional service staff of the legislature. Comple­
tion of this survey required much telephoning and follow-up. 
The Committee Membership Survey 
This survey was the easiest to administer, since we were asking for nothing 
more than the committee membership roster for the year in question. We re­
ceived complete committee lists for all chambers and were able to use these lists 
to verify questionnaire data as well as to determine committee size and the num­
ber of committees employed. For most states these lists do not include subcom­
mittee assignments. 
The Indiana-Missouri Surveys 
For the 1981 sessions of the Indiana and Missouri legislatures, the official jour­
nal indexes were utilized to obtain individual bill sponsorship and success data. 
Members who retired voluntarily from the legislature after the 1981-82 term 
were sent a questionnaire to elicit their reasons for doing so. Of the sixty-three 
who voluntarily retired, forty-three responded satisfactorily. In Indiana 36 per­
cent of the retirees were minority party members, compared to 34 percent for 
the entire legislature. In Missouri 42 percent were minority party retirees, com­
pared to 32 percent minority party membership in the full body. There was 
no substantial evidence that minority party members have a greater tendency 
to retire. 
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Mailing Code

STATE LEGISLATIVE SURVEY 
1.	 How many years have you served in the legislature? Present chamber?

House or Senate

Party affiliation? Date of birth (year)?

Please indicate if during the most recent session you held any of the following positions:

( ) Committee Chair or Ranking Member of Committee

( ) Speaker, Majority or Minority Leader, or party whip

( ) Member of Policy Committee (skip if this is not a leadership committee)

( ) Subcommittee Chair ( ) Other

Have you held any of the above positions in prior sessions? ( ) yes ( ) no

2.	 In your legislature, where would you say the most significant decisions are made? Please

use numbers 1, 2, and 3 to order your top three choices, where "1" is your first choice.

( ) Party Caucus ( ) Regular Committee Meetings ( ) In Governor's Office

( ) In Policy Committee ( ) Prelegislative Session ( ) In Subcommittees

( ) On the Floor ( ) Office of Presiding Offi- ( ) Other

cers or Majority Leaders

3.	 From your experience in committee work, what would you regard as the ideal committee size

(# of members) for the following types of committees?

a typical standing committee of your chamber,

a typical subcommittee (if appropriate to your chamber)

Which of the following rules best describes the committee voting procedures in your chamber?

( ) In order to report a bill out favorably, voting support of only a majority of

those present must be obtained (if quorum e x i s t s ) .

( ) In order to report a bill out favorably, voting support of a majority of the ful 1

committee membership must be obtained.

If you have a committee quorum rule, what is it?	 __^______

4.	 Some state legislatures now use subcommittees frequently, what is the status of this

practice in your chamber? (please check)

( ) Subcommittees are an official part of my chamber rules and at least some committees

are required to use them.

( ) Subcommittees are used on a regular basis in may committees, but it is really up to

the chairman of the comnittee to decide in each session whether they will be used.

( ) Subcommittees are not very common but they tend to be used in an informal manner in

some committees.

( ) To my knowledge subcommittees have not been used.

5.	 Where would you say partisanship is most evident in your chamber? (please check one)

( ) During floor proceedings ( ) During committee proceedings

( ) During subcommittee proceedings ( ) Not evident in mv chamber
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6.	 During the most recent session, how many regular committee assignments did you receive?

How many of these committees actually handled legislation?

How many subcommittee assignments did you receive?

How pleased have you been with your committee/subcommittee assignments?

( ) Pleased ( ) Neither pleased nor displeased ( ) Displeased

Please check if any of the following items characterize your chamber committee system:

( ) Most members receive too many committee assignments.

( ) Many committees are too large to work effectively.

( ) For at least some committees too many proposals are received.

( ) For many members the schedule of meetings (committee/subcommittee) creates

attendance problems.

7.	 What is the nature of committee staffing in your chamber? (please check)

( ) The only staff help committees get is through a central office and generally staff

members do not attend the committee meetings.

( ) Only important committees are assigned specific staff.

( ) Most or all committees have at least one staff member assigned.

( ) Other

If your committees do receive staff help, which of the following functions do the staff

members perform?

( ) Clerical	 ( ) Technical or scientific

( ) General information input ( ) Policy-level advice

8.	 Do any of the following statements characterize the way committees are managed in your

chamber? (please check)

( ) A committee chairman usually has almost full control over the committee agenda.

( ) Most committees are dominated by the chairman.

( ) Important committees rely on subcommittee reports.

9.	 In a typical legislative day, how many hours do you spend on committee work (including meet­

ings, preparation, information discussion, subcommittee assignments, etc.)?

How many hours do you spend on other work?

Of those hours you spend on committee/subcommittee work, how would you estimate they are

allocated among the following activities?

# of Hours

Obtaining information about proposals in order to understand their content.

Finding out how other committee members feel about the issues (formal and informal

di scussions ).

Hammering out workable compromises with members of the committee(s).

P.eviewing the conduct of administrative agencies.

Other
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10.	 We would now like to- turn to your evaluation of specific committees on which you served.

Could you name two regular committees on which you served during the most recent session

of your legislature? (Please indicate committees that handle legislation. If you served

on only one committee of this type, we would appreciate your response regarding it.)

Which of the following items help describe the committee's proceedings during the most

recent session? (please check)

Committee A Committee B

( ) ( ) Held public hearings

( ) ( ) Appointed subcommittees

( ) { ) Amended bills in committee

( ) ( ) Reviewed conduct of administrative agencies

( ) ( ) Amendments were usually made by a voice vote or show of "lands

rather than a roll call vote

( ) ( ) Bills were usually reported out by a voice vote or show of

hands rather than a roll call vote

It would be very helpful if you could provide the following information for the above two

committees:

Number of staff members assigned?	 A

Number of meetings per week during last two months of session (estimate)? A

If the committee had regular working subcommittees, how many did it have? A

Please check if you were chair of either committee	 A

About how many bills did the committee receive this most recent session? A

Which of the two committees (A or B ) :  _ A B

a.	 Has required more of your time ( ) ( )

b.	 Has seemed more efficient? ( ) ( )

c.	 Has had a more complex subject matter ( ) ( )

d.	 Has dealt with more important policies? ( ) ( )

e.	 Has dealt with issues that cause more ( ) ( )

disagreement?

How many members were typically present at a committee meeting? . . . . A

12.	 How satisfied were you with those bills that were passed or recommended favorably b." the

following units of your legislature?

Degree of Satisfaction

very very not ap­
high high medium low low plicable 
Committee A ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
Committee B ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 
In general , my committees 
(if you have more than 2) 
The other committees of the chamber 
My party caucus 
My chamber as a whole 
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13. How satisfied were you with the decisions not to consider, recommend unfavorably, or

defeat bills by the following units?

Degree of Satisfaction

very very not ap­

high high medium low low plicable

Committee A	 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )

Committee B	 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ]

In general, my committees	 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ]

(if you have more than 2)

The other committees of the chamber . . . ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ]

My party caucus 
My chamber as a whole 
Apart from the bills, how satisfied were you with the way business was conducted by the

following units during the most recent session?

Degree of Satisfaction

very very not ap­

high high medium low low plicable

Committee A

Committee B

In general, my committees

(if you have more than 2)

The other committees of the chamber

My party caucus 
My chamber as a whole

Please indicate if any of the following statements would apply to your experience with

Committees A and B during the most recent session:

Committee A Committee B

Members of the committee share a similar perspective to

a greater degree than do members of my chamber as a whole. ( ) ( )

There is often an excessive amount of time consuming

debate and discussion before the committee can reach a ( ) ( )

decision on important issues.

Important committee decisions are often held up because ( ) ( )

individual legislators are unwilling to compromise.

I usually have a good idea what position tr.y fellow com­

mittee members will take on an issue before I discuss ( ) ( )

it with them.

The committee chairperson usually keeps unnecessary

debate and discussion to a minimum. ( ) ( )

By the time we understand each others' positions on an

issue, there is usually an obvius compromise solution ( ) ( )

on which committee members can agree.

Most of the debate and discussion is left to sjbcom- , > , >

mittees where most major differences are ironed out. ' '
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committees, 13-14; overlapping of,

2; of standing committees, 32-36

Labor, division of, 4, 99-100
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islation, 34; and sponsorship success,

147; as stabilization norm, 21-22,

22n; vote-favors as, 17

Reelection, 6, 83, 91-92

Representation through use of open-

input system, 122-24

Representatives, U.S. House of, 3-6
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But inefficiencies in organization represent 
decentralized agenda setting's underlying cost. 
Such inefficiencies are related to committee 
structure and procedure, including the number 
of committee assignments and the extent to 
which the preferences of legislators are taken 
into account in the design of committee juris­
dictions. Committee tasks range from minor 
housekeeping functions to such activities as 
raising campaign funds, resolving chamber dif­
ferences, and meeting with the chief executive, 
all of which contribute to the overall cost of 
legislative service—in essence, how many 
days each year legislators must spend in the 
state capital. The Legislative Committee Game 
provides the first comparative study of state 
legislatures and their internal functioning. 
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